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Every criminal offence contains within it a diagnosis of the ‘problem’ to be solved by that 
offence: its ‘problem representation’. This representation is not the correct definition of the 
proscribed conduct and what is wrong with it, but one of many possible interpretations. 
Nevertheless, the problem representation given credence informs the language of an offence, 
and affects its application. Representations of the nature of criminal acts, and what is wrong 
with them, inform the message we send to the community about offenders and their 
behaviour, and the experiences and suffering of victims. It is therefore vital to interrogate 
our laws to uncover their implicit problem representations, and to challenge those 
representations which produce undesirable outcomes.  
This thesis considers the various problem representations of Intimate Partner Abuse (IPA) 
that are implicit in the language of the criminal law in the UK and Australia, as well as 
competing representations. It aims to find a representation of IPA which, when vested in a 
criminal offence, appropriately conveys the experiences and circumstances of victims.  
Using Carol Bacchi’s ‘What’s the Problem Represented to be?’ methodology, I consider 
how IPA has been described, defined, and discussed by academics and activists, criminal 
law reformers, and criminal justice officials (such as police, prosecutors and judges) in the 
UK and Australia. I show how these people have used their positions of influence to shape 
the construction of criminal law solutions to IPA. I also consider how the language of 
criminal offences shapes public perceptions of IPA, its perpetrators and victims. In 
particular, I consider the effect of highlighting or obscuring the gender of victims and 
perpetrators on how the experience of IPA is portrayed. Finally, I propose an alternative 
representation of IPA, and consider whether a specific offence of IPA informed by this 
representation could produce better outcomes for victims. This alternative represents IPA as 
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an abuser’s repeated or continuous exploitation of the victim’s vulnerability to restrict their 
freedom of action. 
For a crime as tormenting and destructive as IPA, it is all the more important to be conscious 
of the impact of problem representations on any solutions offered by the criminal law. It is 
vital to examine and challenge the problem representations which lodge in criminal offences 
of IPA, because the way the problem is represented has serious consequences for victims.  
vi 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In 1991, revered criminal law scholar Glanville Williams wrote The Problem of Domestic 
Rape in response to the UK Law Commission’s working paper on rape within marriage.1 
Despite the impression given by the title, Williams did not view marital rape as a problematic 
social issue. Women, he believed, could not find rape by their husbands ‘nearly so traumatic’ 
as that committed by a stranger.2 He deplored the provisional conclusion of the Law 
Commission (influenced as Williams saw it by feminist pressure-groups, whom he 
somewhat maliciously termed ‘dragons’) that the marital rape immunity should be 
abolished.3 He feared that innocent men would suffer from the stigma of being cast as 
criminals for having sex with women who had implicitly acquiesced when they walked down 
the aisle. Williams accepted that through marriage, women do not give ‘permanent and 
unqualified consent’ to sex, and that a man who assaults his wife in the process of forced 
coition ought to be punished for that assault.4 But that a man might be stigmatised for raping 
his wife, and regarded no differently from a man who lurks in the shadows to ensnare 
unsuspecting women, was to Williams a fearful prospect.  
So too was the idea of giving women power to destroy their husbands’ lives. Women could 
be a capricious lot in Williams’ eyes. Elsewhere, he encouraged instructing juries to distrust 
female rape victims, saying that these ‘cases are particularly subject to the danger of 
deliberately false charges, resulting from sexual neurosis, phantasy, jealousy, spite or simply 
a girl’s refusal to admit that she consented to an act of which she is now ashamed’.5 He 
worried that a woman who refused her husband’s advances following ‘a tiff’ might resort to 
the criminal law in response to his forcing himself upon her, only to later be reconciled with 
                                                 
1 Glanville Williams, ‘The Problem of Domestic Rape’ (1991) 141(6491) New Law Journal 205; Law 
Commission, Rape Within Marriage, Working Paper No 116 (1990). 
2 Williams, above n 1, 206. 
3 Ibid 205; Law Commission, above n 1, 3 [1.6]. 
4 Williams, above n 1, 205. 
5 Glanville Williams, ‘Corroboration – Sexual Cases’ [1962] Criminal Law Review 662, 159. 
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him.6 Women’s changeable nature made them, in his opinion, unequal to the privilege of 
using the criminal law. Williams believed that a ‘charge of rape is too powerful (and even 
self-destructive) a weapon to put in the wife’s hands’.7 
Williams’ article provoked understandable outcry from the ‘dragons’.8 Commentators 
deplored Williams’ assumption that ‘real’ rape is committed by a stranger, and questioned 
how a man had any right to speculate about women’s experience of sexual assault.9 As 
Zedner noted, perpetrators of rape are frequently known to their victim, and the existence of 
a prior relationship between the victim and offender ‘does not mitigate, and may in fact 
exacerbate, the severity of the trauma caused, not least because rape in such circumstances 
constitutes a betrayal of trust’.10 Naffine suggested that Williams’ argument rested on a false 
assumption that inequality in marriage no longer existed – an assumption she noted obscures 
‘the social conditions that shape women’s consent’.11 Rejecting Williams’ suggestion that 
rape within marriage constitutes a ‘trivial misdemeanour’ resulting from a quarrel, 
commentators instead argued that such conduct is ‘commonly a manifestation of a long-term 
abusive, often violent relationship’.12  
Nevertheless, Williams’ views about ‘real’ rape were influential, especially among certain 
members of the judiciary.13 In R v M, for example, Lord Taylor expressed the notion that: 
                                                 
6 Williams, above n 1, 206. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Melisa J. Anderson, ‘Lawful Wife, Unlawful Sex – Examining the Effect of the Criminalization of Marital 
Rape in England and the Republic of Ireland’ (1998) 27(1) Georgia Journal of International & Comparative 
Law 139, 159.  
9 See, eg, Claire Glasman, ‘Women judge the courts’ (1991) 141(6496) New Law Journal 395; Margaret 
Anderson, ‘Domestic rape’ (1991) 141(6495) New Law Journal 336.  
10 Lucia Zedner, ‘Regulating Sexual Offences within the Home’ in Ian Loveland (ed), Frontiers of Criminality 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) 173, 191.  
11 Ngaire Naffine, ‘Possession: Erotic Love in the Law of Rape’ (1994) 57(1) Modern Law Review 10, 22, 
quoting Vanessa Laird, ‘Reflections on R v R’ (1992) 55(3) Modern Law Review 386, 392.  
12 Zedner, above n 10, 191; Joanna Bourke, Rape: A History from 1860 to the Present Day (Virago, 2007) 320.  
13 Theresa Fus, ‘Criminalizing Marital Rape: A Comparison of Judicial and Legislative Approaches’ (2006) 
39(2) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 481, 494. 
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there is a distinction between a husband who is estranged from his wife and is parted from 
her and returns to the house as an intruder … and a case where, as here, the husband is 
still living in the same house and, indeed, with consent occupying the same bed as his 
wife. We do not consider that this class of case is as grave as the former class.14 
This was not a universal attitude amongst the UK judiciary. A series of cases in the early 
1990s concluded that the exemption was an outdated legal fiction.15 Nevertheless, even after 
the exemption was abolished in 1994,16 some members of the judiciary continued to embrace 
Williams’ attitudes. Rumney’s analysis of rape sentencing in the UK Court of Appeal 
between 1986 and 1997 shows that, even after the exemption was abolished, men convicted 
of raping their wives continued to receive lower sentences than those who committed 
stranger rape.17 Lord Justice Lawton, who chaired the Criminal Law Revision Committee 
during its 1980s revision of sexual offences,18 insisted at the time that marital rape ought not 
to be criminalised due to the inevitable ‘floods of women’ who would approach police for 
assistance, thus doing irreparable damage to multitudes of marital relationships.19 Five years 
after the exemption was abolished, Lord Justice Lawton maintained his views, despite the 
fact that only 12 cases of alleged marital rape had been brought in the UK.20  
That Williams’ attitudes prevailed for so long, and were so influential, is attributable to his 
position as a leading criminal legal theorist and law reformer.21 Williams was a widely 
respected criminal law teacher, and was viewed as the UK’s foremost legal scholar. His 
                                                 
14 (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 770, 772. 
15 R v R [1991] 1 All ER 747; R v R [1992] 1 AC 599, 611; R v C [1991] 1 All ER 755. See also R v J [1991] 
1 All ER 759, 768. 
16 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK) c 33, s 142. This Act clarified that rape can be committed 
by any man against any woman, regardless of the relationship between them. 
17 Philip N.S. Rumney, ‘When Rape Isn’t Rape: Court of Appeal Sentencing Practice in Cases of Marital and 
Relationship Rape’ (1999) 19(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 243, 258–60. 
18 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fifteenth Report: Sexual Offences, Cmnd 9213 (1984). 
19 Sue Lees, Ruling Passions: Sexual violence, reputation and the law (Open University Press, 1997) 119, 
citing Thames Television, ‘The Right to Rape’, World in Action, 25 September 1989 (Lord Justice Lawton). 
20 Lees, above n 19, 119. 
21 Zedner, above n 10, 191–2; Lord Herbert Edmund-Davies, ‘Foreword’ in P.R. Glazebrook (ed), Reshaping 
the Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of Glanville Williams (Stevens & Sons, 1978) vii. 
4 
position on the Criminal Law Revision Committee gave him a commanding voice among 
academics, practitioners and reformers.22 His wide influence over the criminal law explains 
how he was in a position to have his assumptions about how women experience rape so 
readily accepted. 
This thesis is not intended to uncover the right and wrong sides of the argument between 
Williams and his critics. Nor does it focus exclusively on marital rape. Rather, I use the 
example of Williams’ article to demonstrate my focus on problem representations. Williams’ 
article betrays his understanding of the problem of rape as the sexual exploitation of a woman 
of high moral virtue by an opportunistic and depraved stranger.23 This is a profoundly 
different representation of the problem to that held by feminist commentators – that it 
constitutes an encroachment on women’s right to sexual autonomy. 
The competition between various problem representations is the focus of this thesis. A 
problem representation that is given credence shapes the language and outcomes of our 
criminal laws. Language choice informs the message we send to the community about the 
behaviour of offenders, and the experiences of victims. An influential problem 
representation, such as Williams’ representation of marital rape, can become so ingrained in 
popular understanding that recognition of alternative representations, and reform of the law, 
is delayed or prevented. It is therefore vital to be aware of problem representations implicit 
within the criminal law, and challenge them when they produce undesirable outcomes.  
In this thesis, I consider the various problem representations of Intimate Partner Abuse (IPA) 
that are revealed in the language of the criminal law in the UK and Australia, as well as 
competing representations that are not present in the criminal law. Using Bacchi’s ‘What’s 
                                                 
22 Edmund-Davies, above n 21, vii. 
23 Williams, above n 1, 206. 
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the Problem Represented to be?’ (WPR) methodology,24 I consider how IPA has been 
defined, described, and discussed by academics, activists, criminal law reformers, and 
criminal justice officials (i.e. police, prosecutors and judges) in the UK and Australia.25 I 
show how these people have used their positions of influence to shape the construction of 
criminal law solutions to IPA. I also consider how the language of criminal offences shapes 
public perceptions of IPA, its perpetrators and victims. Finally, I propose an alternative 
representation of IPA, and consider whether a specific offence of IPA informed by this 
representation could produce better outcomes for victims. It is vital to examine and challenge 
problem representations implicit within criminal law solutions to IPA, because the way the 
problem is represented has serious consequences for victims. 
1.1. METHODOLOGY 
There is a multitude of social conditions that exist in society, some of which may be 
distressing or harmful for people who experience them. But the moment a social condition 
is identified as a problem, the person who identifies it as such puts an interpretation on the 
problem – both what causes it and what is concerning about it. This person shapes and 
constructs the problem. Others may challenge this interpretation, and locate the cause and 
concern of the condition elsewhere. However, once the condition has been given ‘problem’ 
status, we cannot analyse it without interpretation. The solutions we create in response to a 
problem will reflect our interpretation. 
This is the reality uncovered by Bacchi’s WPR approach to policy analysis. It is based on 
the assumption that the way we perceive an issue affects what we think should be done about 
it.26 Every criminal offence contains a diagnosis of the ‘problem’ to be solved by that 
                                                 
24 Carol Bacchi, Analysing Policy: What’s the problem represented to be? (Pearson, 2009) 2. 
25 References herein to ‘criminal justice officials’ refer to police, prosecutors and judges. 
26 Carol Bacchi, Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of Policy Problems (SAGE Publications, 1999) 
199. 
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offence, which Bacchi calls its ‘problem representation’.27 This problem representation is 
not the correct definition of the social condition, but one of many possible interpretations of 
it. Various interpretations will benefit or harm the parties affected by the social condition in 
different ways.28 In this thesis, I am primarily concerned with how the criminal law 
represents victims and their experience of IPA. It will therefore be necessary to identify, and 
analyse the effects of, implicit problem representations in criminal law responses to IPA. 
Bacchi argues that it is ill-advised to assess policy proposals without analysing their implicit 
representations since, if the ‘problem’ is diagnosed in a manner which has harmful effects, 
the solution is unlikely to be helpful.29 
Therefore, in this thesis, I adopt Bacchi’s WPR methodology to probe criminal offences in 
the UK and Australia dealing with IPA to uncover the effects of their implicit representations 
of the problem of IPA. The common law roots of these jurisdictions make their offences 
suitable for comparison. I do not intend to conduct a comprehensive analysis of all criminal 
offences associated with IPA in each jurisdiction.30 Rather, I will be selective in the material 
for analysis to compare the effects of various problem representations. I will refer to those 
reformers, practitioners and activists whose work was fundamental to the development of 
criminal law solutions to IPA in each country, and will uncover the impact of their 
assumptions and motivations on the representations of IPA ultimately bound up in the law. 
Close attention to problem representations in legal responses to IPA provides insight into 
the effects of certain framings.31  
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Bacchi, above n 24, 34. 
29 Bacchi, above n 26, 199. 
30 I primarily focus on English laws in the UK. 
31 Bacchi, above n 26, 179–80. 
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The ‘What’s the Problem Represented to be?’ approach 
Bacchi introduced the WPR method of policy analysis in her 1999 book Women, Policy and 
Politics: The Construction of Policy Problems.32 This political science approach is based on 
social and contextual constructionism – the study of historical and social factors allowing 
constructions of ‘real’ problems to be made, as well as those people who make claims about 
problems and have those claims heard.33 The constructionist approach acknowledges that 
social problems do not arise spontaneously, but are attributable to a combination of 
historical, institutional, cultural and political factors. The focus is therefore not on social 
problems as ‘objective conditions to be studied and corrected’,34 but ‘the processes of social 
problems claims-making’.35  
WPR is not used ‘to seek out the “real problem” in order to develop “appropriate” 
“solutions”’.36 Rather, it facilitates ‘critical interrogation’ of the implicit claims made in 
laws.37 It begins with ‘the premise that what one proposes to do about something reveals 
what one thinks is problematic’.38 Thus, each criminal offence contains within it a 
representation of the problematic nature of the proscribed conduct. This representation may 
highlight or obscure the interests of various parties who engage in, or are victims of, the 
proscribed conduct. The representation will also reveal the social vision that the law is 
intended to reflect and maintain.39 As Bacchi notes, we must consider ‘competing social 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid 55–7. 
34 Gale Miller and James A. Holstein, ‘Reconsidering Social Constructionism’ in James A. Holstein and Gale 
Miller (eds) Reconsidering Social Constructionism: Debates in Social Problems Theory (Aldine De Gruyter, 
1993) 5, 6. 
35 Bacchi, above n 26, 55. 
36 Carol Bacchi ‘Introducing the “What’s the Problem Represented to be?” approach’ in Angelique Bletsas and 
Chris Beasley (eds), Engaging with Carol Bacchi: Strategic Interventions and Exchanges (University of 
Adelaide Press, 2012) 21, 23.  
37 Ibid 21. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Bacchi, above n 26, 62. 
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visions and … discuss how particular problem representations … contribute to or undermine 
visions we support’.40  
This powerful analytical method has been applied in diverse fields.41 The emphasis on 
critically evaluating problem representations makes the approach well-suited to the analysis 
of criminal laws. To apply the WPR approach, one must examine laws to identify how the 
‘problem’ (e.g. of IPA) is represented, and then analyse this representation. Bacchi uses the 
following set of questions to guide her analysis:  
1. What’s the ‘problem’ … represented to be in a specific policy? 
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the ‘problem’? 
3. How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about? 
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? 
Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently? 
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’? 
6. How/where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced, disseminated and 
defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced?42 
These are not a rigid set of queries. Rather, they prompt consideration of the people who talk 
about the problem and the social context in which it is identified and discussed as a problem. 
To tease out an implicit representation (question 1), we can consider those who have played 
a role in the development of the law (e.g. researchers, activists and law reformers) and 
determine the effect of their assumptions on how the problem has been represented (question 
2). We can also consider the historical and social context within which the problem 
representation arose (question 3). Question 4 prompts scrutiny of the representation’s gaps 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 See, eg, Amber Bastian and John Coveney, ‘The responsibilisation of food security: What is the problem 
represented to be?’ (2013) 22(2) Health Sociology Review 162; Lisa Carson and Kathy Edwards, ‘Prostitution 
and Sex Trafficking: What Are the Problems Represented To Be? A Discursive Analysis of Law and Policy in 
Sweden and Victoria, Australia’ (2011) 30(1) Australian Feminist Law Journal 63. 
42 Bacchi, above n 24, 2. 
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and limitations, and permits consideration of alternative representations. Questions 5 and 6 
encourage assessment of the effects of the representation on the application of the law under 
scrutiny, and whether alternative representations would produce different results.  
It is not the purpose of this thesis to engage in debate purely on the success or failure of 
criminal law solutions to IPA. Rather, WPR is used to identify problem representations of 
IPA which have the potential to produce useful solutions. What counts as useful will 
invariably be coloured by the analyst’s ‘social vision’, as Bacchi calls it, which is informed 
by their ‘institutional and cultural’ location, and ‘position in discourse’.43 I elaborate my own 
social vision in chapter 2, following an examination of the various problematisations of IPA 
made by different influential scholars and activists. Put briefly, however, my intention is to 
identify a representation of IPA which better recognises the experiences of victims.  
In this abstract form, the WPR approach may be somewhat bewildering. To clarify the 
method, let us return to marital rape. To understand how it became a problem for the criminal 
law, it is useful to consider the social and historical context before it gained problem status. 
The UK Criminal Law Revision Committee’s 1984 report on sexual offences was one of the 
last official declarations that marital rape was not problematic.44 One of the Committee’s 
primary arguments echoed Williams’ opinion that forced sex in marriage cannot be nearly 
as traumatic as ‘real’ rape because the couple is likely to have had regular sexual 
intercourse.45 Another key factor was the anticipated detriment to the institutions of marriage 
and family.46 The Committee noted the frequency with which domestic violence victims 
withdrew charges against abusers, and suggested that police intervention in domestic 
disturbances only drove couples further apart. This, they supposed, would be the result of 
                                                 
43 Bacchi, above n 26, 62. 
44 Criminal Law Revision Committee, above n 18. 
45 Ibid 19–20 [2.64]. 
46 Ibid 20 [2.66]. 
10 
police intervention in cases of forced sex in marriage. The Committee was also concerned 
that intervention ‘would be detrimental to the interests of any children of the family’.47 
Marital rape was not considered a criminal problem, because to recognise it as such would 
invite interference in, and cause damage to, the family unit. As Bacchi explains, when we 
adopt a social vision that idealises the nuclear family, we will ignore harm to one member 
in order to maintain the whole.48 Thus, when one member of a family experiences violence 
at the hands of another, we are likely to adopt ‘strategies aimed at “restoring” family 
harmony’ rather than address violent behaviour.49 Thus, the Committee felt it best to prevent 
marital discord by retaining the marital rape immunity.  
For marital rape to be recognised as a criminal problem, it had to be perceived more seriously 
than the potential threat to family life posed by state intervention. In the 1992 case of R v R, 
in which the immunity was declared an outdated legal fiction, Lord Keith acknowledged that 
‘marriage is in modern times regarded as a partnership of equals, and no longer one in which 
the wife must be the subservient chattel of the husband’.50 He opined that ‘the time has now 
arrived when the law should declare that a rapist remains a rapist subject to the criminal law, 
irrespective of his relationship with his victim’.51 Lawyers and academics also increasingly 
began drawing links between domestic violence and marital rape – arguing that marital rape 
was symptomatic of domestic violence, rather than a distinct issue.52 Domestic violence, by 
this time, had been accepted amongst legal scholars as highly problematic, so drawing 
parallels between domestic violence and marital rape helped promote the latter to problem 
status. As Freeman, a family law expert, noted, ‘[t]here is nothing more domestic and 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 Bacchi, above n 26, 167. 
49 Ibid. 
50 [1992] 1 AC 599, 616. 
51 Ibid 611. 
52 See, eg, MDA Freeman, ‘“But If You Can’t Rape Your Wife, Who[m] Can You Rape?” The Marital Rape 
Exemption Re-examined’ (1981) 15(1) Family Law Quarterly 1. 
11 
 
nothing more violent than marital rape’.53 Thus, marital rape came to be represented in law 
as problematic. While the nuclear family remained a prominent social vision, judges, 
scholars, and eventually the UK Parliament, came to recognise that the safety and autonomy 
of individuals within the family unit ought to be protected in preference to maintaining the 
unit as a whole.  
Materials for analysis 
When criminal law theorists analyse offences, they tend to question how well those offences 
deal with the problematic behaviour they criminalise. Theorists rarely interrogate the 
construction of the problematic behaviour. They take the problem as a given. A criminal 
offence is viewed simply as a more or less successful attempt to deal with the problem, which 
itself precedes legal analysis. Therefore, the offence itself, and cases in which it is applied, 
are usually the main focus of analysis. This is not so for WPR.  
Certainly, criminal offences will provide material for analysis, though my focus will not be 
on whether they can be applied to successfully attain justice. Rather, my focus will be on the 
effects of their language and construction. Bacchi explains that the language used to frame 
a problem creates parameters within which the topic can be thought of and changes can be 
made.54 Consider the various discourses surrounding intimate partner abusers. If those who 
abuse their intimate partners are portrayed as mentally ill, medical treatment and counselling 
will be proposed as solutions. If we refer to abusers as alcoholics, there will be calls for 
temperance, and those abusers who are teetotallers are less likely to have their behaviour 
scrutinised. In the same way, by considering the language of criminal offences, we can 
uncover the limiting effects of their underlying problem representations.  
                                                 
53 Ibid 3.  
54 Bacchi, above n 26, 40. 
12 
WPR prompts us to consider the wording of laws in the context in which they were made. It 
is important to consider what was occurring in society at the time to trigger new 
understandings of a problem. So too is it important to consider who was talking about the 
problem, and what they were saying. Therefore, debates in parliament or the media, 
government research and policy, law reform inquiries and academic research are all 
potentially useful materials for analysis.55 Of great importance is to consider those who held 
the ‘enunciative position’ – that is, those politicians, academics or other commentators who 
were in a position to influence how the problem was represented.56 Heather Maroney coined 
the term ‘enunciative position’ to explain how priests, academics and politicians in Quebec 
were able to use their influential social positions to encourage native Quebecer women to 
have more children.57 These people (mainly men) held important positions in society, and 
therefore held the power to enunciate or construct a ‘crisis’ of falling native fertility rates. 
They represented fertile women as the saviours of national identity to encourage higher birth-
rates.58 Bacchi adopts the concept of the enunciative position to explain the need to consider 
claims-makers. She recommends identifying those people and organisations in a position to 
direct the rhetoric around a social problem.59 Problem representations are moulded by those 
who hold the enunciative position – the rhetoric they use to discuss a problem will shape the 
way laws are formulated. If we return once more to the problem of marital rape, Zedner 
noted in her response to Williams that her rejection of his stance ‘may do little to undermine 
the powerful resistance of those like him, to [marital rape’s] effective criminalisation’.60 
Zedner recognised that Williams maintained a strong hold on his enunciative position.  
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Not all those with legitimate claims will be heard, and WPR encourages consideration of 
representations made by people who do not hold the enunciative position.61 It is important 
to consider alternative problem representations made by academics and reform activists with 
less enunciative power, and who, unlike politicians, are not able to impose their 
representations on society through the law. If various representations harm and benefit 
people in different ways, we must consider a variety to determine which produces the best 
results for the right parties. We ought to consider what would happen if others held the 
enunciative position.  
The materials for analysis are therefore extensive. We can consider not just the wording of 
criminal offences, but the language and assumptions of those who played a role in enacting 
them (academics, law reformers, and politicians), those with alternative representations, 
those who demanded reform (activists, social service providers, and victims), and those 
enforcing the law (police and judges). 
Why WPR? 
WPR allows us to understand the law within its social and historical context, and thus 
uncover the impact of social visions underlying the institution of law. This accords with a 
recent movement among criminal law theorists to understand the law as the 
institutionalisation of social norms that have come to be viewed by society as obligations.62 
These scholars suggest that, to understand our institution of law, we must consider it as 
evidence of the ‘habits, customs, theories and practices’ which have become values inherent 
within society.63 We must consider the context in which the law was created, noting the 
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agendas ‘of political parties, of government agencies, [and] of pressure groups’.64 In so 
doing, we can understand the values that the institution of law purports to protect.65 
Criminal law theorist Lindsay Farmer adopts a similar method to WPR in his account of the 
development of the modern institution of criminal law in England. In Making the Modern 
Criminal Law, Farmer aims to explain contemporary understanding of criminalisation theory 
(i.e. the principles defining legitimate state action).66 While criminalisation has ‘become one 
of the dominant themes of academic criminal law theory’,67 Farmer argues that this is a 
relatively recent development. He deplores the trend among scholars to consider 
criminalisation ahistorically, and present recent debates as ‘part of a longer liberal tradition 
running from Hobbes and Locke’ to Mill, Hart and Devlin, without recognition of the gaps 
between these commentators and the general lack of concern in the ‘criminalization 
question’ throughout much of the last three centuries.68 
Farmer argues that criminalisation cannot be understood without an account of ‘the 
development of the institutional conditions that underpin and make possible our 
contemporary understanding of criminalization’.69 He aims to give a coherent account of the 
modern English criminal law which locates it in its social context. Farmer notes that ‘the 
scope or function of the criminal law at particular points in time might depend less on moral 
theory than the ability of social groups or classes to harness the power of the law’.70 Thus, 
to understand criminalisation, one ‘must be open to this particular combination of 
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understanding how the law is used and enforced, the interests that it might serve, and the 
social functions that it might perform’.71 
Farmer engages in analysis similar to WPR. His focus on the ‘persons, acts, or events’ 
responsible for the development of the criminal law mirrors questions 2-3 of WPR.72 He 
concentrates on the evolution of the aims of the criminal law, and the influence of historical 
social norms. He identifies that the ‘problem’ of criminalisation is now represented as too 
much state interference in the lives of citizens, but instead of blindly proposing a ‘solution’, 
he asks the ‘prior question’ of how we came to frame criminalisation in this way.73 
Although similar, Bacchi’s approach offers something additional to Farmer’s. In focusing 
on claims articulated by people who have been in a position to affect the law, Farmer neglects 
those have not held enunciative power. Tadros notes that such a method of analysis will tend 
to defend the values that the law adopts, and those who have had influence in shaping the 
law.74 This does not allow us to look beyond the social vision held by those in power, and 
consider how alternative social visions may have altered the law’s construction. It ignores 
claims articulated by others who held less power, arguably reinforcing inequality.75 Tadros 
argues that legal theorists ought instead to engage more closely with political theory, given 
its capacity to comprehend competing values.76 WPR permits analysis of the law in context, 
as well as competing social visions. 
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1.2. TERMINOLOGY 
A general term must be assigned to the conduct analysed in this thesis – a difficult matter 
when adopting the WPR approach, which insists that the choice of language employed to 
frame an issue is limiting.77 While many terms, such as ‘domestic violence’, ‘family 
violence’, and ‘wife-beating’, are often used interchangeably, each represents the problem 
differently, suggesting various essential determinants such as ‘marriage, gender, familial 
relationship, intimacy, or physical violence’.78 Any term will emphasise, obscure, and 
exclude certain aspects and actors, and will therefore limit what can be thought about such 
conduct. Nevertheless, the conduct must have a label. Speaking in abstract terms is no more 
helpful. I therefore use the term Intimate Partner Abuse (IPA). 
This term, like all others, contains a representation of the problem. While this representation 
will place limits on my analysis, this is unavoidable, and its implicit representation is 
preferable to me than those underlying other terms. Bacchi explains that policy analysis is 
inevitably informed by the analyst’s motivations, so it is important to be explicit about those 
motivations.79 I will therefore justify my terminology by comparing it with other labels in 
common usage, their underlying problem representations and limitations.  
‘Wife-beating’, ‘wife-battering’, and ‘domestic violence’  
The terms ‘wife-beating’ and ‘wife-battering’ prompt us to consider violence by men against 
their wives, and imply that we should only be concerned about physical violence. The terms 
conjure an image of a submissive and timid housewife beaten by a physically imposing, 
degenerate, unemployed, or alcoholic husband. These were terms of choice for the 1960s 
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battered women’s movement, as their emotive nature and focus on physical abuse made them 
powerful tools in encouraging state intervention.80 Evoking the vulnerability of victims 
roused the paternalistic inclination of the state, and focusing on physical violence meant that 
existing offences against the person were applicable.  
However, these terms, along with the now more prominent ‘domestic violence’, are severely 
limiting. ‘Beating’, ‘battering’, and ‘violence’ limit the problem to physical assault. They 
prevent consideration of other behaviours such as emotional abuse, intimidation, and 
isolation. This is troubling given that victims frequently report that emotional abuse is more 
distressing than physical violence.81 One respondent to a 1988 UK study into how women 
define their experiences of violence demonstrates this point: ‘What he did wasn’t exactly 
battering but it was the threat. I remember one night I spent the whole night in a state of 
terror … And that was worse to me than getting whacked’.82 This account also reveals the 
difficulty that victims (and society) have in recognising ‘battering’ where abusers are not 
physically violent. Regardless of other abusive tactics, victims can refuse to accept that they 
have experienced ‘battering’ or ‘domestic violence’ if physical abuse is infrequent.83 These 
terms tell victims, the community, police and judges that the sole concern is physical 
violence.  
Feminist legal theorist Jennifer Nedelsky suggests that terms such as ‘domestic violence’ 
threaten ‘to domesticate, privatize, and trivialize frightening and horrific’ behaviour.84 Such 
terms put the problem behind closed doors, thus discouraging intervention. They also 
exclude those victims who are not married to or living with their abuser, or who have 
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separated from their abuser. By drawing attention to marriage and the domestic sphere, they 
can invoke deeply gendered stereotypes of the kinds of people who can be victims. The terms 
suggest that the abhorrent act is limited to the physical assault of a dutiful housewife and 
mother who is unable to fight back. This may prevent women who do not fit the ideal image 
of domesticity (perhaps because they have fought back, or have a history of alcohol or drug 
abuse) from seeking assistance. 
Moreover, women who have been in abusive relationships frequently avoid labelling 
themselves as ‘battered women’, which American feminist lawyer and scholar Elizabeth 
Schneider attributes to the reductive quality of the phrase – that is, it presents a woman as 
battered, defining her whole life experience around the fact that she has been abused.85 She 
is no longer a woman, but has become a ‘battered woman’. The term is not empowering, but 
belittling. It suggests that the victim is defenceless and defeated, and ignores her capacity to 
resist and move past the period in her life in which she was battered.86  
Furthermore, drawing attention to the domestic sphere allows the abuser to disappear from 
analysis.87 As Schneider notes, the focus of terms like ‘wife-battering’ is the victim – a 
woman is battered, and we are not prompted to consider by whom.88 The perpetrator remains 
faceless and nameless, and his (because terms like ‘wife-battering’ lead one to assume the 
abuser is male) actions are not attributed to him. When we focus on the battered woman, she, 
rather than the abuse she suffers, may be viewed as the problem. We may be motivated to 
consider her reaction to the abuse, whether she tried to leave, and whether she tried to protect 
her children. 
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Focusing on the ‘wife’ or invoking the ‘domestic’ sphere also perpetuates the traditional 
notion of IPA as a man’s way of establishing and maintaining power within the nuclear 
family unit.89 Labels that suggest that violence occurs only within the traditional family unit 
as a result of, and with the intention of perpetuating, their patriarchal structure, tend to lead 
to solutions that silence the experience of LGBTIQ and heterosexual male victims. 
‘Family violence’ 
‘Family violence’ is an increasingly common term, especially in government research and 
reports.90 It is a broad term, encompassing abuse against all family members, not just 
intimate partners.91 The term ‘domestic violence’ is increasingly used in the same context to 
cover abuse between family members. The Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 
(UK), for example, applies to abuse committed by a member of the same household as the 
victim.92 The justification for these expansive terms is that they permit recognition of the 
abuse suffered by those victims who would otherwise be silenced by terms such as ‘wife 
beating’ – especially male and LGBTIQ victims, children and the elderly.93 As was observed 
during parliamentary debates on the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill,94 widening 
the scope of the problem to cover all relatives enables the police to ‘protect the vulnerable 
without discrimination’.95 Further, the term ‘family violence’ is used among Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people to encompass an even broader concept of violent and abusive 
behaviours, not only between intimate partners and immediate family members, but also 
between kin and members of the wider cultural community.96  
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While the benefit of these terms is their expansive nature, it is also their limitation. As Reece 
perceptively argues, ‘if domestic violence occurs everywhere then domestic violence occurs 
nowhere’.97 The term ‘family violence’ cannot provide victims of IPA with recognition of 
the specific wrong done to them. The act of one partner taking advantage of the other’s 
expectation of trust and intimacy to abuse or exploit them distinguishes IPA from abuse 
between relatives.98 The term ‘family violence’ also obscures the distinct dynamics 
underlying child and elder abuse.99 A blanket term would be inappropriate, as it would 
conflate victims, and trivialise and obscure the variety of distinctive wrongs each suffers. 
Subcategorisation 
Certain influential feminist sociologists and law reform activists have created subcategories 
to further differentiate between forms of abuse. Johnson differentiates between ‘patriarchal 
terrorism’ and ‘common couple violence’, using the former to refer to the ‘terroristic control 
of wives by their husbands’, and the latter to refer to gender-neutral conflict between partners 
that may include some violence, but is generally not very serious.100 Similarly, Dempsey 
distinguishes ‘strong domestic violence’ (unjustified violent acts which tend to sustain the 
patriarchy) from ‘weak domestic violence’ (unjustified violent acts unrelated to patriarchal 
issues).101 Stark suggests that ‘partner assault’ can occur between any intimate partners, as 
both men and women can be violent and aggressive.102 ‘Coercive control’, however, he 
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defines as the ongoing use of violence, intimidation, isolation and control ‘deployed almost 
exclusively by men to dominate individual women’.103  
There are advantages to dividing IPA into various categories, if one assumes that IPA is 
caused by, or compounded by, social conditions in which men tend to have superior power 
over women. If the problem is understood in this way, then there ought to be a specific term 
for violence used by men who have been able to exploit a power imbalance to control female 
victims. So too should there be a separate term for other forms of IPA which are not 
characterised by this power imbalance because the abuser is female, or the abuse occurs in 
an LGBTIQ relationship.  
Johnson’s and Stark’s terms for more serious forms of IPA – ‘patriarchal terrorism’ and 
‘coercive control’ – also have the benefit of representing the problem in a political light. 
‘Terrorism’ and ‘coercive control’ make the problem more than a personal issue.104 By 
focusing on the entrapment of women, and their inability to leave because of the abuse 
directed towards them, these terms direct attention to issues of autonomy, citizenship and 
human rights.105 A problem labelled as ‘terrorism’ cannot be trivialised. It becomes a 
political problem, and therefore a problem relevant to all in society, not just individual 
victims.  
My concern with subcategorising IPA is that it tends to suggest that cases of IPA are only 
serious when their circumstances match what some represent as the paradigmatic case; a 
woman being abused by her male partner. It denies the seriousness of other cases in which 
patriarchal privileges are not used to establish control. Subcategories that emphasise 
patriarchy suggest that male and LGBTIQ victims have less right to seek assistance, and do 
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not acknowledge other forms of vulnerability that can lead to victimisation. Focusing on the 
patriarchy ignores the potential role of the victim’s race, age, sex, socio-economic status, or 
disability in the abuser’s ability to establish control. To use a term that suggests that the 
problem with serious IPA is the patriarchy is unnecessarily restrictive.  
‘Intimate partner abuse’ 
Let us now consider ‘intimate partner abuse’, and its implicit problem representation. 
‘Intimate partner’ encompasses those people who are, or have been, in sexual or otherwise 
intimately companionate relationships, including married and de facto partners (and those 
who are divorced or separated), current or former boyfriends, girlfriends, or sexual partners, 
whether or not they live or have lived together. Like Nedelsky, who favours ‘intimate partner 
violence’, I value the term’s capacity to encompass abuse by women and those in LGBTIQ 
relationships, while not preventing consideration of the role that male social privilege can 
play in some cases.106 I prefer the word ‘abuse’ because of its capacity to invoke not just 
physical violence, but also the range of non-physical tactics frequently deployed in such 
relationships, such as economic abuse, coercion, threats and isolation.107 Further, ‘abuse’ 
emphasises not just the tactics employed, but also the offender’s abuse of a position of trust 
and intimacy to exert power over the victim.108 
The term ‘intimate partner abuse’ has its limitations. While I regard its gender-neutrality as 
a positive, it obscures that which some scholars regard as the central cause of IPA – that is, 
men’s superior power over women in society and the relationship. However, while I accept 
that male social dominance can be fundamental in many cases of IPA, I do not wish to 
minimise other sources of power on which abusers can draw to establish power over their 
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victims.109 Further, I recognise that IPA implies that the conduct is limited to current 
partners, thus obscuring the additional risk of abuse post-separation.110 However, this is a 
limitation shared by most terminology. While terms like ‘domestic violence’, ‘patriarchal 
terrorism’, and ‘coercive control’ make no explicit reference to former partners, their 
expanded definitions include former partners. Finally, Stark has rejected the word ‘intimate’ 
on the basis that there is nothing intimate about the behaviour in question.111 However, I 
suggest that the emphasis of IPA is not the intimate nature of the relationship, but rather the 
abuse of intimacy – that is, the exploitation of a relationship of trust to more easily 
manipulate and control a person. There is vulnerability inherent in intimate relationships, 
due to the reliance that partners can develop on one another. I suggest that the victim’s 
vulnerability due to their intimacy with their abuser ought to be emphasised. 
Perhaps there is a double standard in advocating a term broad enough to include male and 
LGBTIQ victims, but not family members. I have suggested that the role of male privilege 
can make violence among intimate partners distinct from that between other relatives, but 
have also acknowledged that male privilege is not a determinant in all instances of IPA. I 
argue that it is not the exploitation of male social privilege that distinguishes IPA from other 
forms of family violence. Rather, it is the exploitation of intimacy. Relationships between 
parents and children tend to be characterised by the dependence of one party on the other, 
and thus one of the primary wrongs occasioned by abuse in these relationships is neglect of 
care. By contrast, intimate partnerships tend to be characterised by trust and intimacy, and 
thus the primary wrong is the betrayal and exploitation of that trust. 
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It is important that the term IPA invokes the context of the relationship in which the abuse 
occurs. Farmer observes that violence is made harmful due to the context in which it takes 
place, rather than because of the act itself.112 A punch thrown during a bar brawl is not 
comparable to a man hitting his wife, although they may cause comparable physical injury. 
The context of the relationship between the abuser and victim also allows for recognition of 
non-physical violence. Again, Farmer observes that an ‘act of violence need not be violent 
in itself (an attack), but conduct which can be … capable of producing violent effects’.113 In 
the context of an intimate relationship, coercive or intimidating but non-physical conduct is 
capable of harming the victim. Consider that a man who prevents his wife from interacting 
with strangers may harm her by isolating her, while a parent who refuses to let his child talk 
to strangers is appropriately protective. Thus, the context of the relationship between victim 
and offender is crucial – it is this context which gives IPA its distinctive character.114  
Farmer suggests that we are able to problematise various types of violence in different ways 
because of our understanding of the person at law. He argues that the person is understood 
not just as a ‘body susceptible to injury’, but in the context of their ‘relationships and their 
sense of identity or self’.115 I aim to emphasise the rights of the person, not just to physical 
wellbeing, but to mental wellbeing, integrity, and autonomy. The right to wellbeing cannot 
be secured without considering the relationships in which people engage, because it is 
through relationships with others, intimate or otherwise, that people develop self-identity.116 
Where someone unfairly takes advantage of their intimacy with another person to establish 
unreasonable power over them, the state ought to intervene.117  
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Adopting the WPR approach requires conceding that my chosen term is coloured by my own 
assumptions, and that these assumptions will inevitably influence my analysis. ‘IPA’ is an 
abstraction from a vastly more complex social condition. Nevertheless, I must inevitably 
make an investment in a particular way of characterising the problem. A challenge 
throughout this thesis will be to remain aware of this dilemma, and the influence of my own 
assumptions and biases on my analysis. 
1.3. STRUCTURE 
Chapters 2–4 of this thesis consider various aspects of the criminal law to uncover how IPA 
has been represented, and the effects of those representations. Chapter 2 provides a 
contextual background for the thesis, explaining when and how IPA became a problem in 
society and at law, and how that problem has evolved over time. Chapter 3 explores the 
significance of criminal labels in sending a message to the public about how IPA should be 
understood. Further, it challenges the idea that there can be a ‘fair’ and ‘accurate’ criminal 
label for social problems like IPA. It also promotes the WPR method as an alternative way 
to settle on appropriate criminal labels. Chapter 4 considers how the victim and abuser in an 
intimate relationship are defined and discussed in the criminal law. Having uncovered the 
effects of representations of IPA, its victims and its perpetrators, bound up in the criminal 
law in the UK and Australia, chapter 5 uses this to inform a new offence based on an 
alternative representation of IPA. Using this alternative representation, I aim to create a 
criminal offence of IPA that better serves the interests of victims. Using WPR, it will be 
shown that it is vital to examine and challenge the way IPA is represented, because 
representations have serious consequences for victims. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONTEXT OF IPA 
The modern history of family violence is not the story of changing responses to a constant 
problem, but, in large part, of redefinition of the problem itself.118 
Much of the discussion about IPA in the media, politics and academia is conducted without 
reference to the historical and social context within which it was identified as a problem. It 
is often assumed that the wrong of IPA is self-evident. Yet IPA, like any social problem, 
‘has been historically and politically constructed’.119 Unlike a disease, for example, which 
has an unchanging pathogen which can be identified and eradicated, constructions of IPA 
‘developed and then varied according to … the force of certain political movements’.120 At 
the outset of this analysis of representations of IPA lodging in criminal laws, it is vital to 
consider the context in which IPA was first identified as a problem, and the political and 
social climate in which subsequent representations arose. Changes in how we have 
constructed IPA – what we consider to be its cause, and what we find concerning about it – 
are inextricably linked to changing social norms and conditions.121 To gain a richer 
understanding of how IPA is dealt with in the criminal law, we need to consider the forces 
that have contributed to its construction as a problem.  
In conducting this review of how IPA became a problem – and the people and social 
conditions that prompted changes in its representation – I am primarily addressing question 
3 of WPR. This question prompts consideration of the historical context within which 
representations arise, and the people, events and political movements that influenced their 
evolution.122 It also directs attention to ‘the power relations that affect the success of some 
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problem representations and the defeat of others’.123 As discussed in chapter 1, this approach 
is similar to analysis undertaken by Farmer, who investigates the development of the modern 
criminal law in England by considering how it was used as a tool in securing civil order.124 
He draws on the work of social commentators, judges, members of political movements and 
researchers in a variety of fields at various points during the last four centuries to show their 
influence on the construction of the criminal law.  
I focus on these same actors where they have shaped representations of IPA. Uncovering 
their motivations and assumptions can provide valuable insight into representations of IPA 
lodging within our criminal laws. It is important to be aware of what has been said about 
IPA, and by whom, since it became a ‘problem’. Equally, it is useful to examine those 
periods in which discussion of IPA fell silent, and the factors which prompted re-agitation 
of the issue.125 As Gordon argues, the ‘ebb-and-flow pattern of concern about family 
violence’ over the last century proves ‘the necessity of an historical approach to 
understanding it’.126  
The following discussion is not intended to be a comprehensive historical survey. I consider 
very generally the process by which IPA became a problem in Australia and the UK, and 
will jump between countries and time periods to highlight significant moments in time that 
permitted change to how IPA is represented. To do so, I draw upon some of the major 
commentaries and histories of criminal law, written by influential criminal law theorists and 
social historians. Farmer’s recent monograph on English criminal law will be fundamental, 
and should be consulted for an expanded analysis.127 
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2.1. CREATING A ‘PROBLEM’ 
Making violence a problem: 18th– 20th centuries 
Most historical accounts of IPA begin by identifying the 1960s feminist movement as the 
source of current concern about IPA.128 However, this misses a shift in attitude towards 
violence in the mid-18th century which allowed IPA to be constructed as a criminal problem. 
Farmer claims that, prior to the mid-18th century, violence was common in public and 
private. Dominance and authority were indicators of a man’s social standing. Duels and fist-
fights were seen as legitimate ways for men to settle disputes and assert masculinity.129 
Within the home, men subjected wives, children and servants to physical ‘correction’,130 
allowing them to maintain ‘male dominance and privilege’.131 Although women were more 
frequently victims than perpetrators, social acceptance of violence as a tool for maintaining 
power meant women were ‘relatively free’ to use force against servants and children.132 
Whether it occurred in public or private, interpersonal violence prior to the mid-18th century 
was generally regarded as a personal matter between individuals. Authorities rarely 
intervened in ‘legitimate’ acts of violence. Only when violence became a ‘threat to social 
order’ (rioting, for example) was it deemed illegitimate, and intervention deemed 
necessary.133  
Farmer characterises the period from 1750 to 1900 in England as one of an intensifying 
‘civilizing offensive’.134 During this period, social commentators redefined appropriate 
interpersonal relations. ‘Civilized’ communities were heralded by commentators as paragons 
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of virtue and enlightenment, set apart from unrefined nations by the establishment of co-
operative, secure and non-violent society.135 Writing in 1836, J.S. Mill explained that 
civilization ‘distinguishes a wealthy and populous nation from savages or barbarians’.136 As 
part of this civilizing offensive, Farmer notes that interpersonal violence came to be viewed 
as a public concern. Violence was no longer merely an immediate threat to social order. 
Rather, interpersonal violence, particularly that occurring in public, was considered 
‘uncivilized and barbaric and not an appropriate standard of conduct for members of a 
modern commercial society’.137  
The criminal law was central to the civilizing process. Mill argued at the time that rules of 
law needed to replace the dominant ‘eye for an eye’ mentality.138 Criminal law reforms 
codified ‘new understandings of violence, laying down expectations of proper conduct, and 
establishing the standards of self-control and foresight which were to be expected of a 
civilized modern man’.139 Practices such as duelling were outlawed, and while organised 
fights were often undertaken covertly, they were ‘routinely broken up by the police, and 
participants (including spectators) could potentially be prosecuted’.140 
Wood observes that 19th century social commentators who drove this civilizing offensive 
were ‘inventing violence: developing a new set of beliefs as to the nature of physical 
aggression, debating and redrawing the boundaries of legitimate interpersonal behaviour and 
seeking explanations for violence in the structures of social life’.141 Since violent behaviour 
was more common among men, civilizing efforts concentrated on redefining masculinity as 
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being a productive and active citizen, and a supportive and attentive father and husband.142 
As Ramsey notes, a man’s ‘capacity to provide for one’s family and treat one’s wife as a 
“sacred partner” and guardian of morality supposedly divided respectable from 
unrespectable’.143  
The social commentators who drove this movement were largely clustered among the 
middle-class in the UK. As members of the middle-class curbed their outwardly violent 
behaviour to maintain their status, these commentators located the problem of violence 
among the lower-class. They used their enunciative position to suggest links between 
violence and ‘the specific social conditions of lower-class life’.144  For instance, Joseph 
Fletcher, a prominent English barrister, argued in 1849 that the most violent peoples were 
found in rural areas, where they were the ‘furthest removed from every civilising 
influence’.145 Commentators who rejected the practice of state-administered corporal 
punishment as contrary to the ‘feelings’ of the ‘humane public’, observed that members of 
the lower-class – ‘the vulgar rabble’ – would watch such spectacles ‘with brutal curiosity’.146 
Newspapers reporting on violent crime noted that ‘the most brutal, the most cowardly, the 
most pitiless, the most barbarous deeds done in the world, are being perpetrated by the lower 
classes of the English people’.147 
While civility became an aspiration in colonial Australia, the civilizing offensive took longer 
to gain traction, due to the strength of values ingrained in the predominantly male population. 
Ramsey observes that the concept of mateship ‘emerged from the brutal convict era as an 
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exclusively male form of camaraderie that reinforced patriarchy and perpetuated the sexual 
objectification of women’.148 The gold rush and booming wool trade of the mid-19th century 
saw an influx of single men into NSW and Victoria, who prized self-interest, physical 
prowess, and independence. These were not the ‘civilized’ men held up as exemplars of 
national refinement among the English middle-class. Colonial governments, seeking to 
establish respectability, encouraged marriage as a method of taming their fiercely self-
interested and violent male citizens. Policies were implemented to encourage women to 
migrate from the UK to become ‘moral police’ for colonial men, and companionate marriage 
became ‘the dominant social aspiration in Australia’.149 
Discovering IPA 
The changing attitude towards violence meant that from the late 18th century in England, and 
the mid-19th century in Australia, cruelty within the home was deemed uncivilized and 
illegitimate.150 Historian John Beattie argues that, whereas the ideal man had been 
constructed as respectable, rational, and non-violent, the civilizing offensive had established 
the ideals of middle-class femininity as fragility, meekness and submissiveness, and created 
a heightened sense of domesticity and companionship within marriage.151 While the man 
was still the master of his household, ‘the legitimacy of his imposing his will by physical 
means was to some extent undermined by a growing hostility toward excessive violence’.152 
Men maintained dominion over their wives, and the limited use of physical force to ‘correct’ 
them was condoned, particularly where wives were seen as lacking feminine qualities, for 
example because of licentiousness or habitual drunkenness.153 However, in both countries, 
men who misused their authority to exert excessive violence over their helpless wives were 
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widely condemned.154 Beattie notes that English courts began imposing stiffer penalties for 
wife and child abuse in the late 18th century.155 By 1891, it was established in the landmark 
UK case of R v Jackson that the supposed right of a husband to physically chastise his wife 
was ‘quaint and absurd dicta’ that had no place in a ‘civilized country’.156 From the mid-19th 
century, police officers in Australia arrested abusive husbands regardless of whether the 
victim complained.157 Although the courts in both countries were sometimes criticised for 
imposing insufficient penalties,158 Ramsey notes that ‘judges usually exercised their 
authority in ways that revealed their contempt for wife-beaters’.159 
Along with legal authorities, social commentators and the media condemned IPA. Mill 
expressed despair that ‘[t]he vilest malefactor has some wretched woman tied to him, against 
whom he can commit any atrocity except killing her, and, if tolerably cautious, can do that 
without much danger of the legal penalty’.160 The press reported on non-lethal wife-assaults 
as ‘shameful’ and ‘a brutal outrage’.161 One reporter noted with anguish that in both England 
and Australia ‘[t]here are hundreds who suffer uncomplainingly, but the small proportion of 
cases that are made public, are sufficient to show that wife beating is sufficiently prevalent 
to form a horrible blot on our social escutcheon’.162 
Women who killed abusive husbands in self-defence were sometimes looked upon 
sympathetically by the courts and society. For example, in 1854, Englishwoman Jane Colbert 
killed her husband after he drunkenly struck her. Her son gave evidence that the deceased 
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frequently beat his mother, and the deceased’s mother gave evidence that Jane was otherwise 
a ‘very good mother, and a very good wife’.163 While the jury found Colbert guilty of 
manslaughter, it ‘strongly recommended her to mercy’, and she was sentenced to 
imprisonment for only one week.164 Similar cases were reported in Australian newspapers 
as ‘a wife’s fight for life’ and ‘justifiable homicide’.165 
Activist approaches to IPA 
Two distinct activist approaches to IPA emerged in the late 19th century, and both capitalised 
on the civilizing offensive. Women aligned with the temperance movement spoke about IPA 
in connection with alcoholism, and drew on the image of the battered wife as ‘the indirect 
victim of drink’.166 They argued that IPA was not a problem of the entire male sex. Rather, 
the problem was located among exceptional, depraved and brutal alcoholic men.167 The 
momentum of the civilizing offensive meant that the image of the drunken layabout who 
beat his wife and children was especially potent in their calls for prohibition.  
The women’s rights movement was primarily concerned with agitating for women’s rights 
to vote, own property and gain an education.168 As with the temperance movement, these 
first-wave feminist activists avoided representing IPA as a problem of women’s inequality 
within marriage. Rather, they drew on the ideals of masculinity and femininity established 
by the civilizing offensive to promote intervention in cases of IPA. Activists represented 
female victims as vulnerable, weak, and defenceless, bound by duty and financial necessity 
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to abusive men, who were depicted as ‘monstrous and depraved, lacking in true manhood’.169 
They claimed that the civilized men of the criminal justice system ought to assist women 
who were subject to abuse from uncivilized men.170 Thus, the problem was set up in a 
hierarchical way. Men were positioned as superior to their wives and therefore bound by the 
social demand for civility to not bring harm to their social inferior. When a man was violent 
towards his wife, society deemed criminal intervention the civilized thing to do.  
By framing women as vulnerable, feminist activists in England were able to agitate for 
divorce rights for women in abusive relationships.171 In 1878, notable first-wave feminist 
Frances Power Cobbe suggested that punishing wife assault by imprisoning and flogging the 
abuser only led to an escalation of abuse when he returned home ‘full of fresh and more 
vindictive cruelty’.172 Cobbe insisted that judicial separation provided a better solution, 
allowing women and their children to legally live apart from their husbands.173 Lord 
Penzance inserted Cobbe’s judicial separation scheme into a bill on divorce procedure,174 
which passed with little contention. Thus, as a result of feminist activism, magistrates were 
empowered to grant women orders of non-cohabitation where they had been subject to 
aggravated assault by their husbands.  
Activists tended to avoid constructing IPA as a problem of inequality within marriage, and 
thus did not align themselves with Mill – an influential, if controversial, social commentator 
of the time, who connected women’s inequality with abuse in marriage.175 This may have 
been because a more prominent stance among social commentators, such as distinguished 
judge and criminal law scholar James Fitzjames Stephen, was that, while problematic, 
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marital violence was not an issue of inequality between men and women.176 The civilizing 
offensive had firmly reinforced man’s superiority over women in the home and society.177 I 
suggest that feminist activists recognised the power of this dominant stance, and chose not 
to work against it. Had activists adopted Mill’s problematisation, men with enunciative 
power over social issues such as IPA may have found feminist arguments unpalatable and 
so ignored them. Rather, activists appealed to men’s desire for dominance, and implored 
them to use that power to protect vulnerable and meek women. Using Bacchi’s words, 
activists spoke ‘in language that would be heard’.178  
The silence of the 20th century 
During the first half of the 20th century, there seems to have been a low-point in public and 
scholarly discussion of wife-beating.179 This low point in public consciousness of IPA has 
been attributed by legal historian Colin James to the ‘personal and cultural disruptions’ of 
war and the depression.180 The family was viewed as a source of stability, contentment and 
civility that could heal the damage of war.181 However, this safe haven was increasingly 
under threat. First-wave feminist victories in attaining divorce rights, and opportunities for 
women to undertake paid work during and post-war, afforded women some independence.182 
This threatened the ideal construct of domesticity, and the male prerogative of being master 
of the household. Concern for family welfare led to a period of ambivalence towards abusive 
behaviour in UK and Australian courts and society.183 According to Walker, men were 
excused for abuse ‘in the face of challenge to traditional sex roles afforded by women’s 
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increasingly independent behaviour’.184 Protecting women from their violent husbands 
became a secondary concern to the breakdown of marriage.185 Courts in England even went 
so far as to recognise a wife’s nagging as a form of cruelty against her husband,186 which 
James suggests was linked to fear of women’s increasing bids at independence.187 During 
this period, a wife’s ‘failure to be nurturing and faithful’, particularly towards a veteran 
husband, went some way to legitimising his violent or controlling conduct.188  
The battered women’s movement and second-wave feminism 
This brief period of silence about IPA, and the staunch defence of the conventional family 
unit, was brought to an end with ‘the emergence of the rights-oriented movements in the 
1960s’.189 Civil-rights, anti-war, and second-wave feminist movements (including the 
battered women’s movement) brought about a new understanding of the problem of violence 
in the UK and Australia. Driven by these rights movements, society in the latter half of the 
20th century altered its understanding of violence once more.190 Violent behaviour was no 
longer seen as an indication that society had fallen to savagery, as it was in the previous 
century. Rather, evolving standards of interpersonal interaction allowed for violence to be 
seen as problematic if it impaired the ‘individual freedom of a person to control their own 
body’.191 Feminist activists framed their campaigns against IPA around this conception of 
violence, arguing that women’s capacity for self-determination was constrained by 
domineering and controlling husbands. Schechter explains that activists came to understand 
that the ‘fear of violence robs women of possibilities, self-confidence, and self-esteem … 
[V]iolence is more than a physical assault; it is an attack on women’s dignity and 
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freedom’.192 This understanding of violence, as preventing a person from existing as an 
autonomous member of society, eventually brought IPA back out of the private realm.  
The second-wave feminist movement generally, and the battered women’s movement in 
particular, condemned men’s elevated status in society and the home. A number of feminists 
represented IPA, or ‘wife-beating’, as a manifestation of the disparity of power and control 
between men and women.193 They noted that men tend to be physically stronger, have better 
education and employment opportunities, have greater earning potential, are unfettered by 
childbirth or child-rearing responsibilities and are generally viewed as less emotional and 
passive.194 Some activists argued that men’s elevated power and status meant they were 
acculturated to expect supremacy over women.195 Advancements in women’s equality over 
the previous decades were therefore something of a culture shock to men who expected 
deference from women. Feminist historian Linda Gordon theorised that some men in the 
early 20th century were prone to aggressive responses to women’s newfound resistance to 
male power.196 Thus emerged in the public consciousness the archetypal wife-beater – a man 
who uses violence, intimidation and physical supremacy over a protracted period to control 
his wife, thereby securing the benefits of sex, domestic work, love, companionship and 
family which were threatened by her newfound equality.197 In the struggle for power and 
control between men and women, activists argued that these men adopted ongoing violent 
and controlling tactics to reinforce their position as ‘boss’.198 In so doing, they restricted 
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their wives’ autonomy, preventing them from engaging fully in their own lives.199 Therefore, 
feminists of the battered women’s movement represented the cause of IPA as not just abusive 
husbands, but also the gendered dynamics of society that permitted and even encouraged 
abuse. The consequence was deprivation of liberty, which left wives isolated and entrapped. 
The second-wave feminist movement was viewed as a liberating force that allowed women 
to speak about the formerly taboo topic of partner abuse.200 Activists who had never 
experienced such violence became aware of its prevalence, and of the ambivalence of police 
and social services.201 In recognition of the fact that victims had nowhere to go to escape 
violence, feminist activists began establishing refuges in the 1970s.202 Refuges not only gave 
women and their children a place to go to escape violence, but, as Schechter notes ‘also 
inspire[d] women to organize together and help one another’.203 Refuges empowered women 
and restored their liberty.204 The provision of safe spaces where women could meet, share 
their stories, and understand ‘their experiences as political ones’, allowed the issue to emerge 
in public discourse.205 This was furthered when, in 1974, Erin Pizzey, founder of the first 
English refuge, published a book on battered wives based largely on observations from the 
refuge.206 Women who ran and used shelters emerged as passionate and vocal campaigners 
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for the recognition of IPA, thus making it possible to speak in public about the harms of IPA. 
Their work ‘began to shape public debate’.207  
A major target of feminist campaigning was the assumption that had re-emerged at the 
beginning of the 20th century that IPA was a ‘private’ matter, and by implication less serious 
than public violence. Bacchi notes that activists clearly comprehended the power of problem 
representations – a problem represented as ‘private’ will tend to be ignored by the public and 
the state.208 Through tireless campaigning, activists revealed as false the notion that ‘the 
family is always a safe haven from a brutal world’.209 Removing the ‘private’ label allowed 
the public to view IPA as akin to public violence, and therefore deserving of police 
intervention.210 However, to encourage stronger criminal intervention, activists had to 
engage with the state. 
From outsiders to insiders 
The feminist strategy altered from the 1980s. Where once they had campaigned exclusively 
outside the state, feminists increasingly sought to establish influence within government.211 
In Australia, feminists lobbied state governments to conduct research into IPA, and ensured 
that activists and refuge staff were on steering committees for such projects.212 For example, 
the Victorian Premier’s Department convened a Domestic Violence Committee in 1981, 
which produced a report on ‘Criminal Assault in the Home’.213 Similarly, in response to 
campaigning by feminist organisation Women’s Aid, the UK Government established the 
Select Committee on Violence in Marriage in 1974.214 The Committee recommended the 
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introduction of new powers to impose injunctions and wider arrest powers.215 As a result, 
two Acts were introduced: the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976,216 
and the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978.217 
The 1980s and 1990s saw an influx of feminists into policy positions in the Australian 
government.218 These women translated ‘external pressure’ from feminists into government 
policy.219 Feminist influence in the 1983–96 Labor Hawke/Keating government put IPA on 
the national agenda, and both Prime Ministers made public statements regarding ‘domestic 
violence’ which drew on the feminist representation of the problem.220 Similarly, when the 
UK Labour party returned to office in 1997, the number of female MPs had risen from 37 to 
101.221 Many of these new MPs ‘had been active in the feminist movement of the 1970s and 
several had links to the refuge movement and wider violence against women sector’.222 IPA 
was a feature of the UK Labour Party election manifesto,223 and following the party’s 1997 
election, there was ‘rapid development in policies and initiatives to counter domestic 
violence’.224  
A shift in representation 
While feminist activism put the spotlight on IPA, Pleck argues that it became clear that for 
IPA to be taken more seriously by criminal justice officials, ‘feminism – a controversial 
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ideology – had to be tamed’.225 Bailey suggests that feminists recognised that re-establishing 
victim autonomy was ‘not the chief goal of the criminal justice system’, so speaking about 
IPA as an issue of autonomy was ‘simply not translatable’ within the criminal law.226 The 
law could only comprehend tangible, concrete harms.227 Therefore, to improve criminal 
intervention, feminists (especially those within government) ‘simplified the problem’.228 
Rather than focus on the diminution of autonomy caused by ongoing abuse, feminists 
reduced the problem to physically violent acts.229 They adopted the term ‘wife assault’ in 
preference to ‘wife-battering’, because the word ‘assault’ placed the problem within a 
criminal legal framework. By changing their representation of the problem, feminists were 
able to demand that the law treat intimate partner abusers the same way it treated those who 
assault strangers.230 In so doing, they were ‘framing the issue in language that would be 
heard’ by the criminal justice system.231 According to Hague, this change in problem 
representation encouraged increased police intervention.232 Police in the UK increasingly 
adopted ‘pro-arrest, pro-prosecution policies’ for IPA, and established domestic violence 
units ‘to support abused women and children and to assist in policing domestic violence’.233  
Some commentators have lamented this strategic simplification of IPA. Stark has argued 
that the emphasis on physical assault has made the problem about individual violent people, 
rather than a consequence of inequality between men and women.234 Currie notes that what 
began as a movement to expose inequality, and redistribute social power, became a 
movement by the state to impose its power to protect (what were now represented to be) 
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weak and defenceless women.235 It has also meant that, although conduct such as emotional 
abuse, stalking, harassment and threats were eventually recognised as IPA, police have 
tended to focus primarily on cases of IPA involving physical violence.236 
2.2. ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATIONS OF IPA 
Although feminists were largely responsible for putting IPA on the public agenda, and were 
involved in establishing government policy, they were not the only actors attempting to 
define, understand, and ‘fix’ IPA. Once it was recognised as a problem, professionals from 
a variety of fields stepped in to claim it.237 Some aligned with or even advanced the second-
wave feminist representation, while others acknowledged alternative causes and 
consequences of IPA. To understand how IPA is represented in the criminal law, it is 
important to consider the influence of these other fields. There is an immense body of 
literature on IPA from various disciplines, and here I give only a brief outline of some of the 
more influential representations from certain leading scholars. I will identify some major 
trends in the problematisation of IPA in various fields, rather than giving a complete account 
of developments within these fields over the last century. 
The psychology of victims and offenders 
Psychological analysis of IPA predated the second-wave feminist analysis, though became 
more prominent after feminists had made IPA a public issue.238 Mental health researchers in 
the mid-20th century tended to attribute male violence and aggression to mental illness or 
psychiatric disorders.239 Abusive husbands were labelled as ‘sick’ or ‘emotionally 
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disturbed’.240 Some researchers also focused on the pathology of victims. In 1944, 
psychoanalyst Helene Deutsch theorised that all women possess three essential traits; 
passivity, masochism, and narcissism.241 Her claim that these traits cause women to desire 
rape, violation and humiliation led to the conclusion among some mental health researchers 
that women either consciously or unconsciously provoked their husbands into beating 
them.242 
While less emphasis has been placed on attributing IPA to the victim’s provocation, more 
recent psychological representations of IPA also focus on the pathology of the victim. 
Notably, in 1984, feminist psychologist Lenore Walker developed the concept of Battered 
Woman Syndrome (BWS) to explain how a woman who has been subject to repeated 
physical force or psychological manipulation by a man can become immobilised, and 
incapable of self-help.243 Walker used BWS to explain why some victims of violence do not 
leave their abusers, and may continue to feel affection towards them. This clinical 
explanation of women’s responses to IPA was adopted by UK and Australian courts in the 
1990s to support established defences such as self-defence and provocation to exonerate 
women who killed their long-term abusive partners.244 However, the effect of BWS 
evidence, in pathologizing the IPA victim, and obscuring the behaviour of their abuser, has 
been extensively criticised by feminist commentators.245  
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While earlier psychological representations of IPA tended to assume that men are the likely 
abusers and women and children their victims, more recent psychological studies have 
questioned this gender paradigm. For example, Dutton suggested in 2012 that IPA is caused 
by ‘couples with dysfunctional conflict management styles or psychopathology’.246 
Alternatively, Capaldi, Kim and Shortt argue that IPA is a problem of violent couples, 
suggesting that aggressive females seek out similarly aggressive males, and both partners 
may contribute to physical aggression.247  
Psychological framings thus tend to assume that the psychopathology of victims and 
offenders is fundamental to the perpetration of IPA. They therefore tend to represent IPA as 
a problem of unhealthy individuals or relationships. Such representations discourage 
criminal intervention, and instead invite the treatment of victims and abusers through 
counselling or psychotherapy.248 For example, when intervention orders were first 
introduced in SA in the 1980s, courts were empowered to order that abusers attend 
psychiatric treatment, or to require both the abuser and victim to attend counselling.249 
Various sociological representations 
The ‘Family Violence’ approach 
By the early 1980s, IPA had attracted the attention of sociologists, who disputed claims by 
some psychological researchers that abusive conduct was confined to the mentally 
unstable.250 Interest in IPA was piqued among sociologists by the publication of US survey 
data in 1977 which asked respondents about the tactics used in their family to deal with 
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conflict.251 Although this publication showed that, in one year, 3.8 per cent of wives in the 
US were subject to physical abuse by their husbands, it also indicated women’s capacity for 
violence towards male partners.252 This sparked fierce debate about the role of gender in IPA 
that persists today. 
Leading American sociologists Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz theorised in 1980 that women 
are as violent, if not more violent, than men in intimate relationships.253 For them, IPA must 
be contextualised as part of the normalisation of violence in society and the family – hence, 
this branch of sociological research was labelled the ‘family violence’ approach.254 Under 
this view, which remains influential today, ‘the institution of the family is set up to allow 
and even encourage violence among family members’.255 Further, social stressors such as 
poverty, alcoholism, and unemployment have been pointed to as contributing to violent 
behaviour among family members.256 ‘Family violence’ researchers do not represent the 
cause of the problem as misogyny or poor mental health, but as learned violence and anti-
social behaviour, as well as ‘the norms which legitimate and glorify violence in society and 
the family’.257 This representation of IPA leads to calls for counselling – to unlearn anti-
social behaviour and manage dysfunctional anger – as well as social policies aimed at 
reducing poverty and unemployment.258 This representation has led to the requirement that 
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some abusers attend behavioural change counselling programs as a term of intervention 
orders made against them.259 
The ‘Violence Against Women’ approach (feminist sociology) 
While some ‘family violence’ researchers accept that sexual inequality has a role in patterns 
of violence,260 critics argue that the ‘family violence’ approach obscures the role of the 
disparity of power between men and women.261 The ‘violence against women’ approach to 
sociological research emerged in the 1980s in response to this perceived oversight, and is 
strongly aligned with the second-wave feminist activist representation of IPA. As Breines 
and Gordon explain, feminist sociologists argue that IPA ought to be analysed independently 
from other forms of ‘family violence’ (i.e. child abuse, elder abuse), because there are 
‘patterns to violence between intimates which only an analysis of gender … can 
illuminate’.262 Central to the feminist sociologist representation is that IPA is gendered – that 
is, it is more commonly committed by men against women in the context of a society which 
provides greater benefits to men. 
Feminist sociologists argue that IPA occurs continuously over a period of time (rather than 
involving isolated incidents), and can involve a variety of tactics (including threats, coercion, 
intimidation, isolation, and economic abuse, as well as physical force) aimed at trapping 
women in abusive relationships.263 Feminist sociologists argue that abusers use these tactics 
repeatedly, and that their cumulative effects allow abusers to establish control over 
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victims.264 These tactics are made more effective due to women’s inferior position both in 
the relationship and society.265  
Feminist sociologists do not deny the existence of abusive women, or that men can be victims 
of IPA.266 However, they counter ‘family violence’ researchers’ claims that women are as 
violent as men by elucidating the different contexts in which men and women use 
violence.267 In an assertion that remains influential today,268 Dobash and Dobash argued in 
1984 that empirical studies that merely ask whether respondents have ever used physical 
violence against their partners fail to uncover that men’s and women’s use of violence is 
both quantitatively and qualitatively different. 269 Men, they argued, tend to use violence to 
control or intimidate others, and to secure benefits such as money, sex, or power.270 
Conversely, ‘women almost always employ violence in defense of self and children in 
response to cues of imminent assault … and in retaliation for previous physical abuse’.271 
They argued that, when men kill their female partners, it is often the final act in a protracted 
campaign of physical violence, abuse and coercion, and may be triggered upon discovering 
their partners’ infidelity or attempt to leave the relationship. Conversely, they suggested that 
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women who kill their male partners very rarely do so under the same circumstances. Rather, 
they do so in defence of themselves or their children.272 
More recently, feminist sociologists have demonstrated that the method used to analyse 
crime statistics affects the apparent seriousness of IPA for women.273 Walby, Towers and 
Francis note that it can be assumed, given the number of victims of crime in England and 
Wales, that the rate of violent crime is decreasing. However, they argue that IPA tends to 
involve repeated criminal conduct against individual victims. Therefore, measuring the 
incidence of crime by the number of victims fails to produce an accurate picture of the 
frequency with which violent crime is committed in intimate relationships.274 Measuring 
crime rates both by the number of victims and the number of crimes, they are able to 
demonstrate that that there has been ‘an increase … in violent crime and especially in the 
amount of violent crime against women and by domestic perpetrators’.275 
Feminist sociologists are committed to examining IPA in the context of gender. As Renzetti 
argues, ‘[t]hat women are sometimes violent in intimate relationships does not diminish the 
importance of discerning the role that gender plays in the etiology and perpetration of 
intimate violence’.276 IPA is represented by these researchers as ‘systemic and structural, a 
mechanism of patriarchal control of women that is built on male superiority and female 
inferiority, sex-stereotyped roles and expectations, and economic, social, and political 
predominance of men and dependency of women’.277 Feminist sociologists argue that it is 
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essential to remember the vast differences in men’s and women’s use of violence when 
analysing and responding to IPA.278 
Intersectionality (third-wave feminist sociologists) 
Women of colour and lesbians began entering the field of sociology in the 1990s, and have 
challenged an enduring assumption among various feminist scholars of the commonality of 
experience for all female IPA victims.279 The second-wave feminist movement, which 
heavily influenced feminist sociology, had until this point largely consisted of white, middle-
class women. This homogeneity perhaps allowed second-wave feminists to make the 
generalisation that IPA affects all women uniformly.280 Richie observes that, by emphasising 
the shared experiences of victims, second-wave feminists avoided individualising and 
therefore trivialising the problem, and instead directed attention to the constant impact of 
male social privilege on the perpetration of IPA.281 Nevertheless, these new members of the 
sociological community argued that, by generalising IPA to emphasise the role of gender, 
established feminist sociologists were making the problem race- and class-neutral, and 
denying the additional burdens faced by marginalised victims.282  
The sociological study of female victims of violence who are marginalised in multiple ways 
was termed ‘intersectionality theory’.283 Intersectionality theorists ‘challenged the primacy 
of gender as an explanatory model’ of IPA, and ‘emphasized the need to examine how other 
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forms of inequality and oppression, such as racism, ethnocentrism, class privilege, and 
heterosexism, intersect with gender oppression’.284 These new feminist sociologists argued 
that, while ‘being female does translate into some commonalities in oppression, 
marginalisation and exclusion’, ‘[w]omen’s experiences of violence and their ability to 
access justice are … not homogeneous’.285 
Intersectionalities shape how each individual experiences IPA, how their experiences are 
understood by the criminal justice system, and how easily they are able to escape abuse.286 
Sokoloff and Dupont note that people ‘exist in social contexts created by the intersections of 
systems of power (e.g. race, class, gender, and sexual orientation) and oppression (e.g. 
prejudice, class stratification, gender inequality, and heterosexist bias)’.287 While one or 
more of these systems of power and oppression may be at play in an individual’s experience 
of IPA, crucially, gender inequality is not the only (or even a necessary) determinant in every 
case.288 For example, Filipino women who migrate to Australia to marry men met through 
marriage agencies have been found to have heightened vulnerability to IPA, and limited 
capacity for resistance or escape due to their relative lack of economic power, and the risk 
to their citizenship status if they leave their abusers.289 Indigenous women face increased 
obstacles to escaping abuse because they are more likely to live in remote areas, lack access 
to social services, and are more likely to encounter racism directed against both them and 
their abusive partner if they seek police assistance.290 Victims with disabilities can be 
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relatively powerless against their abuser, on whom they may be dependant economically and 
for personal care.291 LGBTIQ victims may be prevented from leaving abusive relationships 
if they fear homophobia from police.292  
Recognition of the role of intersectionality has led to greater protection for victims under 
UK law in recent years. As part of the UK Government’s Violence Against Women and 
Girls (VAWG) strategy, it was recognised that ‘women and girls from a black, minority-
ethnic (BME) background may find it more difficult to leave an abusive situation’.293 In 
BME communities, forced marriages, female genital mutilation and so-called ‘honour’-
based violence are more common, and can make it harder for victims of IPA to leave their 
abusers. As part of the strategy, offences of IPA, forced marriage, and failure to protect from 
female genital mutilation have been introduced.294 Nevertheless, some intersectionality 
theorists argue that these new crimes identify abuse as a cultural phenomenon, thus 
obscuring abuse among non-minorities, and creating dangerous stereotypes of all BME men 
as violent.295  
Broad issues in criminal law theory 
Among criminal law theorists and law reform activists there has been discussion of a number 
of issues pertinent to the development of criminal law solutions to IPA. To appreciate how 
IPA is understood by these commentators, some of the major preoccupations within the field 
must be briefly addressed. 
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Overcriminalisation 
Criminalisation (the issue of determining the proper scope of the criminal law) has been the 
primary preoccupation of criminal law scholars since the 1990s.296 The set of conditions that 
must be satisfied for conduct to be criminalised have been the subject of extensive debate.297 
Criminal theorists have tended to support one of two positions; either that the criminal law 
should prevent and punish morally wrong behaviour, or that it should punish the infliction 
of harm.298  
Farmer suggests that neither position adequately explains why offences are created. He 
argues that the law is not developed based on core values of harm or morality, but that 
patterns of criminalisation demonstrate ‘that the law develops in response to specific social 
needs’.299 Those social needs develop and change over time, depending on the values 
deemed important, and the conduct deemed improper.300 We can see this in the trend towards 
criminalising new forms of violence. Offences against the person were established and 
adapted to reflect society’s changing understanding about legitimate forms of violence, 
rather than to reflect pre-legal wrongs. Farmer suggests that there is a chasm between the 
theory which ‘focuses on abstract and decontextualized ideas’, and the practice of 
criminalisation, which is determined by changing understandings of civil order and the aims 
of the criminal law.301 
Nevertheless, Farmer maintains that it is important to debate the proper scope of the criminal 
law. He explains that the current focus in criminalisation literature stems from concern that 
the law is too invasive, thus ‘limiting the autonomy of citizens, or punishing excessively 
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where the law is ineffective in changing conduct’.302 Husak observes an increasing trend for 
governments to overcriminalise by creating offences that target highly specific behaviour 
already covered by existing provisions.303 He expresses concern that there are too many 
criminal laws, and deplores the social obsession with criminalising ever more specific 
behaviour: 
A sensationalistic tragedy attracts media attention, and officials solemnly pledge to ‘do 
something’ to prevent similar events in the future. All too often, this ‘something’ consists 
in the enactment of a new offense: a crime du jour.304 
For those theorists concerned with overcriminalisation, a specific offence of IPA may be 
objectionable as it could constitute re-criminalisation. Many existing offences in the UK and 
Australia are applicable in cases of IPA, including assault, stalking, harassment, false 
imprisonment, criminal damage, rape, murder, and manslaughter.305 A specific offence that 
proscribes conduct covered by these offences could be seen as replicating these offences, 
with little practical benefit.  
Some scholars, such as Tadros and Youngs, reject this line of reasoning, and advocate the 
creation of a specific IPA offence, on the basis that IPA is a morally distinct form of violence 
to that already criminalised.306 They are able to conceive of IPA as morally distinct because 
they do not rely on a representation that focuses on individual criminal acts (e.g. assault, 
stalking, harassment, criminal damage, etc.). Instead, employing the feminist representation, 
these scholars argue that IPA constitutes a course of abuse undertaken in a relationship of 
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trust to restrict the victim’s autonomy.307 Given the ongoing nature of the conduct, and the 
variety of possible tactics involved, these scholars have suggested that IPA is sufficiently 
distinct to warrant a specific offence.308 
State responsibility 
Another point of contention among legal scholars is whether IPA ought to be dealt with 
exclusively by the state through the criminal law, or whether the victim ought to have a say 
in the action taken against the abuser. This debate stems from various understandings of the 
role of the criminal justice system, and various representations of IPA.  
Some criminal theorists argue that the purpose of the criminal justice system is to protect the 
interests of citizens by controlling crime.309 Ashworth argues that it is the state’s 
responsibility ‘to ensure that there is order and law-abidance in society, and to establish a 
system for the administration of criminal justice’ through which crime can be punished and 
potential offenders can be deterred.310 Thus, the prevention and prosecution of crime is in 
the public interest. Under this view, when conduct is found to be wrong, ‘there is a public 
interest in ensuring that people who commit such wrongs are liable to punishment’.311 This 
is not to deny the suffering of the victim, or to suggest that society as a whole is injured when 
one person is victimised. Rather, a wrong done to one member of the community is the 
proper concern of the whole community.312  
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Therefore, as IPA is considered worthy of criminal intervention, these theorists argue that it 
ought not to be open to victims to decide whether action will be taken against their abusers. 
The state, on behalf of the citizens it represents, is obliged to intervene and punish 
perpetrators. Duff argues that IPA ‘should surely not be seen as a matter for negotiation or 
compromise. It should be condemned by the whole community as unqualifiedly wrong; and 
this is done by defining and prosecuting it as a crime’.313 Thus, for these theorists, criminal 
justice is a matter between the community (the state) and the offender. The proper response 
to IPA is to prosecute for the sake of public interest.314 The decision to prosecute abusers 
ought not to be left to victims, who may be so fearful of their abuser, or so deeply under their 
abuser’s control, that they oppose prosecution.315 Were victims given decision-making 
power, there would be inconsistency in prosecution, and the public interest in punishing 
offenders would not be satisfied.  
Opponents of this view suggest that ‘criminal justice is not merely a contest between the 
defendant and the state’, but that it ought to consider ‘the rights and responsibilities of the 
victim’.316 According to Lewis et al, the main reasons victims give for reporting violence are 
to ensure protection for themselves and their children, to deter their partner from future 
abuse, and to receive public recognition of their suffering.317 Victims tend to be less 
concerned about punishment, and may oppose it if they wish to maintain the relationship 
with their abuser. If one understands the problem of IPA as an impairment of the victim’s 
autonomy, then it is arguably preferable to give victims a choice about what remedies are 
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sought,318 rather than to prosecute abusers without reference to victims’ wishes.319 Under 
this view, it is the victim’s needs, rather than the public’s, that ought to be the priority of the 
criminal justice system. Thus, to scholars who place the victim’s interests at the fore, 
criminal sanctions can be viewed as ‘too crude a remedy’.320  
2.3. MY SOCIAL VISION 
In using the WPR approach to evaluate problem representations, the evaluator’s social vision 
(that is, their values, assumptions and political motivations) will inform analysis.321 Bacchi’s 
social vision, for example, involves ‘improving the lives of people, and in particular 
women’.322 She therefore favours those social policies underpinned by problem 
representations that highlight women’s circumstances. It is necessary to be explicit about my 
vision, as it will colour my evaluation of various problem representations throughout the 
thesis. 
My social vision is for the criminal justice system to recognise and understand IPA as it is 
understood and experienced by individual victims. I suggest that victims are better served 
by context-specific approaches to intervention.323 My understanding of the actual 
experiences of victims is informed by the work of intersectionality theorists, who reject the 
proposition that all victims have a uniform experience of IPA.324 I understand IPA as 
ongoing conduct involving varied tactics (that may appear trivial when viewed 
independently), which have a cumulative effect on the victim’s ‘dignity, autonomy, and 
material security’ and possibly ‘physical integrity’.325 Representing IPA as discrete incidents 
of physical violence may be simpler in criminal justice systems that tend to rely on incident-
                                                 
318 This could include restorative justice measures such as mediation. 
319 van Wormer, above n 315, 111. 
320 Schneider, above n 128, 382. 
321 Bacchi, above n 26, 10. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Lewis et al, above n 317, 202. 
324 See especially Stark, above n 102; Sokoloff and Dupont, above n 279. 
325 Stark, above n 102, 398. 
57 
 
based analysis of most criminal conduct, but it misrepresents the experiences of victims, who 
deserve recognition of the fact that abuse tends to diminish the conditions under which they 
can flourish.326 
My analysis of the effects of problem representations will be informed by this social vision. 
I favour those representations that emphasise the circumstances of individual victims, and 
the diminution of liberty associated with IPA. Laws underpinned by such problem 
representations are, in my opinion, likely to be better placed to recognise the wrongs done 
to victims. As Stark enunciates, it is ‘the state’s obligation to provide all adult citizens with 
equal access to the conditions under which personal capacities can flourish and they can feel 
worthy’.327 
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CHAPTER 3: A CHALLENGE TO FAIR LABELLING THEORY 
3.1. FAIR LABELLING 
A great deal has been said about the effect of labels in the field of IPA. As discussed in 
chapter 1, scholars frequently debate the capacity of terms such as ‘wife batterer’ and 
‘domestic abuser’ to appropriately stigmatise abusers. When we create distinct offences of 
IPA, we inevitably encounter the debate once again under the guise of the principle of fair 
labelling. Fair labelling, attributable to Ashworth, who initially described it as 
‘representative labelling’, is considered one of the normative principles of criminal 
liability.328 Its purpose is to signal ‘the nature and magnitude of … law-breaking’ involved 
in distinct offences.329 An inaccurate or vague label may encourage speculation or give a 
false impression about the offender’s actions.330 Thus, a fair label uses simple, descriptive 
language to conjure an image of what the offender did, and what is wrong with that conduct.  
Although it has been claimed to be beyond reproach,331 I challenge an aspect of fair labelling 
on the basis that it conflicts with WPR. The primary assumption of fair labelling – that there 
is something which can be fairly and accurately labelled – is flawed if we accept Bacchi’s 
claim that social problems do not exist interpretation-free. Nevertheless, we must use labels, 
and the WPR approach can help us identify those that produce favourable effects. The 
language we use to label and define a problem inevitably places barriers around how the 
problem can be conceived and what solutions are possible. It is therefore vital to consider 
the effects of labels, even if I suggest abandoning the idea that there is one ‘fair’ or accurate 
label for IPA.  
                                                 
328 A J Ashworth, ‘The Elasticity of Mens Rea’ in C. F. H. Tapper (ed), Crime, Proof and Punishment: Essays 
in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross (Butterworths, 1981) 45, 53. 
329 Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 6th ed, 2009) 78. 
330 James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, ‘Fair Labelling in Criminal Law’ (2008) 71(2) Modern Law Review 
217, 227–8. 
331 Glanville Williams, ‘Convictions and Fair Labelling’ (1983) 42(1) Cambridge Law Journal 85, 85–6. 
59 
 
Fairness to whom? 
Before challenging the assumption of fair labelling, it is important to consider to whom 
fairness is owed. In the following, I consider how fairness requirements differ for the 
offender and victim. Rather than consider offence labels for IPA, which are sparse and 
relatively new, I draw on sexual offence labels to demonstrate the importance of (and 
difficulty of attributing) fairness to offenders and victims.  
The defendant 
One of the foundational requirements of fair labelling is according fairness to the defendant. 
Persons convicted of crimes are stigmatised by society, and that stigma ought to be 
proportionate to the offender’s wrongdoing.332 Ashworth argues that the circumstances of 
an offender’s conduct can fade from memory following conviction.333 Before long, offence 
labels become the only way for potential employers, criminal justice officials, and the 
community to evaluate offenders. Therefore, of particular concern for Ashworth is finding a 
principle to ensure that the appropriate level of stigma attaches to offenders based on their 
moral deserts. He suggests that offence labels that ‘express the wrongdoing of the accused 
and precisely identify his moral blameworthiness’ can prevent the over-statement of an 
offender’s fault.334 A vague or misleading label could disproportionately damage an 
offender’s reputation, lead sentencing judges for subsequent offending to pass more severe 
sentences based on previous convictions, and make potential employers reluctant about 
hiring the offender.335 Thus, offence labels must accurately convey the offender’s actions, 
so they are not excessively censured by the community into which they must eventually re-
integrate.  
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The debate surrounding labels attached to sexual offences – ‘rape’ or ‘sexual assault’ – 
provides a useful example. The Law Reform Commission of Victoria (VLRC) recognised in 
1986 that ‘rape’ is an emotive label, which evokes ‘a particularly effective and appropriate 
form of stigma’.336 The VLRC suggested that the term could conjure in the public’s minds 
an accurate image of the offender’s wrongdoing, as it aptly conveys the terror, humiliation 
and degradation associated with the conduct covered by the offence.337 Various UK and 
Australian government bodies have concluded that ‘rape’ is a fair label as the public has a 
clear understanding of what the term means,338 and therefore, upon hearing that a person is 
a ‘rapist’, could be expected to comprehend their exact behaviour and its immorality. Thus, 
these bodies consider that the label ‘rape’ is fair to offenders as the public is able to recognise 
those truly ‘deserving of the stigma’ entailed by the label.339 
However, each UK and Australian jurisdiction that uses the ‘rape’ label defines the conduct 
differently. For example, UK offences of rape cover non-consensual penetration of the 
vagina, anus or mouth of a male or female victim with the offending male’s penis.340 In SA, 
rape covers non-consensual penetration of a male or female victim’s vagina, labia majora or 
anus by a male or female offender, or an object controlled by the offender, as well as fellatio 
and cunnilingus.341 In Victoria, a male or female offender can commit rape by sexually 
penetrating the male or female victim, or by compelling the victim to sexually penetrate 
themselves, the offender, another person, or an animal, or to be penetrated by another person 
or an animal.342 Therefore, the suggestion that ‘rape’ is something accurately and 
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consistently understood by the public can be challenged by the fact that ‘rape’ does not, and 
has never had, a consistent meaning at law.343 Thus, the argument that the label ‘rape’ can 
produce an accurate understanding of a person’s wrongdoing is erroneous. Simester and 
Sullivan argue that for a label to be fair to an offender, it must be capable of conveying to 
the public ‘exactly what [the offender] has done wrong and why he is being punished’.344 
Given that ‘rape’ has an inconsistent meaning, the label is incapable of sending the public 
an exact message, and could lead to the unfair stigmatisation of some offenders.345 
Unlike ‘rape’, the label ‘sexual assault’ implies that it captures a wide range of non-
consensual sexual conduct. Its capacity to cover a broad range of conduct committed against 
victims of either sex is the main reason it has been preferred over ‘rape’ in NSW.346 
However, the label could be considered inappropriately vague. Unlike ‘rape’, ‘sexual 
assault’ is not a strongly emotive term. The public is less able to infer the offender’s conduct 
from the label, as it may refer to a wide range of sexual conduct of varying degrees of 
seriousness. The label could therefore encourage ‘speculation and false assumptions’ about 
an offender’s behaviour.347 For example, the Committee responsible for developing the 
Australian Model Criminal Code (MCCOC) observed that the Australian public frequently 
refers to persons convicted of sexual assault as rapists, regardless of the offender’s actual 
conduct.348 Chalmers and Leverick argue that a label is fair to an offender when it ‘does not 
create a false or misleading impression of the nature or magnitude of the offender’s 
wrongdoing or encourage an inaccurate conclusion to be drawn’.349 It is for this reason that 
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the MCCOC proposed the alternative label ‘unlawful sexual penetration’.350 It suggested that 
this label fairly represents the exact conduct involved in the offence – that is, non-consensual 
sexual penetration of any kind – and therefore does not give a false impression. 
A further consideration in providing fairness to offenders is whether the label ensures 
accuracy and consistency in the application of the offence. The MCCOC, for example, 
avoided the label ‘rape’ on the basis that it conjures imagery of a furtive stranger attacking 
a defenceless woman in a darkened alley, which might lead juries to be ‘reluctant to convict 
reasonable-looking, well-dressed and presentable men of an offence stereotypically 
associated with lower socio-economic males’.351 It suggested that ‘unlawful sexual 
penetration’, a less emotionally-charged label, would help to remove the influence of 
stereotypes, thus ensuring that juries convict more fairly and consistently.352 
Duff considers labels to be important for their capacity to speak to potential offenders prior 
to the commission of crime. He argues that the law must address potential offenders to give 
them ‘fair notice of what would make them liable, and a fair opportunity to avoid liability’.353 
In theory, a potential offender ought to be able to discover from an offence label whether 
conduct they are considering is punishable. Offence labels that give little detail about the 
prohibited conduct hinder such discovery, and are therefore arguably unfair. Where a 
specific label (e.g. ‘rape’) is used to describe a wide range of conduct, or where a vague or 
broad label is used (e.g. ‘sexual assault’), a potential offender is not given fair notice about 
how their planned actions will be judged.  
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To Ashworth – who was deeply concerned about wrongly stigmatised offenders – fairness 
to victims did not appear a significant consideration. Since his original explanation of the 
principle, the interests of victims have been recognised as equally important.354 As Horder 
puts it, if an offence label ‘gives too anaemic a conception’ of offending conduct and its 
moral gravity, ‘it is fair neither to the defendant, nor to the victim. For the wrongdoing of 
the former, and the wrong suffered by the latter, will not have been properly represented to 
the public’.355 The label applied to an offender inevitably also attaches to the victim.356 
Whether or not the victim is personally identified during trial, they will be referred to by the 
court and the media as the victim of crime – a victim of child marriage, a victim of female 
genital mutilation, etc. It is through illuminating the degradation suffered by the victim that 
courts can demonstrate the abhorrence of the defendant’s conduct. Victim status is already 
troubling for many, as evidenced by the fact that some who have experienced IPA prefer to 
describe themselves as ‘survivors’ rather than ‘victims’.357 Distress at being described as a 
victim can be aggravated when the type of victimisation is misrepresented to the public 
through an inappropriately vague or inaccurate label.  
Settling on a label for sexual offences that is fair to the victim is a particular challenge. As 
discussed above, many jurisdictions have ‘rape’ offences covering extensive conduct. 
Zawati observes that a broad definition of rape not only unfairly stigmatises the offender as 
a rapist, but also stigmatises the victim as a victim of rape.358 A person may not see what 
they experienced as rape, but the label ‘rape victim’ nevertheless attaches to them, increasing 
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‘the trauma and stigma’ they experience.359 Especially in conservative communities, victims 
may be dissuaded from reporting offending conduct to avoid the shame and humiliation of 
being improperly labelled and stigmatised as a rape victim.360  
Conversely, where the ‘rape’ label is applied to a narrowly defined offence, those victims of 
equally humiliating and degrading sexual misconduct excluded from the definition do not 
receive appropriate recognition of their suffering.361 It was for this reason that the Tasmanian 
rape offence was extended. The original offence defined rape as non-consensual penetration 
of the victim’s vagina, anus or mouth by the offender’s penis. However, following a 2017 
Supreme Court ruling that a man could not be convicted of rape for performing non-
consensual oral sex on an intellectually disabled man,362 the Tasmanian government 
extended the offence to a wider range of conduct.363 In NSW, the alternative label ‘sexual 
assault’ was adopted to address the same issue.364 In parliamentary debates, it was argued 
that a broader offence would protect more people ‘far better than the medieval law of 
rape’.365 Nevertheless, it has been suggested elsewhere that the label ‘sexual assault’ does 
not provide fairness to victims because it ‘does not convey the true character of the offence. 
The emphasis on “assault” detracts from the intrusive and violent nature of non-consensual 
penetrative sexual activity’.366 The perception that ‘sexual assault’ does not adequately 
convey the victim’s experience was rather crassly demonstrated by a cartoon in the Sydney 
Morning Herald during debates about the proposed law reform in NSW. The cartoon 
depicted a woman being pursued by a man who says ‘But listen lady, since Mr Wran [then 
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NSW Premier] substituted “sexual assault” for “rape” there is no stigma attached to it’.367 
The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal also observed some years after the label was adopted 
that it ‘tends to divert attention’ from the true nature of the offender’s ‘vicious and brutal’ 
behaviour.368  
Thus, we can see what Ashworth described as ‘the complex and contestable issues involved 
in implementing the principle of fair labelling’.369 When creating an offence, we must be 
conscious of the effects of labels on victims and offenders, and aim to settle on one that 
meets the needs of both. With this understanding of the elusive nature of a ‘fair’ label in 
mind, we can now appreciate how the principle has been used to justify the creation of 
specific offences of IPA. 
Fair labelling of IPA 
When existing offences against the person are charged in cases of IPA, the nature of the 
abuser’s wrongdoing is not expressed through the labels attached to them. The public cannot 
easily identify intimate partner abusers through labels such as assault, rape, false 
imprisonment, or stalking.370 Thus, those who commit IPA are not appropriately stigmatised. 
The range of coercive and controlling tactics involved in IPA, when undertaken repeatedly, 
arguably form a morally distinct type of interpersonal violence, and therefore ought to be 
recognised through a specific offence label.371 Thus, the use of general offence labels in 
cases of IPA is arguably unfair to victims, whose experiences go unrecognised, and to 
abusers, who are not appropriately stigmatised.  
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There are several options open to legislatures attempting to rectify this unfairness. One is to 
highlight specific conduct already covered by a general criminal offence by creating a 
distinct offence label. This was the approach taken in Queensland with the offence of 
‘Choking, suffocation or strangulation in a domestic setting’.372 While such conduct can be 
charged as assault, a specific offence was introduced on the basis that strangulation is a 
frequent precursor to severe violence, particularly intimate partner homicide.373 A specific 
offence label for such conduct therefore allows police, sentencing judges and social service 
providers to assess the risk of future violence, and facilitates better public understanding of 
the context and seriousness of the abuser’s conduct.374  
Another approach is to extend criminal liability to capture conduct not previously 
criminalised. A distinct offence of IPA, incorporating conduct not covered by existing 
offences against the person, with a descriptive label, could demonstrate to the public and 
criminal justice officials that IPA ought to be taken seriously in its own right.375 The new 
UK offence of coercive and controlling behaviour,376 for example, was touted by the Home 
Office as sending 
a clear message that this form of domestic abuse can constitute a serious offence. … It 
sets out the importance of recognising the harm caused by coercion or control, the 
cumulative impact on the victim and that a repeated pattern of abuse can be more injurious 
and harmful than a single incident of violence.377  
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Similarly, the Tasmanian offences of economic abuse, and emotional abuse or 
intimidation,378 were justified as a demonstration to the public that IPA ‘does not always 
take an overtly physical form and that it can involve a range of behaviours aimed at isolating 
the victim and undermining their capacity to take independent action’.379 In fairness to 
victims, these governments deemed it important for the criminal law to specifically recognise 
these forms of behaviour as distinct from already proscribed conduct.380 
Another option is to introduce statutory aggravations for existing offences when they are 
committed in the context of IPA. In SA and WA, certain offences against the person are 
aggravated when committed against current or former intimate partners.381 Offences that can 
attract a higher penalty include assault, causing harm, stalking, and unlawful threats.382 
Crucially, however, aggravating elements are not included in offence labels, nor in the 
sentence passed. As such, it is arguable that offenders are not fairly labelled and stigmatised, 
and that victims do not receive fair recognition of their suffering.383 Further, sentencing 
judges, who are required to take an offender’s record of previous convictions into account 
in determining their sentence,384 are not able to glean information about the circumstances 
of previous convictions from aggravated offences without distinct labels.385 It is therefore 
important that labels on an offender’s record are descriptive enough to provide sentencing 
judges with sufficient information to sentence intimate partner abusers appropriately. It was 
for this reason that the NSW Government introduced the Crimes (Domestic and Personal 
Violence) Act, which requires that if a person is found guilty of an offence of personal 
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violence, and the court is satisfied that the crime occurred in the context of a current or 
former domestic relationship, the offence will be recorded on the defendant’s criminal record 
as a ‘domestic violence offence’.386 In parliamentary debates, it was argued that this label 
‘would leave a permanent stain on a person’s record and would be readily identifiable by a 
sentencing court’.387 The Act ensures that ‘a clear statement is made about the aggravated 
nature of an offence of violence that is committed in the context of a domestic 
relationship’.388 
3.2. A CHALLENGE TO FAIR LABELLING 
The principle of fair labelling is one of the normative principles of criminal liability.389 
Williams goes so far as to suggest that it ‘is immune from challenge as a principle of 
justice’.390 However, is the principle so immune? The primary assumption of fair labelling 
is that there is something which can be fairly, and therefore accurately, labelled.391 Chalmers 
and Leverick, who have made the most notable contribution to the study of fair labelling 
since Ashworth’s original enunciation, use the adjectives ‘fair’ and ‘accurate’ 
interchangeably. One may argue that the two words are not synonymous and that ‘fair’ 
merely means suitable. It is Chalmers and Leverick’s assumption that fair means accurate 
which I challenge.  
It is a common assumption of some legal theorists that there exists in the world a variety of 
discrete moral wrongs that simply need to be matched with corresponding laws.392 This 
assumption is in part attributable to the common practice Lacey identifies among these 
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theorists of discussing only those crimes that are undoubtedly morally wrong.393 Duff, for 
example, insists that we ought to refrain from certain conduct, such as murder, rape and theft, 
‘not because the law prohibits them, but because they are wrongs’.394 His influential view, 
according to Lacey, is that crime is a moral, rather than a legal category, and as such is 
‘outside the ambit of deliberate legislative change. Hence the role of criminal law is basically 
to reflect and articulate a pre-existing conception of wrongdoing’.395 Thus, it is frequently 
supposed that the task of legislators is to write offences, and offence labels, that match these 
pre-existing wrongs. This assumes the existence of an accurate and concrete definition of 
the wrong outside of the law that can be reduced to a label. I challenge this assumption.  
WPR denies the existence of unchanging social problems, and the idea that the law responds 
directly to those problems. There is, Bacchi argues, no such thing as a ‘real’ social problem. 
[W]hile … there are a multitude of disturbing social conditions, once they are given the 
shape of an interpretation, once they are characterized as a ‘problem’ or as a ‘social 
problem’, they are no longer ‘real’. They are interpretations or constructs of the ‘real’. 
We can have no access to the ‘real’.396 
Once a social condition has been constructed as a social problem (that is, once people start 
recognising certain conduct as problematic), it is assigned a particular shape or interpretation 
by those discussing it. It may, in fact, be assigned multiple competing interpretations by 
different people with varying expertise, experience and views. Regardless, once something 
is considered problematic, we cannot think about it without it being coloured by an 
interpretation. All we can know is our understanding of the problem. Thus, when it is claimed 
that an offence label accurately captures the essence of a crime, what it really captures is a 
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representation of a social problem. A label cannot give an accurate picture of what is wrong 
with such conduct, because there is no accurate, interpretation-free picture. 
The social condition of people abusing their intimate partners has occurred throughout 
history. However, as discussed in the chapter 2, the social condition only relatively recently 
regained problem status, following a period of silence in the early 20th century. When 
second-wave feminists argued that such abuse was a problem, and elucidated what the 
problem was, it lost its status as a ‘real’ condition, and became an interpretation of the ‘real’. 
While myriad competing representations have emerged, none have captured the precise 
reality of the social condition. As Bacchi’s approach tells us, there is no one, true, concrete 
definition of the causes and concerns of IPA that can be free from interpretation. There are 
representations of the ‘real’397 – coloured by the assumptions and biases of scholars. This is 
true of all social conditions – even those which legal moralists such as Duff have deemed to 
be pre-legally wrong. While Duff has argued that rape, for example, is indisputably and 
constantly wrong,398 what constitutes rape, and what makes rape wrong, has changed 
dramatically over time as community attitudes have altered.399 Thus, we cannot claim to 
have the capacity to identify the ‘real’ causes and concerns of IPA. This is not to suggest 
that the ‘real’ problem does not exist – only that, as Bacchi puts it, we ‘can have no direct 
access to the “real”’.400  
Our conventional understanding of new criminal offences is that they are lawmakers’ best 
attempts to deal with ‘fixed and identifiable’ problems.401 WPR denies this possibility. WPR 
demonstrates that lawmakers do not create labels that best describe a problem; rather, they 
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settle on a problem representation, and create a criminal offence reflecting that 
representation. The offence label will convey what the conduct is and what is wrong with it 
according to their chosen representation. Lawmakers are in a privileged position, because 
they are able to impose their problem representation on the public by enshrining it in law.402 
Their label, and its implicit representation, is widely broadcast to the public, and can shape 
how the community views the problem.403 Chalmers and Leverick acknowledge and even 
encourage the use of labels to educate the public about wrongdoing.404 While they argue that 
offence labels ought ideally to reflect public opinion, as the public is more likely to treat the 
law with respect if offence labels reflect their own understanding of the problem, Chalmers 
and Leverick suggest that there are circumstances where ‘it may be legitimate for the law to 
seek to shape public opinion’.405 They suggest that the state ought to be responsible for 
demonstrating to the public that certain conduct, especially that committed against a 
vulnerable minority, ought to be taken seriously. Tadros uses a similar line of reasoning to 
advocate the creation of a distinct IPA offence. He suggests that the duty of states to ‘protect 
minorities and those without a strong public voice’ may supersede their duty to ‘reflect in 
their policies the views and values of the citizenry’.406 The creation of a specific offence with 
a descriptive label may therefore be used as a tool to demonstrate to the public that certain 
conduct, such as IPA, is the ‘proper subject of public condemnation’.407  
Lawmakers are therefore not reacting to problems, but are active in their creation.408 They 
create the problem in the sense that they tell the public what to think about it. When members 
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of the public first come to see that conduct as wrongful, they will likely see it through the 
lens of the lawmaker’s representation. By creating an offence, lawmakers effectively silence 
alternative representations. The public’s capacity to consider alternative representations is 
hindered because lawmakers present them with a definitive statement of the problem.  
Consider the following offences applicable in cases of IPA: the UK offence of controlling 
or coercive behaviour,409 the Tasmanian offences of economic abuse410 and emotional abuse 
or intimidation,411 and the Queensland offence of torture.412 The labels of each of these 
offences are intended to explain to the public the kind of conduct involved, as well as the 
moral blameworthiness of perpetrators. Each label appears to achieve that which Chalmers 
and Leverick idealise, as they have ‘simple, informative names that convey the essential 
nature of the wrongdoing and minimise the potential for misrepresentation or 
misunderstanding’.413 They also differentiate the conduct they cover from other forms of 
interpersonal violence. Based on the labels of these offences, a member of the public could 
be expected to easily comprehend the seriousness of an offender’s behaviour.  
However, when viewed through the lens of WPR, these varying labels become problematic. 
The plethora of representations here, all purporting in various ways to address the same 
social problem – abuse between intimate partners – reveal that a ‘fair’ and ‘accurate’ label 
for IPA changes with how each legislature views the ‘problem’. Each label presents a vastly 
different interpretation of what IPA is and why abusers ought to be condemned. 
Queenslanders are told that IPA is a human rights violation, UK citizens have it represented 
as an issue of autonomy, and Tasmanians are given the impression that it can be either an 
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issue of property rights or emotional abuse. The capacity for the law to mould public opinion 
means that in each jurisdiction people are led to accept the representation of IPA bound up 
in the relevant offence label. Media reports of trials involving these offences invariably use 
the offence labels interchangeably with ‘domestic violence’ or ‘family violence’, thus 
encouraging the public to equate them.414 Clearly, each offence deals with behaviour of 
varying degrees of seriousness, and none claim to deal with all manifestations of IPA. 
Nevertheless, the public in different jurisdictions are being given different reasons for why 
they are supposed to abhor IPA and condemn abusers. Thus, what is ‘fair’ and ‘accurate’ is 
different in each jurisdiction. When lawmakers claim that an offence label matches the moral 
essence of a wrong, they are actually selecting one of multiple representations of the wrong, 
of which none are the fixed truth. There is in fact no true, accurate label, because different 
labels bring different understandings of the problem into being. 
The principle of fair labelling is thus at odds with Bacchi’s understanding of social problems. 
The former assumes that concrete social problems exist, and can be solved by corresponding 
offences, and the latter insists that the problem only comes into being once a law purporting 
to solve it is enacted. If we accept Bacchi’s approach, then for any social problem there are 
myriad varying interpretations about its causes and concerns. Of these, lawmakers choose 
one and create an offence on the basis of that interpretation. How then can the resulting 
offence label be a fair and accurate summary of the prohibited conduct and its immorality? 
The label is in fact one of many possible descriptors, each of which is merely an 
interpretation of the ‘real’ problem. 
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3.3. EVALUATING OFFENCE LABELS 
Nevertheless, we must have a label with which to describe criminalised conduct. Chalmers 
and Leverick note the absurdity of outlining an offender’s conduct in narrative form on their 
criminal record.415 While I suggest that no label can give an accurate and uncoloured picture 
of the offending conduct and what is wrong with it, I do not suggest being flippant about the 
choice of label. Different labels produce different effects, so we ought to carefully consider 
which produces the most favourable effects. Settling on a label is not about uncovering 
‘whose reality is right’,416 but about choosing the best possible representation, based on our 
particular aims.  
The WPR method can help us to evaluate offence labels. Question 5 of WPR prompts us to 
consider the effects of competing representations – that is, who benefits and who suffers 
under various interpretations of the problem. We can use this information to determine which 
representation, and therefore which label, produces better outcomes. As noted in chapter 2, 
Bacchi insists that such evaluations are coloured by the values, beliefs, and assumptions of 
the evaluator.417 For example, my own social vision, as enunciated in chapter 2, would lead 
me to favour a criminal offence label informed by a representation of IPA that recognises 
and reflects the experiences of victims. Offences and labels underpinned by a representation 
that reflects the experiences of victims are, in my opinion, more likely to provide appropriate 
recognition of the harms they suffer. Provided we are explicit about our convictions, and 
whose interests we seek to promote in new offences, we are able to evaluate problem 
representations, and therefore offence labels, in an open and conscious manner.  
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3.4. ‘REPRESENTATIVE’ LABELLING 
I do not mean to completely disparage the principle of fair labelling. Its aims remain relevant 
in determining the best offence label. However, the phrase ‘fair labelling’ is perhaps no 
longer appropriate, as it suggests the existence of an accurate and unequivocal description 
of social problems. I suggest that we return to Ashworth’s original terminology of 
‘representative labelling’, though admittedly not for Ashworth’s reasons.418 When Ashworth 
first used this phrase, he intended for it to signify an accurate representation of the offender’s 
wrongdoing. Williams rejected the use of the word ‘representative’ in his response to 
Ashworth, on the grounds that ‘representative’ is frequently used to denote the few acting 
for the many (e.g. representative government).419 Williams instead favoured the word ‘fair’. 
I do not see the danger of misunderstanding that concerned Williams. I fail to see the context 
in which the word ‘representative’, meaning the few acting on behalf of the many, could be 
paired with the word ‘labelling’ to create a meaningful principle. Further, the phrase ‘fair 
labelling’ appears to me to be no more self-explanatory than ‘representative labelling’. A 
return to the former title seems to me no great hindrance.  
I suggest that ‘representative labelling’ far better serves our purposes, as it allows for 
recognition that the label reflects merely a representation of the problem. The OED defines 
‘representation’ as an ‘action of putting forward an account of something discursively’, or a 
statement ‘which conveys or intends to create a particular view or impression’.420 This is 
similar to Bacchi’s definition of problem representations: the way ‘problems are described, 
implied causations and the implications which follow’.421 Using the phrase ‘representative 
labelling’ reminds us that lawmakers choose one of many possible representations of the 
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problem, none of which are completely accurate. The label is therefore ‘representative’ of 
the wrong, rather than a fair and accurate description of the wrong. The phrase is an 
important reminder that, to judge the suitability of an offence label, we must consider who 
benefits and who suffers from its implicit problem representation. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE BULLY AND THE UNDERDOG – GENDERED LANGUAGE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 
I actually did change my language when it … was brought to my attention that there 
[were] some serious issues surrounding some men in our community needing help as 
well.422 
When Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk spoke with a male IPA survivor during a 
community event in 2015, she admitted her previous lack of recognition of male victims. 
She confirmed her new commitment to using gender-neutral language when discussing IPA, 
and to make future IPA campaigns more inclusive of male victims.423 Palaszczuk’s 
seemingly mild decision to use gender-neutral language when talking about IPA was met 
with indignation, with a responding headline blaring ‘Annastacia Palaszczuk warned: don’t 
put domestic violence against men above women’.424 Karyn Walsh, a representative of the 
Brisbane Domestic Violence Service, responded to Palaszczuk’s comments by saying ‘[i]t’s 
important to acknowledge any human being that experiences violence but we need to make 
sure our response to domestic violence maintains a gendered focus’.425 For Walsh, the core 
of IPA is men’s belief in their right to possess women. Her concern was that, by not explicitly 
referring to women as victims and men as abusers, Palaszczuk could overlook the role of 
gender in IPA perpetration, which could result in improper allocation of funding for victim 
resources.426 This example succinctly demonstrates an unrelenting debate about the language 
we use to talk about IPA: should we refer to perpetrators and victims using gender-neutral 
pronouns (such as ‘the person’) to ensure that all cases are treated as equally serious, or 
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should we use language that highlights what is often represented as the paradigmatic case of 
IPA (that is, a man abusing his female partner)?  
Of particular interest to Bacchi is the language used to refer to the subjects of problems – 
the people who engage in, and are affected by, problematic conduct. She argues that an 
important aspect of WPR is considering to whom ‘the roles of bully and underdog’ are 
allocated in problem representations, ‘and how a different definition would change power 
relations’.427 In this chapter, I analyse the language used in IPA offences to uncover how 
these roles have been assigned, and the effect of language that brings the gender of 
perpetrators and victims to the fore, compared with language which obscures gender. By 
considering the language we use to talk about victims and offenders, we can identify the 
most useful way to convey the experiences and circumstances of victims of IPA.428  
4.1. HOW IPA BECAME GENDER-NEUTRAL 
While most UK and Australian government policy is underpinned by an assumption that IPA 
is a gendered phenomenon (i.e. that IPA is more commonly committed by men against 
women, and made possible or more serious by physical and social inequalities between men 
and women),429 it is striking that offences charged in cases of IPA in both countries are 
almost invariably written in gender-neutral language.430 Before we can uncover the effects 
of statutory language on victims of IPA, it is useful to examine why this dominant 
assumption in policy is not transferred into law.  
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At this stage, the question of whether IPA is actually a gendered phenomenon is not 
important for our purposes.431 We are not concerned with identifying the truth (if indeed it 
can be identified), but with what has been assumed to be true by those representing the 
problem.432 There are two major arguments about how the gendered dynamics of IPA ought 
to be conceptualised. The first is that IPA should not be understood as a gendered 
phenomenon because women can be abusers, and IPA can occur in same-sex relationships. 
The second is that IPA is generally committed by men against their female intimate partners. 
As part of this assumption, male aggression against current and former female intimate 
partners tends to be contextualised as part of men’s social and physical domination over 
women. Male violence against women is thus presented as a consequence of men’s greater 
physical strength, economic standing, and historic superiority over women.433  
As discussed in chapter 2, these competing assumptions stem from the extensive debate on 
the causes and dynamics of IPA among researchers from various fields. As Stark observes, 
‘[n]o question … excites more passionate disagreement’ than whether perpetrators are 
predominantly men and victims are predominantly women.434 The word ‘passionate’ is 
perhaps an understatement. Critics of the gender-neutral explanation have written to 
government agencies to demand the rescission of grants awarded to ‘family violence’ 
researchers.435 Proponents of the gender-neutral explanation have received death threats, and 
bomb threats have been made against conferences at which some have been scheduled to 
appear.436 On the other side, opponents have called the gender paradigm a ‘cult’ that ignores 
‘inconvenient’ data in pursuit of their ‘dogma’.437 The two sides are irreconcilable, and are 
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likely to remain so given that qualitative and quantitative data drawn on by each tends to 
measure entirely different conduct.438 Nevertheless, the assumption that IPA is gendered 
underpins most Australian and UK government research and policy on IPA,439 and has been 
the basis of several government-funded awareness campaigns.440 It could therefore be 
considered strange that the assumed roles of men and women in the perpetration of IPA 
appear to have slipped from the consciousness of lawmakers. New UK and Australian IPA 
offences invariably refer to offenders and victims as ‘persons’,441 or ‘A’ and ‘B’,442 as 
opposed to ‘the man’ and ‘the woman’ respectively. Consider, for example, the following 
UK offence: 
76 Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship  
(1)  A person (A) commits an offence if—  
(a)  A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards another 
person (B) that is controlling or coercive,   
(b)  at the time of the behaviour, A and B are personally connected,   
(c)  the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and   
(d)  A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect 
on B.   
(2)  A and B are “personally connected” if—  
(a) A is in an intimate personal relationship with B, or  
(b) A and B live together and—   
(i)    they are members of the same family, or   
(ii) they have previously been in an intimate personal 
relationship with each other.443 
The offence represents IPA as controlling or coercive behaviour committed by one 
genderless person, A, against another genderless person, B. Yet tracing back through 
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research and government policy that influenced the content of the offence reveals that the 
representation has not always been gender-neutral.  
The concept of coercive control has informed programs to reduce male violence against 
women since the late 1970s.444 The most authoritative scholarly statement of coercive 
control comes from the highly influential American feminist sociologist Evan Stark. 
Although Stark’s sociological research draws heavily on his clinical work with abusers and 
victims in America, his is the dominant representation of coercive control in the UK and 
Australia.445 Stark represents coercive control as ‘a course of calculated, malevolent conduct 
deployed almost exclusively by men to dominate individual women by interweaving 
repeated physical abuse with three equally important tactics: intimidation, isolation and 
control’.446 For Stark, while physical violence is an important (though not vital) aspect of 
IPA, the primary harm inflicted by coercive control ‘is political, not physical, and reflects 
the deprivation of rights and resources that are critical to personhood and citizenship’.447 
Gender is fundamental to Stark’s formulation of coercive control. While Stark recognises 
that both women and men physically and verbally assault intimate partners, he argues that 
women’s subordinate position in society makes them especially vulnerable to coercive 
control by men.448 He points to specific examples of women’s inequality that increase the 
risk of, and difficulty of escaping abuse: economic inequality between men and women, 
gender norms that attribute greater household and childcare responsibilities to women, and 
gendered expectations that women will defer to the needs of their husbands and family.449 
Stark observes that abusive men adopt tactics that take advantage of this imbalance of power 
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to establish control. One tactic men may use is micromanaging their female partners’ 
performance of stereotypically female behaviour and roles: ‘how women dress, cook, clean, 
socialise, care for their children, or perform sexually’.450 Another tactic a man can use to 
establish control is to diminish his partner’s independence (e.g. by confiscating pay cheques, 
constantly checking up on her at work, or not permitting her to socialise).451 In addition, a 
man may be physically violent.452 A man may employ some or all of these tactics, slowly 
increasing his demands of his partner over time, in order to diminish her autonomy.453 These 
tactics ‘limit [women’s] freedoms, curtail their liberties, exploit their resources and 
subjugate them’.454 They are effective because they are seemingly ordinary – control can be 
established imperceptibly, and the effect of the various tactics accumulates, slowly eroding 
the victim’s ‘space for action’.455 
Stark’s gendered representation of IPA as coercive control was adopted by the UK 
Government in the process of implementing its VAWG strategy. The strategy was deeply 
influenced by a gendered construction of violence against women – that is, it was based on 
an assumption that women and girls frequently experience violence because they are 
female.456 To implement aims of the strategy, the UK Government introduced the offence of 
controlling or coercive behaviour into the Serious Crime Bill.457 However, the offence was 
framed in gender-neutral terms. 
Despite the influence of Stark’s representation, it seems his views about the primacy of 
gender in coercive control did not prevail. It might be said that Stark did not hold the 
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enunciative position in the creation of the new offence. Had he retained his enunciative 
power, the resulting offence may well have been gender-specific, or may have included a 
definition of controlling or coercive behaviour which would have revealed the gendered 
nature of the representation. Rather, the enunciative power was held by lawmakers, who 
altered Stark’s representation. Bacchi reminds us that problem representations are strategic 
endeavours, designed ‘to win the most people to one’s side and the most leverage over one’s 
opponents’.458 Whatever the UK Government’s attitude towards the role of gender in IPA, 
it is important to satisfy the majority of the voting public when creating a new offence and, 
as we shall see, the public has a strong opinion about the use of gendered language, both in 
general and in relation to IPA. 
Interestingly, the current trend of using gender-neutral language in legislative drafting in the 
UK and Australia may be associated with the second-wave feminist movement.459 Prior to 
that, a common drafting practice was the ‘masculine rule’ – a term Petersson uses to describe 
the use of male pronouns to represent both men and women.460 The masculine rule was 
adopted in the UK in 1850,461 as a way of reducing the volume of law.462 As a result, statutes 
such as the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 used ‘he’ as the predominant pronoun for 
offences applying to ‘all persons’.463 By the 1980s, dissatisfaction with the masculine rule 
(both in legislative drafting and as a general grammatical practice) was widely expressed in 
the UK and Australia.464 The masculine rule was regarded by feminists as perpetuating 
discrimination against women. To some, the assumption that ‘he’ subsumed ‘she’ implied 
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that ‘personality is really a male attribute, and that women are a human subspecies’.465 By 
1988 in Australia and 2007 in the UK, drafting practice was altered, and statutes are now 
primarily drafted in gender-neutral terms.466 The pervasive attitude of disdain for the 
masculine rule makes it clear why legislators tend to frame new IPA laws in gender-neutral 
terms, even if they assume that gender plays a role in its perpetration. Ironically, the demand 
for gender-neutral language in legislative drafting originated with the same feminist 
movement that identified IPA as a gender-specific problem.  
Further, it seems that the public increasingly doubts the role of gender in IPA. Australian 
community attitude surveys suggest that, in spite of official statistics indicating that women 
are most commonly victims of male-perpetrated IPA,467 the public increasingly views IPA 
as a gender-neutral problem.468 While 86 per cent of Australians surveyed in 1995 believed 
that men are the primary perpetrators of ‘domestic violence’, the proportion dropped to 71 
per cent in 2013.469 Schneider and Wangmann suggest that public scepticism about the 
gendered nature of IPA stems from reports and opinion pieces in the news media which are 
frequently based on the work of ‘family violence’ sociologists and men’s rights activists.470 
The media are able to shape public attitudes by drawing on research from one side of the 
gender debate to characterise the ‘essential nature’ of IPA as gender-symmetrical.471 Articles 
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reporting on IPA against men tend to portray these cases as ‘typical’.472 Thus, the public is 
increasingly presented with articles such as the following from The Guardian: 
More than 40% of domestic violence victims are male, report reveals: About two in five 
of all victims of domestic violence are men, contradicting the widespread impression that 
it is almost always women who are left battered and bruised …473 
Faced with a community that demands equality in the language of the law, and which 
increasingly doubts the gendered nature of IPA, even those lawmakers who accept a 
gendered representation of IPA could be expected to use gender-neutral language. Therefore, 
the comments about not forgetting male victims dotted throughout the debates on the new 
UK offence of controlling or coercive behaviour are to be expected. For example, the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State noted that ‘it is absolutely right that we also consider 
male victims of domestic abuse. All our policy initiatives are gender-neutral in recognising 
what domestic abuse means’.474 Moreover, it was an understandable goal of the UK 
government to protect, and to appear to be protecting, all victims of IPA regardless of gender 
and sexuality. Therefore, rather than mete out the roles of ‘bully’ and ‘underdog’, 475 UK 
lawmakers opted instead to create a generally-applicable offence based on two genderless 
and context-free characters – persons ‘A’ and ‘B’. Having uncovered their reasons for doing 
so, we can continue to consider the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour to identify 
the effects of such a representation.  
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4.2. THE EFFECTS OF GENDER-NEUTRAL REPRESENTATIONS 
The intended effect of using gender-neutral language in law is to ensure that men and women 
are treated equally – the assumption being that equality is achieved by linguistically treating 
women the same as men.476 While feminist demands for linguistically equal treatment were 
met through the abolition of the masculine rule, some scholars argue that the law is resolutely 
male.477 They argue that gender-neutral laws have a bias towards men – having in large part 
been written by men who imbue them with masculine ‘characteristics and mannerisms’.478 
Thus, the intended effect of achieving equality at law by removing references to gender is 
thwarted as the law is invested with dominant male attitudes about criminal conduct.479 
Women’s experiences and attitudes are silenced – their behaviour becomes atypical, rather 
than the norm.480 As Mooney argues, ‘to change the linguistic evidence would not re-make 
the gendered world in which we live’.481  
This is evident if we return to the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour. Of the 155 
defendants proceeded against between March 2015 (when the offence was enacted) and 
December 2016, 150 were men and 5 women.482 Perhaps this indicates that men are indeed 
more likely to engage in IPA than women, or that reporting abuse is easier for female victims, 
or that the assumption of the gendered nature of IPA leads police to pay greater attention to 
male abusers. Nevertheless, the language of the offence does not prompt consideration of 
the role of gender in IPA. The offence is not designed for victims as women. It is designed 
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to protect the abstract, dehumanised and desexualised ‘B’.483 Stark insists that coercive 
control is characterised by a man engaging in ‘an ongoing and gender-specific pattern’ of 
behaviour that reduces his female partner’s autonomy.484 The abusive man is able to draw 
on social expectations of the roles of men and women in intimate relationships to entrap his 
partner.485 However, the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour is gender-neutral, and 
applies not only to intimate partners but also to members of the same family. This suggests 
that the dynamics that contribute to all forms of family violence are the same, thus obscuring 
the imbalance in power which, according to Stark’s representation, characterises male abuse 
of female partners. The gender-neutral offence does not prompt recognition of the context 
in which controlling or coercive behaviour is said to occur – a society in which women are 
frequently physically, economically, and sexually subordinate to their male partners. The 
language of the offence has ‘disguised, diluted and distorted’ the behaviour originally 
targeted by Stark.486 Thus, the gender-neutral offence of controlling or coercive behaviour 
‘seems no longer to be about the very behaviour that the crime … was supposed to 
proscribe’.487 
By removing gender, as well as broadening the category of people who come under the 
offence to include family members, the UK government has attempted a one-size-fits-all 
solution that distorts Stark’s representation of the essence of coercive control. The 
underlying assumption that equality can be achieved through sameness of treatment fails to 
acknowledge that IPA can, according to Stark, be made more serious for female victims 
because of the disadvantages they face. Treating female victims the same as male victims 
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may only serve to reinforce their disadvantage. What then would happen if the law 
acknowledged gender differences? 
4.3. WHEN THE CRIMINAL LAW ACKNOWLEDGES GENDER 
The intended effect of recognising gender differences in law is to achieve equality between 
men and women by recognising them as having the same status, while explicitly 
acknowledging their differences in experience and circumstances.488 Lawmakers with this 
understanding of equality (and who accept a gendered representation of IPA) would be likely 
to create an offence of IPA that labels the victim as female and the perpetrator as male.489 
These labels would be intended to make clear to criminal justice officials and the public that 
the abuser’s behaviour was carried out in the context of an imbalance of power between him 
and his victim. They would make salient the gendered context in which IPA is sometimes 
said to occur. It would remind those administering the offence of the gendered dynamics of 
male dominance and female subjugation that certain representations of IPA count as typical.  
Exposing the effects of gender-specific representations of IPA in the criminal law is hindered 
by the fact that there are few gender-specific offences related to IPA in the UK and 
Australia.490 The idea of having a gender-specific offence or aggravating factor has been 
mooted, for example in Queensland and Scotland, but is disfavoured because it is predicted 
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that such language would trivialise women’s experiences, stereotype women, and exclude 
certain victims of IPA.491 I will examine each of these negative effects. 
Trivialising women’s experiences 
The 2000 Queensland Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code considered the 
possibility of introducing a gender-specific crime of IPA based on the New Zealand offence 
of ‘assault by a male on a female’, which sets a higher maximum sentence for assault when 
it is committed by a man against a woman.492 The Queensland Taskforce received multiple 
submissions rejecting such a model on the grounds that it could separate ‘crimes against 
women from the mainstream’.493 The New Zealand offence of assault by a male on a female 
is the equivalent of common assault, although it has a higher maximum penalty. It is intended 
to indicate the heightened culpability of men who abuse women, especially those with whom 
they are in an intimate relationship, and to indicate propensity to engage in IPA.494 However, 
separating physical assault against women from common assault could give the impression 
that assault against women is different from, and by implication less serious than, assault 
against men.495 By separating assault against women from ordinary assault, women’s 
experiences of violence are arguably trivialised and ‘othered’.496 As one respondent to the 
Queensland Taskforce noted, ‘assault is assault is assault … no matter who is the subject, 
since the implications … may well be as great for [women and men] depending more on the 
                                                 
491 Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code, ‘Report of the Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code’ 
(Queensland Government, 2000) 112, 117 (‘Qld Taskforce’); Justice Committee, above n 468, 33 [105], 36 
[115].  
492 Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) s 194(b). 
493 Qld Taskforce, above n 491, 112. 
494 New Zealand Law Commission, Review of Part 8 of the Crimes Act 1961: Crimes Against the Person, 
Report No 111 (2009) 6 [22]. 
495 Qld Taskforce, above n 491, 116. 
496 See also Law Commission, Reform of Offences against the Person: A Scoping Consultation Paper, 
Consultation Paper No 217 (2014) 126–7 [5.149]. The Law Commission made a similar point about the effects 
of introducing a separate domestic violence offence. 
90 
“nature” of the individual rather than any features generalised as those being of one sex or 
another’.497 
Stereotyping female victims 
Another reason the Queensland Taskforce did not recommend a gender-specific offence of 
IPA is that such an offence has the potential to reinforce a stereotype of women as perpetual 
victims.498 A gender-specific offence of IPA, that labels women as victims and men as 
abusers, may encourage the public and criminal justice officials to equate victimhood with 
womanhood. It may suggest that women are unable to fend for themselves, and denies 
women’s capacity for independence and autonomy. A woman who retaliates against an 
abusive partner, or resists her partner’s attempts to establish control, may therefore struggle 
to be recognised as a ‘real’ victim and obtain assistance.499 Further, representing all victims 
as women suggests that all victims are the same, thus denying the circumstances of 
individual cases, and the additional barriers faced by some victims due to other forms of 
societal discrimination.500 Intersectional feminist commentators have rejected the 
essentialist view that all women share inherent characteristics of weakness and passivity, 
and therefore experience IPA in the same way. Rather, they insist that the law recognise the 
particular circumstances of individual victims. As Goodmark argues, ‘[d]omestic violence 
does not transform every woman who experiences it into a stereotypical victim, nor should 
this victim stereotype shape domestic violence law and policy’.501 
Haigh and Hepburn argue that there are some circumstances in which relying on stereotypes 
about women can be useful for courts ‘in clarifying the complex realities of social 
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existence’.502 They consider Garcia,503 in which the High Court of Australia confirmed the 
existence of the wives’ special equity. This principle allows for guarantees to be set aside 
where they have been made by a woman who was under undue influence from her husband 
or who failed to understand the guarantee. In his dissenting judgment, Kirby J argued that 
this principle reinforces ‘outdated assumptions’ about wives, and accords ‘legitimacy to a 
discriminatory rule expressed in terms which are unduly narrow, historically and socially 
out of date’.504 However, the majority ruled that, in spite of social change, ‘[t]here is still a 
significant number of women in Australia in relationships which are, for many and varied 
reasons, marked by disparities of economic and other power between parties’.505 This, Haigh 
and Hepburn posit, was an appropriate use of stereotyping. While it ‘undoubtedly 
perpetuates the stereotype of wives as vulnerable, weak or disempowered’,506 the majority’s 
decision addresses the social reality that some people conform to this stereotype, and ‘would 
be at risk if the protection were removed’.507 To ignore this stereotype would be to ignore a 
very real inequality. As with all stereotypes however, there are many women who do not 
conform, though are nevertheless deserving of recognition.508 Thus, we should avoid ways 
of constructing offences which allow harmful stereotypes to inform judicial decision-
making, and which preclude consideration of individual experiences.509 
Silencing other victims 
A gender-specific construction of IPA would obscure the harm suffered by male and 
LGBTIQ victims. As one respondent to the Queensland Taskforce noted, a gender-specific 
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approach ‘assumes that power imbalances will only exist between men and women, and does 
not recognise that power imbalances may occur in many other contexts eg abuse in same sex 
relationships’.510 Hassouneh and Glass have shown that women in same-sex relationships 
struggle to recognise that they are victims of IPA, or seek help, due to an assumption that 
IPA occurs only in heterosexual relationships.511 Thus, a gender-specific offence of IPA, 
which proscribes male abuse of female intimate partners, could perpetuate the assumption 
that violence committed by men in heterosexual relationships is more serious and worthy of 
intervention than violence committed against men or violence in same-sex relationships.  
4.4. CONCLUSION 
A gender-neutral representation of IPA cannot appropriately convey the context in which 
abuse takes place. Equally, a gender-specific offence gives the impression that gender is the 
only explanation for why IPA occurs and how it harms its victims.512 An alternative 
representation, explored in the following chapter, is that factors such as sexuality, race, 
religion, and disability, along with gender, can intersect to make certain victims more 
vulnerable to abuse. Being a woman may contribute to the harm suffered by a victim, but 
without acknowledging the relevance of other factors that make a victim vulnerable to abuse, 
the full context of their situation cannot be comprehended by the law. I will seek to create a 
specific offence of IPA that not only makes the victim’s gender salient, but which draws 
attention to all of the factors contributing to the victim’s vulnerability.  
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CHAPTER 5: VULNERABILITY – AN ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATION 
5.1. UNIVERSAL VULNERABILITY 
The concept of vulnerability has been the subject of considerable feminist scholarship,513 
and is increasingly deployed to frame political problems.514 American feminist law scholar 
Martha Fineman is perhaps the most notable proponent of the concept, and hers is generally 
accepted as the dominant model.515 She advocates vulnerability as a way to reframe the 
problem of women’s inequality. Rather than suggesting that women have unequal social 
standing, Fineman views vulnerability as a universal human condition. She argues that all 
people are vulnerable to ‘the ever-present possibility of harm, injury, and misfortune’.516 
Vulnerability prevents us from being completely autonomous and independent – instead, we 
are ‘enmeshed in a web of relationships’ on which we are interdependent.517  
Fineman qualifies her account by explaining that vulnerability ranges in magnitude for each 
person. While everyone is vulnerable, each person is made more or less so by various factors 
outside their control.518 Those whose identities are ‘marked by precariousness’ are more 
likely to experience heightened vulnerability.519 Fineman asserts that women tend to 
experience heightened vulnerability because, among other reasons, they are typically 
responsible for unpaid caretaking.520 Vulnerability may be exacerbated among the elderly, 
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those with disabilities, racial minorities, and the LGBTIQ community. However, heightened 
vulnerability is not inevitable for every member of a minority. A great deal depends on the 
resources upon which a person can draw.521 A person who is, for example, financially secure, 
or part of a highly supportive community, will be substantially less vulnerable than someone 
who has no access to such resources, even if both are members of the same minority. 
Fineman does not use the term ‘vulnerable’ in a negative sense to suggest that certain people 
or groups are weak. Rather, she uses it in an inclusive sense that recognises that all humans 
are vulnerable (physically, economically, and institutionally), but that vulnerability ranges 
in magnitude for each individual.522  
Vulnerability and equality 
Fineman argues that equality can be rendered ‘less illusive’ by recognising humanity’s 
shared vulnerability.523 Looking at IPA through the lens of vulnerability offers a way of 
comprehending the uneven distribution of power between victims and offenders without the 
negative effects that accompany a purely gendered focus. Representing IPA as men taking 
advantage of male social privilege to abuse female partners ignores those victims who are 
made more susceptible to abuse because of factors such as disability, race, sexuality, or 
economic standing. Representing IPA as an abuser taking advantage of their partner’s 
vulnerability to establish power and control over them avoids this oversight. 
So too can the vulnerability approach address the negative effects of a gender-neutral 
representation. Unlike a gender-neutral representation, the vulnerability approach can 
comprehend the imbalance between male and female partners due to uneven gendered power 
relations. In addition, it has the capacity to comprehend other power imbalances, such as the 
dependence of one partner on the other for financial assistance, personal care, or the ongoing 
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right to residence in the country. Fineman argues that trying to achieve equality by treating 
all people the same fails to provide equal opportunities to everyone because, in practice 
‘there is no level playing field’.524 Trying to achieve equality through sameness of treatment 
only guarantees rights ‘to an abstract individual shorn of limiting human characteristics and 
potentially debilitating social and historical inequities’.525 Thus, unlike the approaches to 
equality discussed in chapter 4, the vulnerability approach offers a way of comprehending 
IPA that takes into account the range of potential factors that can cause a power imbalance 
between victims and offenders. 
Vulnerability and intersectionality 
The vulnerability approach can be used to reframe our understanding of IPA in a way that 
closely aligns with intersectionality theory. As noted in chapter 2, my representation of IPA 
draws heavily on intersectionality theory. Rather than subscribing to the assumption that IPA 
is a gendered phenomenon, intersectionality theorists insist that there is a variety of forms 
of discrimination that can heighten an individual’s vulnerability to their partner’s abuse, and 
which can make obtaining help more difficult.526 Various forms of discrimination, ‘such as 
racism, ethnocentrism, class privilege, and heterosexism [can] intersect with gender 
oppression’ to shape the experiences of individual IPA victims in different ways.527 For 
example, Indigenous Australian women may encounter racism, sexism, and other forms of 
discrimination both within their intimate relationship and in society generally, which can 
determine whether they seek assistance.528 An expectation of institutional racism from 
criminal justice officials may prevent an Indigenous woman from reporting abuse for fear 
that she will not be believed, that she will experience hostile treatment, or, if her partner is 
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also Indigenous, that he will be subject to extreme treatment and harsh sentencing.529 Her 
abuser can take advantage of these fears, using his influence over her to make her feel guilty 
about reporting abuse, or to taunt her about her lack of resources and power. Thus, the 
intersection of various forms of oppression may leave a victim more vulnerable to her 
partner’s control and abuse, and less able to access help. 
Fundamental to intersectionality theory is recognition that the experience of IPA is not 
common to all victims – it varies depending on the vulnerability of the victim relative to 
their abuser and in society generally.530 Similarly, Fineman emphasises the need to assess 
vulnerability on an individual basis.531 To comprehend the magnitude of a person’s 
vulnerability, we must consider the context in which they exist; their relationships with other 
individuals, the community to which they belong, the quality and quantity of economic and 
social resources upon which they can draw, and how they are treated by the criminal justice 
system. This approach is therefore useful as it recognises the potential for intersecting forms 
of discrimination to heighten a victim’s vulnerability. 
Vulnerability in the criminal law 
Acknowledgement of vulnerability in the criminal law is not without precedent. According 
to Farmer, the ‘person’ protected by the criminal law has evolved from a physical body to 
an individual located in the context of their relationships and individual characteristics.532 
Whereas conduct has traditionally been criminalised for causing physical harm, the law 
increasingly protects the individual from conduct which diminishes their autonomy. The 
person’s autonomy is vulnerable. It may be eroded not just by physical harm, but also by 
fear caused by ‘threatening, intimidating, controlling or abusive conduct’.533 Farmer draws 
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on the example of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, under which a range of offences become 
aggravated if they are motivated by hostility towards the victim’s race or religion.534 He 
suggests that this demonstrates the increasing concern of the criminal law with protecting 
those with ‘prior vulnerability’ from conduct which could induce fear and anxiety, thereby 
diminishing autonomy.535 This evolved conception of personhood ‘facilitates a pressure for 
increased criminalization’ of conduct which threatens vulnerable autonomy.536  
An alternative representation of IPA 
IPA can be reframed by assuming universal vulnerability. Both parties in an intimate 
relationship are vulnerable. Neither exists independently. Rather, they are involved in a 
network of institutional and personal relationships upon which they are reliant for their sense 
of self.537 The intimate relationship is part of that network, and the trust and intimacy which 
tend to characterise intimate partnerships can create an environment in which both develop 
personal integrity, self-esteem, and self-trust.538 However, if one partner abuses the other, 
trust and intimacy are destroyed, and the victim’s self-esteem and autonomy are eroded. The 
victim becomes even more vulnerable because a close relationship, upon which they had 
become dependent for an aspect of their sense of self, has been exploited.   
In individual cases, it may be that the victim has heightened vulnerability relative to their 
abuser, depending on the nature of their network of relationships. A victim with supportive 
external relationships is likely to be far less vulnerable than a victim who has no one in 
whom to confide the abuse.539 If, for example, a victim is rejected from his previously 
supportive church group because of his same-sex relationship with his abuser, he may find 
                                                 
534 (UK) c 37, ss 28–32. 
535 Farmer, above n 62, 260. 
536 Ibid 261. 
537 Fineman, above n 513, 15. 
538 Tadros, above n 108, 1000.  
539 Unless the abuser restricts the victim’s access to those networks. 
98 
himself less able to escape abuse. A victim’s family may pressure her to remain in an abusive 
relationship due to cultural beliefs that she will bring shame on the family by leaving.540 A 
victim with a criminal history, or from a racial minority, may find either that his calls for 
police assistance go ignored, or that he is blamed for abuse. A victim can be vulnerable 
relative to their abuser even where both have identities ‘marked by precariousness’.541 For 
example, both partners in a same-sex relationship may be subject to homophobia and 
heterosexism from their family, work colleagues, and society generally. However, the 
abusive partner can take advantage of the other’s increased vulnerability by, for example, 
threatening to expose the victim’s sexuality to her family, workplace or religious institution.  
Thus, my representation of IPA relies on a contextual understanding of the abuser’s power 
over the victim. While both the abuser and victim are vulnerable, my representation focuses 
on the abuser’s exploitation of the victim’s heightened vulnerability. I represent IPA as the 
conduct of a person who takes advantage of their partner’s vulnerability to restrict their 
freedom of action. They abuse their position of trust to engage in repeated behaviour levelled 
at establishing power over the victim, potentially entrapping them in the relationship. 
There are several ways in which this representation can be translated into a criminal law 
response. The abuser’s exploitation of the victim’s vulnerability could be added as an 
aggravating circumstance in sentencing.542 Alternatively, new offences or defences could be 
introduced to capture those situations where a vulnerable IPA victim commits a crime. 
Consider, for example, a defence similar to marital coercion,543 which operates in Victoria 
on the grounds that women may be under their husbands’ control, and coerced into 
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committing crime.544 Another approach is to introduce a new offence of IPA that constructs 
the proscribed conduct around the exploitation of the victim’s vulnerability. While each of 
these options has its merits, I focus here on the latter option, by redrafting the UK offence 
of controlling or coercive behaviour to focus on the victim’s vulnerability.545 
5.2. THE COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTION OF THE LAW 
Before considering how such an offence should be worded, it is imperative to consider to 
whom the offence will speak, and the message that audience needs to receive. Dan-Cohen 
suggests that criminal offences simultaneously guide public behaviour, and instruct criminal 
justice officials on what behaviours to punish and how to punish them.546 I therefore consider 
the messages that need to be sent to these audiences. 
Guiding the public 
The criminal law must communicate with the public generally, and specifically with victims 
and offenders. Duff makes the critical point that, to uphold the principle of fair notice of 
potential liability, the law must be addressed to those whom ‘it claims to bind’.547 It must be 
explicit about the conduct it proscribes, what is wrong about that conduct, and the penalties 
for engaging in it.548 An offence that fails to send a potent message about the immorality of 
an offender’s conduct cannot give the public an adequate understanding of the ‘significance 
of conviction’ and the victim’s experience.549  
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An important point at which the law communicates with individual members of the public 
is when they are brought to answer for their conduct in court. Throughout their trial and 
sentencing, offenders hear about the moral gravity of their conduct. However, Duff argues 
that the communicative function of the law is unfulfilled if offenders are punished without 
having the opportunity to understand the reason for their punishment.550 That being said, if 
an offender does not recognise and repent their wrongdoing, the law does not fail in its aim. 
Provided that the language of the law is sufficiently expressive to give offenders the 
opportunity to understand why they are being condemned, the communicative function is 
achieved. Duff argues that ‘we owe it to his victim, to the values he has flouted, and even to 
him, to censure his wrongdoing even if we are sure that he will be unmoved and unpersuaded 
by the censure’.551  
An offence of IPA that explains the conduct and its wrongfulness to the public can serve an 
additional educative function. A descriptive offence, reformulated on the basis of 
vulnerability, could give the public the impetus to re-evaluate how they understand IPA. 
Dominant representations of IPA tend to highlight discrete incidents of physical abuse. An 
offence underpinned by a broader representation could send a message that the public ought 
to condemn not only incidents of physical abuse, but also ongoing belittlement, isolation and 
control of victims. Such an offence could also educate the public about the kinds of 
behaviour to be aware of among family or friends who may be either abusers or victims.552  
A reformulated offence could send an especially important message to those victims who 
have been unable to recognise the nature of the wrong directed at them.553 Stark has observed 
that IPA victims who have not experienced physical abuse can be apologetic for not being 
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‘real’ victims, because the ‘dominant victimization narrative’ does not incorporate ongoing, 
ostensibly low-level tactics.554 Because the criminal law expresses ‘public condemnation’ of 
proscribed behaviour,555 a specific IPA offence that captures a wider range of tactics could 
give more victims permission to see themselves as such, and could validate their desire to 
seek help or leave the relationship.556   
Instructing criminal justice officials 
Every offence guides criminal justice officials on what conduct is prohibited and how it 
should be punished.557 Tadros notes that a specific offence therefore has the potential to 
deliver an important message to criminal justice officials about the seriousness of IPA. He 
argues that the UK criminal justice system has historically failed to respond adequately and 
consistently to IPA.558 This he attributes to an attitude among criminal justice officials that 
IPA is ‘less serious’ than other forms of abuse, and a failure among prosecutors and courts 
to recognise the ‘systematic nature of domestic abuse’.559 As IPA tends to be charged as 
individual incidents of physical violence, the ongoing nature of abuse is not uncovered 
during trial. The abusive conduct that is prosecuted can therefore appear not especially 
egregious because it is viewed out of context. Therefore, a specific offence based on an 
assumption of vulnerability, which delineates precisely the conduct involved, could educate 
criminal justice officials and encourage improved practice.560 
Communicating with both audiences 
Dan-Cohen explains that criminal offences must be capable of sending all of these 
messages.561 This could lead to contradictory conclusions about the best wording for the 
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offence. On the one hand, Dan-Cohen suggests that for a law to communicate with the public, 
and to send a message that corresponds with the public’s existing moral sensibility (so they 
are more willing to treat that law with respect), the offence definition must be ‘broadly drawn 
and open-ended’.562 On the other hand, the offence must be sufficiently ‘narrow and precise’ 
to constrain criminal justice officials in their decisions about whether to charge and convict, 
and how severely to punish offenders.563 These requirements are not necessarily inconsistent, 
because the messages sent to each audience are transmitted in different ways. 
It is unlikely that many members of the public read new offences. Rather, the message of an 
offence tends to be conveyed to the public through the news media and advertising 
campaigns. Noteworthy cases of IPA are frequently reported by news outlets as trials unfold. 
Such reports often draw on the language of the offence label and definition to explain the 
abuser’s conduct.564 Increasingly, criminal justice organisations use social media to 
communicate directly with the public. The UK Crown Prosecution Service, for example, has 
more than 220,000 Twitter followers, and uses that platform to explain the significance of 
new offences. 
It is therefore important that the label and definition of my proposed offence use ‘ordinary 
language’,565 so the public can comprehend what the prohibited conduct is, and what is 
wrong with it. The language of the label and definition must be sufficiently familiar to give 
people a sense of the significance of vulnerability, the ongoing nature of the behaviour, and 
the tactics involved.566 In other words, it must reveal the problem representation. 
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563 Ibid. 
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Criminal justice officials, on the other hand, receive their particular message primarily from 
the wording of the offence itself. The language of the entire offence must precisely articulate 
the criminalised conduct, so that criminal justice officials understand what decisions are 
expected of them. Dan-Cohen explains that the offence can include ‘technical and esoteric 
professional language’ because this does not present a barrier to criminal justice officials’ 
comprehension.567 
5.3. THE VULNERABILITY APPROACH IN PRACTICE 
In the following section, I lay out the proposed offence, and analyse its elements. To 
demonstrate how it has been adapted, the elements of the UK offence of controlling or 
coercive behaviour which I have retained are underlined. An extract of the relevant sections 
of the UK offence can also be found on page 80. 
Intimate partner abuse 
(1) A person (the abuser) commits an offence if –  
a. the abuser repeatedly or continuously takes advantage of another person’s 
(the victim) vulnerability by engaging in coercive or controlling behaviour 
towards the victim;  
b. at the time of the behaviour, the abuser and the victim are in an intimate 
partnership, or have previously been in an intimate partnership with each 
other; and 
c. the abuser knows or ought to know that the behaviour would tend to restrict 
the victim’s freedom of action. 
(2)  Indicators of the victim’s vulnerability may include one or more of the following –  
a. gender; 
b. sexual orientation; 
c. race; 
d. physical or mental illness or disability; 
e. age; 
f. religion; 
g. citizenship or immigration status; 
h. socio-economic status; 
i. marital status; 
                                                 
‘boomerang effect’. Sarah N. Keller, Timothy Wilkinson and A. J. Otjen, ‘Unintended Effects of a Domestic 
Violence Campaign’ (2010) 39(4) Journal of Advertising 53. 
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j. pregnancy; 
k. child-rearing responsibilities;  
l. homelessness; 
m. previous intimate partner abuse victimisation; or 
n. any other relevant factor. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1) –  
a. “coercive behaviour” means one or more acts of assault, threats, humiliation 
and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish or frighten the 
victim; 
b. “controlling behaviour” means one or more acts designed to make the victim 
subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, 
exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of 
the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating 
their everyday behaviour; 
c. “intimate partnership” means persons who are or have been married or in de 
facto, dating or ongoing sexual relationships regardless of whether they live 
together or have previously lived together;  
d. The abuser “ought to know” that which a reasonable person in 
possession of the same information would know.  
(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable to imprisonment for a term 




While I have retained the language of coercive control which informed the UK offence, I 
have altered the offence label. I am convinced of the utility of Stark’s representation of IPA 
as coercive control, though I use the label ‘Intimate partner abuse’ to assist in realising a 
communicative aim of the offence. As discussed in chapter 3, an offence sends an 
appropriate message to the public when it is ‘known by a name that not only describes 
factually what the defendant has done, but also purports to capture the moral essence of the 
wrong involved’.568 The term ‘coercive control’, while descriptive, is incapable of conveying 
the exact conduct involved without reference to a definition.  
‘Intimate partner abuse’, as explained in chapter 1, has the capacity to create ‘a clear moral 
as well as factual picture of the wrongdoer and the wrongdoing’.569 It uses ‘ordinary 
                                                 




language’,570 which signifies the offender’s conduct, and therefore ‘minimise[s] the potential 
for misrepresentation or misunderstanding’.571 Perhaps neither label can convey the ongoing 
nature of IPA, and the potential erosion of the victim’s autonomy. However, I suggest that 
‘Intimate partner abuse’ would nevertheless be more capable of giving the public reason to 
condemn the behaviour and those who engage in it.  
Repeated or continuous behaviour 
I have retained the requirement from the original offence that the abuser’s behaviour be 
repeated or continuous.572 This prevents criminal justice officials from focusing only on 
discrete incidents of abuse. Stark argues that IPA is not characterised by isolated incidents 
of physical or psychological abuse, but by a range of ongoing tactics aimed towards 
establishing power over the victim.573 Some of these tactics are already crimes (e.g. stalking 
and sexual assault), although many are not (e.g. repeated put-downs, monitoring phone calls, 
or restricting access to finances). Stark observes that it is only when viewed as part of a 
pattern of conduct that the cumulative effect of these apparently trivial tactics can be 
recognised.574 Therefore, an offence formulated around repeated or continuous behaviour 
will allow police and prosecutors to identify apparently trivial conduct as part of a pattern of 
behaviour directed towards eroding the victim’s freedom of action.575 
Some scholars favour a requirement of a ‘course of conduct’, rather than ‘repeated or 
continuous behaviour’.576 Both Burke’s and Tuerkheimer’s proposed offences require a 
course of conduct, defined as at least two acts directed against the victim, each of which 
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constitute criminal conduct.577 This formulation has been described as ‘unnecessarily 
restrictive’, and indicates Burke’s and Tuerkheimer’s unwillingness to depart from the 
traditional representation of IPA as involving individual instances of serious (physical) 
abuse.578 Bettinson and Bishop argue that a ‘course of conduct’ offence would maintain 
judicial focus on discrete incidents of physical violence.579 They suggest that a formulation 
based on repeated or continuous behaviour would permit new ‘judicial understandings’ of 
IPA to emerge.580 Moreover, while Burke’s and Tuerkheimer’s offences require the abuser 
to have committed multiple crimes, and this may be easier to prove than repeated or 
continuous behaviour, it could reinforce the perception in the public and among criminal 
justice officials that only those acts of an especially violent or oppressive nature constitute 
IPA. Such formulations obscure those acts which may appear ordinary when removed from 
the context of an ongoing effort by the abuser to establish control over the victim.  
Vulnerability 
The proposed offence requires that the abuser takes advantage of the victim’s vulnerability 
by engaging in coercive or controlling behaviour. Subsection (2) lists various factors that 
may cause the victim to be vulnerable, both in society and to the abuser. These factors are 
well-known indicators of vulnerability.581 Evidence of the victim’s membership in any of 
these groups need not be presented unless they are part of the reason for the victim’s 
vulnerability.  
This list of factors contributing to vulnerability has the potential to assist in the educative 
function of the offence. The public dissemination of information about the characteristics 
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that may contribute to vulnerability could assist in educating the public about the additional 
barriers faced by vulnerable people. The list of vulnerability factors also has the capacity to 
constitute the problem of IPA as a political problem as well as a personal one. It represents 
IPA not merely as a problem of interpersonal abuse, but also of the social institutions and 
divisions that allow one person to take advantage of another.  
Subsection (2)(n) of the proposed offence, which allows prosecutors to introduce any other 
factor relevant to the victim’s vulnerability, is included to ensure that no victim is excluded 
from protection.582 This provision avoids the ‘patchwork protection’ provided by other 
offences aimed at protecting vulnerable groups.583 For example, the UK offence of causing 
or allowing a vulnerable adult to die or suffer serious physical harm only applies to those 
who are vulnerable due to physical or mental disability or old age.584  
I use the terms ‘abuser’ and ‘victim’ to refer to the offender and victim respectively. This 
allows for recognition of male and LGBTIQ victims, which would not be possible if the law 
labelled the abuser a man and the victim a woman. Although these labels obscure the gender 
of both parties, subsection (2)(a) permits consideration (where relevant) of how the victim’s 
gender made her (or him) vulnerable to the offender. Although the terms used in the UK 
offence – ‘A’ and ‘B’ – also prevent exclusion of male and LGBTIQ victims, they are 
dehumanising. 
Coercive or controlling behaviour 
The proposed offence uses the UK cross-government definition of the terms ‘coerce’ and 
‘control’.585 These were definitions settled on by the UK Home Office in 2012 to be used 
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across government agencies to ensure consistent policy development and service provision. 
The original offence did not define these terms, which could hamper implementation due to 
ambiguity about the conduct they include.  
I include the UK government definitions of the terms, which draw on Stark’s own 
definitions,586 to convey a message to the public and criminal justice officials about the 
conduct targeted by the offence. The definitions give criminal justice officials ‘precision and 
determinacy’ about the range of conduct covered under the offence, which is lacking in the 
original offence.587 At the same time, the definitions could educate the public about the kinds 
of behaviour involved in IPA, and the tendency of IPA to limit the freedom of its victims. 
The definitions are therefore sufficiently broad and ‘open-ended’ for the public to develop a 
wider conception of the conduct involved in IPA.588   
Intimate partnership 
The proposed offence defines ‘intimate relationship’ to include current or former partners, 
regardless of whether they are living together.589 This counters the seemingly arbitrary 
exclusion in the original UK offence of former intimate partners who do not live together.590 
Given the increased risk of serious abuse immediately following separation,591 the exclusion 
of former intimates who do not cohabitate in the UK offence is troubling.  
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The original UK offence applies to both intimate partners and members of the same 
family,592 therefore encompassing distinct forms of violence such as child and elder abuse. 
However, the proposed offence restricts application to current and former intimate partners, 
and thus cannot be applied in other cases of family violence. There is something distinctive 
about IPA that warrants a separate offence from other forms of family violence. 
Relationships between parents and children tend to be characterised by the dependence of 
one party on the other. Children rely on their parents for food, shelter, education and other 
amenities. An elderly parent may rely on their child for personal care and maintenance. Thus, 
when abuse occurs between parents and children, one of the primary wrongs is neglect of 
care. The dependence of one party on another is not paradigmatic of intimate partnerships. 
Of course, in certain intimate relationships, one party may, for example, have a physical 
disability and rely on the other. However, intimate partnerships tend to be characterised by 
relationships of trust and intimacy, which are betrayed when one partner abuses the other.593 
IPA is therefore morally distinct from child and elder abuse because of the different 
dynamics present in the relationship between abuser and victim. Thus, if we accept Horder’s 
general proposition that morally distinct forms of interpersonal violence ought to be 
differentiated in the criminal law,594 then IPA ought to have a separate offence that draws 
attention to its fundamental dynamics. Failure to distinguish different forms of family 
violence through distinct offences could perpetuate public confusion over the distinction 
between IPA, child and elder abuse.595  
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Restriction of the victim’s freedom of action 
The existing offence of controlling or coercive behaviour requires that the abuser’s actions 
have a ‘serious effect’ on the victim.596 ‘Serious effect’ is defined as either causing the victim 
‘to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against’ them, or causing the 
victim ‘serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on [their] usual day-
to-day activities’.597 This phrasing suggests that the victim’s fear, alarm or distress will be 
assessed subjectively, which limits application of the offence to those cases in which the 
victim is able to recognise and articulate the harm they suffered.598 Moreover, it places focus 
on the victim’s reaction to abuse, highlighting their mental state and making their response 
to abuse as important an element as the abuse itself.599 
The proposed offence instead describes the harm as a restriction of the victim’s freedom of 
action, and does not require that the victim actually experience it – only that the abuser knew 
or ought to have known that such a restriction would tend to be the result of their behaviour. 
Removing the requirement that the victim actually experience fear, alarm or distress prevents 
focus of the trial being on a pathologised victim. The focus will instead be on the actions of 
the abuser.600 
Further, like Youngs,601 Burke,602 and Tadros,603 I argue that a person who tries to restrict 
their partner’s freedom should not escape condemnation simply because they are 
unsuccessful. As Tadros observes: 
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[t]he fact that there are instances of domestic abuse that do not lead to the diminution of 
freedom … does not entitle the perpetrators of such abuse to an acquittal. The diminution 
of freedom is central to the wrong, and yet the natural tendency of such conduct to lead 
to that diminution is sufficient to justify conviction. The defendant has perpetrated 
conduct which often leads to such a diminution of freedom. Indeed, such an effect is 
arguably paradigmatic of domestic abuse. That such a diminution does not in fact come 
about cannot save him from being liable for the same offense as those whose conduct has 
the relevant harmful consequence.604 
Failure to establish control should not be a barrier to conviction. Abusers ought not to be 
absolved simply because their victims respond to attempts to establish control by resisting 
or seeking assistance.  
Mental elements 
There are two mental elements of the proposed offence. The first is that the abuser 
intentionally takes advantage of the victim’s vulnerability by engaging in coercive or 
controlling behaviour. The requirement that the abuser ‘takes advantage’ implies that 
intention must be proved. Further, all of the conduct covered under the definitions of 
coercive and controlling behaviour is widely recognised as requiring intention (e.g. assault, 
intimidation, stalking, false imprisonment, etc.).605 
The second requirement is that the abuser knew or ought to have known that their behaviour 
would tend to restrict the victim’s freedom of action. This places the abuser’s conduct in the 
context of the relationship – a person who possesses information about the vulnerability of 
the victim ought to know the likely effect of taking advantage of that vulnerability. Finch, 
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commenting on the objective standard adopted in UK stalking and harassment offences, 
observes that the objective standard is vital in such offences, because victims have a right to 
protection regardless of whether the offender intended their behaviour to cause fear.606 In 
the same way, an abuser should not be able to claim that they did not realise their behaviour 
might restrict their partner’s freedom.607  
In contrast, some scholars suggest that an offence of IPA ought to require that the abuser 
intended to reduce the victim’s freedom of movement.608 Youngs, for example, suggests that 
an abuser ought only to be liable for pursuing ‘a course of conduct with the intent to establish, 
or maintain, power and control’ over the victim.609 Drawing on Stark’s representation of 
IPA, Youngs argues that the ‘core of the wrong’ is the intention to establish control over an 
intimate partner, and therefore, an educative criminal offence of IPA must reflect that 
intention.610 While this is an apt observation, I am nevertheless concerned that an offence 
framed around intention to restrict the victim’s freedom of action suggests that a person who 
is ignorant of the likely effect of abusive conduct is less culpable. Abusive, threatening, 
coercive or isolating conduct is no less wrong because an abuser did not understand its likely 
effects.611 Further, as Tuerkheimer has observed, it is likely to prove difficult to convince 
judges beyond reasonable doubt that a person intended to restrict their victim’s freedom of 
action.612 
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‘[A]nother string to the bow of the criminal justice system’613 
The proposed offence should supplement, rather than replace, existing offences against the 
person in cases of IPA. Intimate partner homicide, for example, ought not to have a distinct 
charge from other forms of homicide, and non-consensual sex within an intimate relationship 
should not be viewed differently from rape. As Tadros argues, a specific offence of IPA is 
best thought of, not as a replacement charge, but as ‘another string to the bow of the criminal 
justice system’.614 This offence offers a way to recognise a range of behaviours, some already 
criminal and others not, which, when undertaken repeatedly over a period of time, in a 
relationship of trust, can produce harm.615 Having a separate offence based on repeated or 
continuous behaviour ensures that there are multiple options for prosecutors.  
As with the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour,616 the proposed offence has a 
relatively low maximum penalty. Bettinson and Bishop have suggested that the maximum 
sentence of five years imprisonment ‘does not reflect the severity of the harm of coercive 
control and leads to the creation of a hierarchy of harm when compared with the maximum 
sentences for physical harm’.617 Nevertheless, I suggest that it is useful to have a lower-level 
offence which can stand as an alternative to general offences such as rape and assault, and 
which captures a range of behaviours, some of which would otherwise go unnoticed by the 
criminal justice system, but are still detrimental to the victim’s full and free citizenship.618  
5.4. EFFECTS OF THE VULNERABILITY APPROACH 
Some effects of the proposed offence have already been revealed. Here, I delve further to 
answer question 5 of WPR; that is, to identify the effects of the underlying problem 
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representation. I consider three further consequences of the representation that could produce 
mixed effects on trial procedure and outcomes, but nevertheless do not undermine the utility 
of the offence.      
Protection or paternalism? 
A major criticism levelled at the concept of universal vulnerability – the idea that we are all 
vulnerable – is that it tends to license paternalistic state intervention at the cost of depriving 
vulnerable people of their autonomy and free will.619 According to Fineman, once we accept 
universal vulnerability, the state has a responsibility to intervene in exploitative conduct and 
to protect its vulnerable citizens.620 However, if we accept that IPA has a limiting effect on 
a victim’s freedom of action, then it could be argued that an appropriate response would 
involve giving the victim freedom to decide whether and how the offender is punished.621 In 
criminalising IPA, it could be argued that the state paternalistically takes the decision about 
how to proceed out of the victims’ hands.622 As Dunn, Clare and Holland have observed, 
this could be counter-productive – first the abuser disempowers the victim and then the state 
intervenes, giving the victim no say in whether it intervenes and how it treats the abuser.623  
Nevertheless, state intervention is important for a crime that tends to erode the victim’s 
liberty. If an abuser has successfully established power and control over their victim, then 
the victim may be unwilling to pursue prosecution and give evidence at trial because of 
pressure from the abuser, or because they fail to realise that they are in an abusive 
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situation.624 In such circumstances, one could argue that the victim needs the state’s 
protection because they are vulnerable and unable to act in their own best interests.  
Further, it might be in society’s best interests to ensure that abusers are prosecuted for IPA 
even when victims are reluctant to pursue prosecution. Some scholars argue that, while the 
wrong of conduct such as IPA is directed at, and felt primarily by, the victim, the wrong still 
‘properly concern[s] us all as citizens’.625 As Duff argues: 
[w]e must take such wrongdoing seriously, if we take seriously the values against which 
it offends, the victim’s standing as one who has suffered such a wrong, and the 
wrongdoer’s standing as a responsible agent who has done wrong: but to take it seriously 
is to be prepared to declare it to be wrong … and to call to account and to condemn those 
who engage in it.626  
According to this logic, regardless of the victim’s position on intervention, abusers ‘must 
answer to [their] fellow citizens’ for their criminal behaviour.627 Stark argues that the 
primary harm of IPA is that it deprives victims of ‘their rights to privacy, self-respect, and 
autonomy’,628 making it not just a wrong against individuals, but a broader political wrong 
in which the state ought to intervene.629 Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that, ‘[r]ather than 
the abuser dominating the victim and making decisions about her life, now the state is taking 
on the same role’.630 Ultimately, however, the paternalistic nature of the proposed offence is 
a necessary cost to protect victims and ensure abusers are held accountable. 
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Evidence of vulnerability and its exploitation 
As part of the proposed offence, prosecutors must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
victim was vulnerable, and that the abusive tactics used against the victim exploited that 
vulnerability. Given the difficulty in successfully prosecuting specific offences of IPA,631 
the additional burden of proving the victim’s vulnerability and its exploitation could lead to 
low conviction rates for the proposed offence. Establishing exploitation of vulnerability is 
likely to be more onerous than those offences that can be proved using tangible evidence 
such as medical records. In the following, I consider how these elements of the proposed 
offence can be proved, and whether there is still utility in the offence given the potential for 
a low conviction rate.  
The ideal person to present evidence of the victim’s vulnerability and its exploitation is the 
victim, as other people in the victim’s life are unlikely to be able to understand and articulate 
the impact of various forms of social oppression on the victim’s experience of IPA. Hanna 
argues that an offence framed around coercive control has the unique benefit of making a 
‘complete narrative’ of the victim’s experience important evidence.632 Focusing on the 
ongoing exploitation of the victim’s vulnerability ‘allows the victim to tell her story – the 
whole story – and have it matter’.633  
However, the victim is likely the only person who can present such evidence. Hanna and 
Stark both observe that the ongoing tactics of IPA target aspects of everyday life, and may 
therefore not be identifiable as IPA without the victim’s narrative to link them together.634 
The defendant taking the victim’s pay cheques, or not allowing the victim to participate in 
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important household decisions may be viewed as a normal division of decision-making 
typical in some relationships.635 The defendant constantly checking up on the victim, or 
monitoring their whereabouts could be viewed by external observers as deeply 
affectionate.636 A facial expression that may appear innocuous to others may induce extreme 
fear in a victim who recognises it as a threat of violence.637 Individual incidents of 
aggression, such as the offender slamming doors, could be viewed as inappropriate, though 
not especially noteworthy in isolation.638  
If, as Hanna suggests, the only way to prove that trivial behaviour constitutes IPA is through 
the victim’s narrative,639 then prosecution could be doomed if a victim refuses to testify. 
Hanna rejects Tadros’ claim that an offence of this nature could be successfully prosecuted 
without the victim’s testimony.640 Tadros’ assumption that the victim’s evidence is not 
always necessary stems from the example he uses – he envisages a case in which the victim 
is physically assaulted by their partner several times, each time being admitted to hospital 
with minor injuries, and refusing to explain how the injuries came about. Tadros argues that 
the victim’s testimony may not be necessary, as medical reports and evidence from 
neighbours about fighting between the couple could be sufficient to establish ongoing abuse. 
However, such evidence would likely be insufficient where the abuser’s tactics are subtler 
or seemingly ordinary.641 In fact, friends, family, or colleagues may even attest to the abuser 
being affectionate. Hanna fears that an offence based on continuous, ostensibly low-level, 
behaviours would produce fewer successful prosecutions than existing offences against the 
person, because it relies almost entirely on the testimony of a potentially unwilling or 
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inarticulate witness.642 Nevertheless, the proposed offence captures behaviours which are 
not already covered under existing offences, and so is still ultimately beneficial. 
Further, expert evidence could be introduced where victims refuse to testify, or where they 
are unable to articulate how the abuser exploited their vulnerability. As it is unlikely that this 
form of abuse will be understood by the court,643 expert evidence could ‘help to ensure that 
the contexts of the lives of abused [people] … are better understood and heard throughout 
the criminal justice process’.644 In addition, expert witnesses could explain that a common 
result of IPA is the erosion of the victim’s autonomy, thus explaining a victim’s reluctance 
to give evidence.645  
Sheehy notes that finding qualified experts on coercive control could prove difficult, as the 
expertise of psychologists is mostly in BWS and PTSD.646 However, she notes that in US 
and Canadian battered women’s murder trials, evidence has been admitted from frontline 
victim advocates regarding the consequences of coercive control.647 For the proposed 
offence, frontline workers (e.g. victim advocates, refuge staff etc.) are ideally placed to 
articulate how the victim’s vulnerability left them open to their abuser’s exploitation, as well 
as the likely effect of that exploitation. This evidence could allow judges to understand the 
vulnerability of victims who are unable to articulate it themselves, or are unwilling to give 
evidence. Thus, while there are potential difficulties in gathering evidence, there are 
nevertheless valid reasons for enacting this offence, and ways of mitigating these difficulties. 
                                                 
642 Hanna, above n 625, 1465. 
643 Douglas, above n 499, 376. 
644 Ibid 378. 
645 Ibid 376. 





Drawing attention to the various ways in which victims are vulnerable is perhaps a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, the offence could be seen as packaging together disparate 
groups and labelling them as weak and therefore inferior.648 In the same way as female IPA 
victims tend to be viewed as weak and defenceless when gender is rendered salient, the 
proposed framing could suggest that all minority victims are incapable of autonomous 
action. On the other hand, in drawing attention to the victim’s vulnerability, not only to their 
abuser but also in society, the offence ensures that attention is given both to the abuse, and 
context in which it occurs. Mahoney suggests that drawing attention to the context of the 
struggle for power and control within which IPA occurs prevents stigmatisation of the 
victim.649 For example, when the social context of the abuse is emphasised (e.g. the 
homophobia, racism, or sexism the victim faces in society), criminal justice officials are less 
likely to question why the victim did not leave the relationship or report the abuse.  
Without highlighting the way that the victim’s gender, culture and other identity markers 
intersect to shape their experience of abuse, it may be that judges would be tempted to fall 
back on preconceived notions of what to expect from minority victims. As Armor notes, if 
we ‘consciously confront’ prejudices by drawing attention to the victim’s particular 
circumstances, we are more likely to afford the victim justice ‘than if we take a colorblind, 
ostrich-head-in-the-sand approach’ that allows the court to rely on assumptions.650 Given 
that the victim’s vulnerability is an element that must be proved, we can expect that the 
proposed offence would allow an examination of how various forms of discrimination ‘work 
to sustain the power differences’ between the abuser and victim, as well as between the 
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victim and society.651 Victims would be less likely to be seen as weak because the context 
of their oppression in the relationship and in society would be revealed.  
5.5. CONCLUSION 
The vulnerability approach provides an alternative way to examine IPA that articulates the 
wide range of possible determinants in each case, and makes them central to understanding 
the harm suffered by each victim. In adopting this representation, I have aimed to better 
capture the experiences of victims – not only their treatment at the hands of their abusers, 
but also how their experience of abuse is shaped by interactions with other people and 
institutions. The proposed offence is, of course, based on one of many possible problem 
representations. Nevertheless, I suggest that the effects of the representation on the operation 
of the offence would be beneficial for victims, at least when the offence is understood in the 
context of the various legal and social services available. Making the victim’s narrative 
central to the offence may indeed create a barrier to prosecution in certain cases. 
Nevertheless, this reframing has the potential to change the perceptions of everyone to whom 
the criminal law speaks, thus making criminal law intervention more effective.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
It is hard to imagine liberties more basic to personal development or citizenship than those 
suppressed [by IPA].652 
My social vision is for the criminal justice system to recognise IPA victims as individuals 
whose experiences are shaped by their relationships with their abuser and society. In using 
the WPR approach, I have examined the ways in which academics, activists, law reformers, 
and criminal justice officials have shaped responses to the social problem of abuse in 
intimate partnerships. I have traced how IPA came to be a problem for the criminal law and 
how legislatures have been influenced by competing problem representations. WPR has 
allowed me to comment on the effects on victims of varying representations of IPA bound 
up in criminal offences. It has also given me the tools to proffer my own representation of 
IPA, and propose a criminal offence that might better articulate the experiences of victims. 
As I have shown, it is vital to examine and challenge problem representations which lodge 
in criminal law solutions to IPA, because the way the problem is represented has serious 
consequences. 
One area in which this thesis has been relatively silent, and thus where further research is 
necessary, is in examining how the judiciary considers new criminal law responses to IPA. 
As judges are important social commentators, with strong enunciative power, the way they 
talk about these offences is equally important to consider. For instance, it would be useful to 
examine the language employed by judges interpreting the UK offence of controlling or 
coercive behaviour. 
Criminal law responses to IPA are constantly evolving as governments attempt to find better 
solutions to a changing problem. Since the beginning of 2018, both Scotland and Ireland 
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have introduced new, specific offences of IPA.653 It is vital that we constantly examine and 
challenge new offences of IPA as they arise, and the representations underpinning them. In 
so doing, we can determine whether new offences appropriately convey the experiences of 
victims. Wrongs perpetrated against the vulnerable in our society must be the concern of all 
citizens,654 and we must seek solutions which allow victims of IPA to ‘live the fullest, most 
flourishing life’.655 
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654 Duff, above n 312, 52. 





Aitken, Jo, ‘“The Horrors of Matrimony among the Masses”: Feminist Representations of 
Wife Beating in England and Australia, 1870–1914’ (2007) 19(4) Journal of Women’s 
History 107 
Anderson, Kristin L., ‘Why Do We Fail to Ask “Why” About Gender and Intimate Partner 
Violence?’ (2013) 75(2) Journal of Marriage and Family 314 
Anderson, Margaret, ‘Domestic rape’ (1991) 141(6495) New Law Journal 336 
Anderson, Melisa J., ‘Lawful Wife, Unlawful Sex – Examining the Effect of the 
Criminalization of Marital Rape in England and the Republic of Ireland’ (1998) 27(1) 
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 139 
Armour, Jody, ‘Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the 
Prejudice Habit’ (1995) 83(3) California Law Review 733 
Armstrong, Susan M., ‘Evaluating Law Reform’ (2006) 10(1) University of Western Sydney 
Law Review 157 
Arnold, Gretchen, ‘A Battered Women’s Movement Perspective of Coercive Control’ 
(2009) 15(12) Violence Against Women 1432 
Ashworth, A J, ‘The Elasticity of Mens Rea’ in C. F. H. Tapper (ed), Crime, Proof and 
Punishment: Essays in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross (Butterworths, 1981) 45 
Ashworth, Andrew, ‘Some Doubts about Restorative Justice’ (1993) 4(2) Criminal Law 
Forum 277 
Ashworth, Andrew, ‘Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice’ (2002) 42(3) British 
Journal of Criminology 578 
Ashworth, Andrew, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 6th ed, 2009) 
Ayres, Susan, ‘When Women Kill Newborns: The Rhetoric of Vulnerability’ in Kirsti Cole 
(ed), Feminist Challenges or Feminist Rhetorics? Locations, Scholarship, Discourse 
(Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014) 83 
Bacchi, Carol, Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of Policy Problems (SAGE 
Publications, 1999) 
Bacchi, Carol, Analysing Policy: What’s the problem represented to be? (Pearson, 2009) 
124 
Bacchi, Carol, ‘Introducing the “What’s the Problem Represented to be?” approach’ in 
Angelique Bletsas and Chris Beasley (eds), Engaging with Carol Bacchi: Strategic 
Interventions and Exchanges (University of Adelaide Press, 2012) 21 
Baker, Reg, ‘Domestic Violence: Legal Considerations’ (1984) 8 Criminal Law Journal 33 
Bailey, Kimberly D., ‘Lost in Translation: Domestic Violence, “The Personal is Political,” 
and the Criminal Justice System’ (2010) 100(4) Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 
1255 
Bastian, Amber and John Coveney, ‘The responsibilisation of food security: What is the 
problem represented to be?’ (2013) 22(2) Health Sociology Review 162 
Beattie, J. M., Crime and the Courts in England: 1660–1800 (Clarendon Press, 1986) 
Behlmer, George, ‘Summary Justice and Working-Class Marriage in England, 1870–1940’ 
(1994) 12(2) Law and History Review 229 
Bettinson, Vanessa and Charlotte Bishop, ‘Is the creation of a discrete offence of coercive 
control necessary to combat domestic violence?’ (2015) 66(2) Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 179 
Blake, Matilda M., ‘Are Women Protected?’ (1892) 137 Westminster Review 43 
Bograd, Michele, ‘Strengthening domestic violence theories: Intersections of race, class, 
sexual orientation, and gender’ (1999) 25(3) Journal of Marital and Family Therapy 275 
Bourke, Joanna, Rape: A History from 1860 to the Present Day (Virago, 2007) 
Braithwaite, John, ‘Crime in a Convict Republic’ (2001) 64(1) Modern Law Review 11 
Breines, Wini and Linda Gordon, ‘The New Scholarship on Family Violence’ (1983) 8(3) 
Signs 490 
Bumiller, Kristin, In an Abusive State: How Neoliberalism Appropriated the Feminist 
Movement Against Sexual Violence (Duke University Press, 2008) 
 
Burke, Alafair S., ‘Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent’ (2007) 75(3) George 
Washington Law Review 552 
Burton, Mandy, Legal Responses to Domestic Violence (Routledge-Cavendish, 2008) 
Buxton-Namisnyk, Emma, ‘Does an Intersectional Understanding of International Human 
Rights Law Represent the Way Forward in the Prevention and Redress of Domestic Violence 




Capaldi, Deborah M., Hyoun K. Kim and Joann Wu Shortt, ‘Women’s involvement in 
aggression in young adult romantic relationships’ in Martha Putallaz and Karen L. Bierman 
(eds), Aggression, Antisocial Behaviour and Violence among Girls (The Guilford Press, 
2004) 223 
Carline, Anna, ‘Women Who Kill Their Abusive Partners: From Sameness to Gender 
Construction’ (2005) 26(1) Liverpool Law Review 13 
Carline, Anna and Patricia Easteal, Shades of Grey – Domestic and Sexual Violence Against 
Women (Routledge, 2014) 
Carson, Lisa and Kathy Edwards, ‘Prostitution and Sex Trafficking: What Are the Problems 
Represented To Be? A Discursive Analysis of Law and Policy in Sweden and Victoria, 
Australia’ (2011) 30(1) Australian Feminist Law Journal 63 
Chalmers, James and Fiona Leverick, ‘Fair Labelling in Criminal Law’ (2008) 71(2) Modern 
Law Review 217 
Charles, Nickie and Fiona MacKay, ‘Feminist politics and framing contests: Domestic 
violence policy in Scotland and Wales’ (2013) 33(4) Critical Social Policy 593 
Cobbe, Frances Power, ‘Wife-Torture in England’ (1878) 32 Contemporary Review 55 
Copelon, Rhonda, ‘Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture’ in 
Rebecca J. Cook (ed), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 116 
Crenshaw, Kimberle, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color’ (1991) 43(6) Stanford Law Review 1241 
Cunneen, Chris and Julie Stubbs, ‘Cultural Criminology and Engagement with Race, Gender 
and Post-Colonial Identities’ in Jeff Ferrell, Keith Hayward, Wayne Morrison and Mike 
Presdee (eds), Cultural Criminology Unleashed (Glasshouse Press, 2004) 97 
Currie, Dawn H., ‘Battered Women and The State: From the Failure of Theory to a Theory 
of Failure’ (1990) 1(2) Journal of Human Justice 77 
Dan-Cohen, Meir, ‘Decision rules and conduct rules: On acoustic separation in criminal law’ 
(1984) 97(3) Harvard Law Review 625 
Dasgupta, Shamita Das, ‘A Framework for Understanding Women’s Use of Nonlethal 
Violence in Intimate Heterosexual Relationships’ (2002) 8(11) Violence Against Women 
1364 
Dempsey, Michelle Madden, Prosecuting Domestic Violence: A Philosophical Analysis 
(Oxford University Press, 2009) 
126 
Deutsch, Helene, The Psychology of Women (Grune & Stratton, 1944) 
Dobash, R. Emerson and Russell P. Dobash, ‘The Nature and Antecedents of Violent Events’ 
(1984) 24(3) British Journal of Criminology 269 
Dobash, Rebecca and Russell Dobash, ‘Violence Against Women in the Family’ in Sanford 
N. Katz, John Eekelaar and Mavis MacLean (eds), Cross Currents: Family Law and Policy 
in the US and England (Oxford University Press, 2000) 495 
Dobash, Russell P. and R. Emerson Dobash, ‘Women’s Violence to Men in Intimate 
Relationships: Working on a Puzzle’ (2004) 44(3) British Journal of Criminology 324 
Dobash, Russell P., R. Emerson Dobash, Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, ‘The Myth of 
Sexual Symmetry in Marital Violence’ (1992) 39(1) Social Problems 71 
Douglas, Heather, ‘A consideration of the merits of specialised homicide offences and 
defences for battered women’ (2012) 45(3) Australian & New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology 367 
Douglas, Heather, ‘Do We Need a Specific Domestic Violence Offence?’ (2015) 39(2) 
Melbourne University Law Review 434 
Douglas, Heather and Robin Fitzgerald, ‘Legal Processes and Gendered Violence: Cross-
Applications for Domestic Violence Protection Orders’ (2013) 36(1) UNSW Law Journal 56 
Duff, R.A., Punishment, Communication and Community (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
Duff, R.A., Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Hart, 
2007) 
Dunn, Michael, Isabel Clare and Anthony Holland, ‘To empower or to protect? Constructing 
the “vulnerable adult” in English law and public policy’ (2008) 28(2) Legal Studies 234 
Dutton, Donald G., ‘The case against the role of gender in intimate partner violence’ (2012) 
17(1) Aggression and Violent Behaviour 99 
Dutton, Donald G., Andrew Starzomski and Lee Ryan, ‘Antecedents of Abusive Personality 
and Abusive Behaviour in Wife Assaulters’ (1996) 11(2) Journal of Family Violence 113 
Edmund-Davies, Lord Herbert, ‘Foreword’ in P.R. Glazebrook (ed), Reshaping the Criminal 
Law: Essays in Honour of Glanville Williams (Stevens & Sons, 1978) vii 
Edwards, Susan S. M., and Ann Halpbern, ‘Protection for the Victim of Domestic Violence: 
Time for Radical Revision?’ (1991) 13(2) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 94 
127 
 
Farmer, Lindsay, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order 
(Oxford University Press, 2016) 
Faulk, M., ‘Men Who Assault Their Wives’ (1974) 14(3) Medicine, Science, and the Law 
180 
Finch, Emily, ‘Stalking the Perfect Stalking Law: An Evaluation of the Efficacy of the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997’ [2002] Criminal Law Review 703 
Findlay, Mark, Problems for the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2001) 
Fineman, Martha Albertson, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition’ (2008) 20(1) Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1 
Fineman, Martha Albertson, ‘Equality: Still Illusive After All These Years’ in Linda C. 
McClain and Joanna L. Grossman (eds), Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women’s Equal 
Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 251 
Fletcher, Joseph, ‘Moral and Educational Statistics of England and Wales’ (1849) 12(2) 
Journal of the Statistical Society of London 151 
Freeman, MDA, ‘“But If You Can’t Rape Your Wife, Who[m] Can You Rape?” The Marital 
Rape Exemption Re-examined’ (1981) 15(1) Family Law Quarterly 1 
Fus, Theresa, ‘Criminalizing Marital Rape: A Comparison of Judicial and Legislative 
Approaches’ (2006) 39(2) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 481 
Gardner, John and Stephen Shute, ‘The Wrongness of Rape’ in John Garner (ed), Offences 
and Defences (Oxford University Press, 2007) 1 
Garland, David, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society 
(Oxford University Press, 2001) 
Gelles, Richard J., ‘Family Violence’ (1985) 11 Annual Review of Sociology 347 
Gelles, Richard J., ‘The Missing Persons of Domestic Violence: Battered Men’ [1999] 
(Autumn) Women’s Quarterly 18 
Glasman, Claire, ‘Women judge the courts’ (1991) 141(6496) New Law Journal 395 
Goodmark, Leigh, ‘Reframing Domestic Violence Law and Policy: An Anti-Essentialist 
Proposal’ (2009) 31 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 39 
Gordon, Linda, Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence – 
Boston, 1800–1960 (Penguin, 1988) 
128 
Gordon, Linda, ‘Women’s Agency, Social Control, and the Construction of “Rights” by 
Battered Women’ in Sue Fisher and Kathy Davis (eds), Negotiating at the Margins: The 
Gendered Discourses of Power and Resistance (Rutgers University Press, 1993) 122 
Hague, Gill, ‘Domestic violence policy in the 1990s’ in Sophie Watson and Lesley Doyal 
(eds), Engendering Social Policy (Open University Press, 1999) 131 
Haigh, Richard and Samantha Hepburn, ‘The Bank Manager Always Rings Twice: 
Stereotyping in Equity After Garcia’ (2000) 26(2) Monash University Law Review 275 
Hanna, Cheryl, ‘The Paradox of Progress: Translating Evan Stark’s Coercive Control Into 
Legal Doctrine for Abused Women’ (2009) 15(12) Violence Against Women 1458 
Harris, Angela P., ‘Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory’ (1990) 42 Stanford 
Law Review 581 
Hassouneh, Dena and Nancy Glass, ‘The Influence of Gender Role Stereotyping on 
Women’s Experiences of Female Same-Sex Intimate Partner Violence’ (2008) 14(3) 
Violence Against Women 310 
Herring, Jonathan, Vulnerable Adults and The Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 
Hester, Marianne, ‘Transnational influences on Domestic Violence Policy and Action – 
Exploring Developments in China and England’ (2005) 4(4) Social Policy & Society 447 
Heyrick, Elizabeth, Observations on the Offensive and Injurious Effects of Corporal 
Punishment; on the Unequal Administration of Penal Justice; and on the Pre-eminent 
Advantages of the Mild and Reformatory over the Vindictive System of Punishment 
(Hatchard and Son and Hurst, Chance & Co, 1827) 
Horder, Jeremy, ‘Rethinking Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person’ (1994) 14(3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 335 
Husak, Douglas, ‘The Criminal Law as Last Resort’ (2004) 24(2) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 207 
Husak, Douglas, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 
James, Colin, ‘A History of Cruelty in Australian Divorce’ [2006] Australia & New Zealand 
Law & History E-Journal 1 
Johnson, Michael P., ‘Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two Forms of 
Violence Against Women’ (1995) 57(2) Journal of Marriage and the Family 283 
129 
 
Kanuha, Valli, ‘Domestic Violence, Racism and the Battered Women’s Movement in the 
United States’ in Jeffrey L. Edleson and Zvi C. Eisikovits (eds), Future Interventions with 
Battered Women and their Families (Sage Publications, 1996) 34 
Keller, Sarah N., Timothy Wilkinson and A. J. Otjen, ‘Unintended Effects of a Domestic 
Violence Campaign’ (2010) 39(4) Journal of Advertising 53 
Kelly, Liz, ‘How women define their experiences of violence’ in Kersti Yllö and Michele 
Louise Bograd (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse (Sage Publications, 1988) 114 
Kelly, Liz and Nicole Westmarland, ‘Naming and defining “Domestic Violence”: Lessons 
from research with violent men’ (2016) 112(1) Feminist Review 113 
Lacey, Nicola, ‘Contingency and Criminalisation’ in Ian Loveland (ed), Frontiers of 
Criminality (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) 1 
Laird, Vanessa, ‘Reflections on R v R’ (1992) 55(3) Modern Law Review 386 
Lees, Sue, Ruling Passions: Sexual violence, reputation and the law (Open University Press, 
1997) 
Lewis, Ruth, Russell Dobash, Rebecca Dobash and Kate Cavanagh, ‘Protection, Prevention, 
Rehabilitation or Justice? Women’s Use of Law to Challenge Domestic Violence’ (2000) 
7(1–3) International Review of Victimology 179 
Lovecy, Jill, ‘Framing claims for women: from “old” to “new” Labour’ in Claire Annesley, 
Francesca Gains and Kirstein Rummery (eds), Women and New Labour: Engendering 
Politics and Policy? (The Policy Press, 2007) 63 
MacCormick, Neil, ‘Reconstruction after Deconstruction: A Response to CLS’ (1990) 10(4) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 539 
MacCormick, Neil, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, 
2007) 
Mahoney, Martha R., ‘Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation’ (1991) 90(1) Michigan Law Review 1 
Maroney, Heather Jon, ‘“Who has the baby?” Nationalism, pronatalism and the construction 
of a “demographic crisis” in Quebec 1960–1988’ (1992) 39 Studies in Political Economy 7 
McHoul, Alec and Wendy Grace, A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject 
(Melbourne University Press, 1993) 
130 
McMahon, Marilyn and Paul McGorrery, ‘Criminalising Controlling and Coercive 
Behaviour: The Next Step in the Prosecution of Family Violence?’ (2016) 41(2) Alternative 
Law Journal 98 
Mill, John Stuart, The Subjection of Women (Source Book Press, 2nd ed, 1869) 
Mill, John Stuart, ‘Civilization’ in Gertrude Himmelfarb (ed), Essays on Politics and 
Culture: John Stuart Mill (Doubleday, 1962) 51 
Miller, Casey and Kate Swift, Words and Women (Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976) 
Miller, Gale and James A. Holstein, ‘Reconsidering Social Constructionism’ in James A. 
Holstein and Gale Miller (eds) Reconsidering Social Constructionism: Debates in Social 
Problems Theory (Aldine De Gruyter, 1993) 5 
Mooney, Annabelle, ‘When a woman needs to be seen, heard and written as a woman: Rape, 
law and an argument against gender neutral language’ (2006) 19(1) International Journal 
for the Semiotics of Law 39 
Munro, Vanessa E., ‘Shifting Sands? Consent, Context and Vulnerability in Contemporary 
Sexual Offences Policy in England and Wales’ (2017) 26(4) Social & Legal Studies 417 
Munro, Vanessa E., and Jane Scoular, ‘Abusing Vulnerability? Contemporary Law and 
Policy Responses to Sex Work in the UK’ (2012) 20(3) Feminist Legal Studies 189 
Naffine, Ngaire, ‘Possession: Erotic Love in the Law of Rape’ (1994) 57(1) Modern Law 
Review 10 
Nagel, Thomas, The View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press, 1986) 
Nedelsky, Jennifer, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2012) 
Nichols, Andrea J., ‘Meaning-Making and Domestic Violence Victim Advocacy: An 
Examination of Feminist Identities, Ideologies, and Practices’ (2013) 8(3) Feminist 
Criminology 177 
Nussbaum, Martha C., Sex and Social Justice (Oxford University Press, 1999) 
O’Donovan, Katherine, ‘Law’s Knowledge: The Judge, The Expert, The Battered Woman, 
and Her Syndrome’ (1993) 20(4) Journal of Law and Society 427 
Pahl, Jan, ‘Introduction’ in Jan Pahl (ed), Private Violence and Public Policy: The needs of 
battered women and the response of the public services (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) 1 
131 
 
Pal, Leslie, ‘Missed Opportunities or Comparative Advantage? Canadian Contributions to 
the Study of Public Policy’ in Laurent Dobuzinskis, Michael Howlett and David Laycock 
(eds), Policy Studies in Canada: The State of the Art (University of Toronto Press, 1996) 
359 
Pauwels, Anne, Women Changing Language (Longman, 1998) 
Petersson, Sandra, ‘Gender Neutral Drafting: Historical Perspective’ (1998) 19(2) Statute 
Law Review 93 
Phillips, Ruth, ‘Undoing an activist response: feminism and the Australian government’s 
domestic violence policy’ (2006) 26(1) Critical Social Policy 192 
Pierobom de Ávila, Thiago, ‘The criminalisation of femicide’ in Kate Fitz-Gibbon, Sandra 
Walklate, Jude McCulloch and JaneMaree Maher (eds), Intimate Partner Violence, Risk and 
Security: Securing Women’s Lives in a Global World (Routledge, 2018) 181 
Pizzey, Erin, Scream Quietly or the Neighbours Will Hear (Penguin, 1974) 
Pleck, Elizabeth, Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy against Family Violence 
from Colonial Times to the Present (Oxford University Press, 1987) 
Ramsey, Carolyn B., ‘Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide Law 
Reform’ (2010) 100(1) Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 33 
Ramsey, Carolyn B., ‘Domestic Violence and State Intervention in the American West and 
Australia, 1860–1930’ (2011) 86(1) Indiana Law Journal 185 
Razack, Sherene, ‘What is to be Gained by Looking White People in the Eye? Culture, Race, 
and Gender in Cases of Sexual Violence’ (1994) 19(4) Signs 894 
Reece, Helen, ‘The End of Domestic Violence’ (2006) 69(5) Modern Law Review 770 
Renzetti, Claire, ‘On Dancing with a Bear: Reflections on Some of the Current Debates 
among Domestic Violence Theorists’ (1994) 9(2) Violence and Victims 195 
Renzetti, Claire, ‘Studying Partner Abuse in Lesbian Relationships: A Case for the Feminist 
Participatory Research Model’ in Carol T. Tully (ed), Lesbian Social Services: Research 
Issues (Harrington Park Press, 1995) 29 
Renzetti, Claire, ‘The Challenge to Feminism Posed by Women’s Use of Violence in 
Intimate Relationships’ in Sharon Lamb (ed), New Versions of Victims: Feminists Struggle 
with the Concept (New York University Press, 1999) 42 
Richie, Beth E., ‘A Black Feminist Reflection on the Antiviolence Movement’ (2000) 25(4) 
Signs 1133 
132 
Rumney, Philip N.S., ‘When Rape Isn’t Rape: Court of Appeal Sentencing Practice in Cases 
of Marital and Relationship Rape’ (1999) 19(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 243 
Schechter, Susan, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Struggles of the Battered 
Women’s Movement (Pluto Press, 1982) 
Schneider, Elizabeth M., Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking (Yale University Press, 
2000) 
Schneider, Elizabeth M., ‘Domestic Violence, Citizenship, and Equality’ in Linda C. 
McClain and Joanna L. Grossman (eds), Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women’s Equal 
Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 378 
Scutt, Jocelynne A., ‘Sexism in Legal Language’ (1985) 59(3) Australian Law Journal 163 
Segal, Lynne, Is the Future Female? Troubled Thoughts on Contemporary Feminism 
(Virago, 1987) 
Sheehy, Elizabeth, ‘Expert evidence on coercive control in support of self-defence: The trial 
of Teresa Craig’ (2018) 18(1) Criminology & Criminal Justice 100 
Sheehy, Elizabeth A., Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie, ‘Defending Battered Women on Trial: 
The Battered Woman Syndrome and its Limitations’ (1992) 16(6) Criminal Law Journal 
369 
Simester, A.P. and Andreas von Hirsch, Crimes, harms, and wrongs: On the principles of 
criminalisation (Oxford University Press, 2011) 
Simester, A.P. and G.R. Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine (Hart Publishing, 3rd 
ed, 2007) 
Sokoloff, Natalie J. and Ida Dupont, ‘Domestic Violence at the Intersections of Race, Class, 
and Gender’ (2005) 11(1) Violence Against Women 38 
Stark, Evan, Coercive Control: The Entrapment of Women in Personal Life (Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 
Stark, Evan, ‘Re-presenting Battered Women: Coercive Control and the Defense of Liberty’ 
in Maryse Rinfret-Raynor, Élisabeth Lesieux, Marie-Marthe Cousineau, Sonia Gauthier, 
Elizabeth Harper (eds), Violence Against Women: Complex Realities and New Issues in a 
Changing World (Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2014) 33 
Stephen, James Fitzjames, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (Liberty Fund, first published 1873, 
1993 ed) 
Stone, Deborah A., Policy Paradox and Political Reason (HarperCollins, 1988) 
133 
 
Storr, Anthony, Human Aggression (Penguin, 1970) 
Straus, Murray A., ‘Wife Beating: How Common and Why?’ (1977) 2(3–4) Victimology 443 
Straus, Murray A., Richard J. Gelles and Suzanne K. Steinmetz, Behind Closed Doors: 
Violence in the American Family (Anchor Press, 1980) 
Stubbs, Julie, ‘Domestic Violence and Women’s Safety: Feminist Challenges to Restorative 
Justice’ in Heather Strang and John Braithwaite (eds), Restorative Justice and Family 
Violence (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 42 
Stubbs, Julie, ‘Murder, Manslaughter and Domestic Violence’ in Kate Fitz-Gibbon and 
Sandra Walklate (eds), Homicide, Gender and Responsibility: An International Perspective 
(Routledge, 2016) 36 
Stubbs, Julie and Julia Tolmie, ‘Race, Gender, and the Battered Woman Syndrome: An 
Australian Case Study’ (1995) 8(1) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 122 
Stubbs, Julie and Julia Tolmie, ‘Falling Short of the Challenge? A Comparative Assessment 
of the Australian Use of Expert Evidence on the Battered Woman Syndrome’ (1999) 23(3) 
Melbourne University Law Review 709 
Summers, Anne, Damned Whores and God’s Police (Penguin, 2nd ed, 1994) 
Swann, Suzanne and David Snow, ‘The Development of a Theory of Women’s Use of 
Violence in Intimate Relationships’ (2006) 12(11) Violence Against Women 1026 
Tadros, Victor, ‘The Distinctiveness of Domestic Abuse: A Freedom Based Account’ (2005) 
65(3) Louisiana Law Review 989 
Tadros, Victor, ‘Institutions and Aims’ in Maksymilian Del Mar and Zenon Bankowski 
(eds), Law as Institutional Normative Order (Routledge, 2009) 83 
Tadros, Victor, The ends of harm: The moral foundations of criminal law (Oxford University 
Press, 2011) 
Tarrant, Stella, ‘Something is Pushing Them to the Side of Their Own Lives: A Feminist 
Critique of Law and Laws’ (1990) 20(3) University of Western Australia Law Review 573 
Temkin, Jennifer, ‘Towards a Modern Law of Rape’ (1982) 45(4) Modern Law Review 399 
Tolmie, Julia R., ‘Coercive control: To criminalize or not to criminalize?’ (2018) 18(1) 
Criminology & Criminal Justice 55 
Tuerkheimer, Deborah, ‘Recognising and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A Call to 
Criminalize Domestic Violence’ (2004) 94(4) Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 959 
134 
Van Ness, Daniel W., ‘New Wine and Old Wineskins: Four Challenges of Restorative 
Justice’ (1993) 4(2) Criminal Law Forum 251 
van Wormer, Katherine, ‘Restorative Justice as Social Justice for Victims of Gendered 
Violence: A Standpoint Feminist Perspective’ (2009) 54(2) Social Work 107 
Volpp, Leti, ‘Blaming Culture for Bad Behaviour’ (2000) 12(1) Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities 89 
Walby, Sylvia, Jude Towers and Brian Francis, ‘Is Violent Crime Increasing or Decreasing? 
A New Methodology to Measure Repeat Attacks Making Visible the Significance of Gender 
and Domestic Relations’ (2016) 56 British Journal of Criminology 1203 
Walker, Gillian A., Family Violence and the Women’s Movement: The Conceptual Politics 
of Struggle (University of Toronto Press, 1990) 
Walker, Lenore E., The Battered Woman Syndrome (Springer, 1984) 
Wangmann, Jane, ‘Gender and Intimate Partner Violence: A Case Study from NSW’ (2010) 
33(3) UNSW Law Journal 945 
Weeks, Wendy and Kate Gilmore, ‘How violence against women became an issue on the 
national policy agenda’ in Tony Dalton, Mary Draper, Wendy Weeks and John Wiseman 
(eds), Making Social Policy in Australia: An Introduction (Allen & Unwin, 1996) 141 
Weiner, Edmund S., and John Simpson (eds), Oxford English Dictionary (online ed, June 
2018)  
Williams, Christopher, ‘The End of the “Masculine Rule”? Gender-Neutral Legislative 
Drafting in the United Kingdom and Ireland’ (2008) 29(3) Statute Law Review 139 
Williams, Glanville, ‘Corroboration – Sexual Cases’ [1962] Criminal Law Review 662 
Williams, Glanville, ‘Convictions and Fair Labelling’ (1983) 42(1) Cambridge Law Journal 
85 
Williams, Glanville, ‘The Problem of Domestic Rape’ (1991) 141(6491) New Law Journal 
205 
Winters, Marianne and Isabel Morgan, ‘Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Intimate Partner 
Violence’ in Louise McOrmond-Plummer, Patricia Easteal and Jennifer Y. Levy-Peck (eds), 
Intimate Partner Sexual Violence: A Multidisciplinary Guide to Improving Services and 
Support for Survivors of Rape and Abuse (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2014) 234 
Wood, J. Carter, ‘A Useful Savagery: The Invention of Violence in Nineteenth-Century 
England’ (2004) 9(1) Journal of Victorian Culture 22 
135 
 
Wood, J. Carter, Violence and Crime in Nineteenth Century England: The Shadow of our 
Refinement (Routledge, 2004) 
Youngs, Jennifer, ‘Domestic violence and the criminal law: Reconceptualising reform’ 
(2015) 79(1) Journal of Criminal Law 55 
Zawati, Hilmi M., Fair Labelling and the Dilemma of Prosecuting Gender-Based Crimes at 
the International Criminal Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2014) 
Zedner, Lucia, ‘Regulating Sexual Offences within the Home’ in Ian Loveland (ed), 
Frontiers of Criminality (Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) 173 
 
B Cases 
Anderson v Anderson (1927) 44 WN (NSW) 9 
Atkins v Atkins [1942] 2 All ER 637 
Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v TGW [2017] TASCCA 1 
Garcia v National Australia Bank Limited (1998) 155 ALR 614 
King v King [1953] AC 124 
Lau v Director of Public Prosecutions (UK) [2000] 1 FLR 799 
Old Bailey Proceedings Online, Trial of Jane Colbert, 18 September 1854 (March 2015) 
<https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?id=def1-1011-18540918&div=t18540918-
1011> 
Osland v R [1998] HCA 75 
R v C [1991] 1 All ER 755 
R v Camplin (1845) 169 ER 163 
R v Draper (Unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Badgery-Parker J, 9 October 
1990) 
R v Henley [2000] Crim LR 582 
R v J [1991] 1 All ER 759 
136 
R v Jackson [1891] 1 QB 671 
R v Kontinnen (1991) 56 SASR 114 
R v M (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 770 
R v R [1991] 1 All ER 747 
R v R [1992] 1 AC 599 
R v Thornton (1996) 1 WLR 1174 
Usmar v Usmar [1949] 1 All ER 76 
 
C Legislation 
Acts of Parliament Interpretation Act 1850 (UK) 13 & 14 Vict, c 21 
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (UK) c 12 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (UK) c 37 
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) 
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) 
Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) 
Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) 
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) 
Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) 
Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK) c 33 
137 
 
Criminal Law Act 1827 (UK) 7 & 8 Geo 4, c 28 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) 
Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018 (Scot) asp 5 
Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates’ Courts Act 1978 (UK) c 22 
Domestic Violence Act 2018 (Ireland) 
Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 (UK) c 50 
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (UK) c 28 
Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill [HL] 2003 (UK) 
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) 
Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) 
Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) 
Interpretation Act 1889 (UK) 52 & 53 Vict, c 63 
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (UK) 24 & 25 Vict, c 100 
Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) 
Serious Crime Act 2015 (UK) c 9 
Serious Crime Bill [HL] 2014–15 (UK) 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) c 42 
Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 (Scot) asp 9 
 
D Government Sources 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Personal Safety Australia 2016, (8 November 2017) 
<www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/4906.0> 
Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fifteenth Report: Sexual Offences, Cmnd 9213 (1984) 
138 
Criminal Law Revision Committee, Working Paper on Sexual Offences (1980) 
HM Government, ‘Call to End Violence Against Women and Girls: Equality Impact 
Assessment’ (2011) 
HM Government, Call to End Violence against Women and Girls: Strategic Vision (2010) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97905/vaw
g-paper.pdf> 
Home Office UK, ‘Cross-Government Definition of Domestic Violence – A Consultation: 
Summary of Responses’ (September 2012) 
Home Office UK, ‘Controlling or Coercive Behaviour in an Intimate or Family Relationship: 
Statutory Guidance Framework’ (December 2015) 
Home Office UK, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on sex offences (2000) 
Justice Committee, Scottish Parliament, Stage 1 Report on the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) 
Bill (2017) 
Law Commission, Rape Within Marriage, Working Paper No 116 (1990) 
Law Commission, Reform of Offences against the Person: A Scoping Consultation Paper, 
Consultation Paper No 217 (2014) 
Law Reform Commission of Canada, Sexual Offences, Report No 10 (1978) 
Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Rape and Allied Offences: Substantive Aspects, 
Discussion Paper No 2 (1986) 
Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Rape and Allied Offences: Substantive Aspects, 
Report No 7 (1987) 
MacLeod, Linda, Battered But Not Beaten: Preventing Wife Battering in Canada (Canadian 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1987) 
Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 
Chapter 5: Sexual Offences Against the Person Discussion Paper (1996) 
Morgan, Anthony and Hannah Chadwick, ‘Key issues in domestic violence’ (Research in 
Practice Summary Paper No 7, Australian Institute of Criminology, December 2009) 
Morgan, Jenny, Who Kills Whom and Why: Looking Beyond Legal Categories (Victorian 
Law Reform Commission, 2002) 
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 8 April 1981 
139 
 
New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 29 November 2007 
New Zealand Law Commission, Review of Part 8 of the Crimes Act 1961: Crimes Against 
the Person, Report No 111 (2009) 
Office for National Statistics, Statistical bulletin: Domestic abuse in England and Wales: 
year ending March 2017 (23 November 2017), appendix table 30 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/domes
ticabuseinenglandandwales/yearendingmarch2017#coercive-and-controlling-behaviour> 
Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape (the Heilbron Committee), Cmnd 6352 
(1975) 
Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Rape and Other Sexual Offences, 
Discussion Paper No 131 (2006) 
Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland, Not Now, Not Ever: 
Putting an End to Domestic and Family Violence in Queensland (2015) 
Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code, ‘Report of the Taskforce on Women and the 
Criminal Code’ (Queensland Government, 2000) 
Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 18 November 2004 
United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 12 February 1850, vol 108 
United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 13 May 2014, vol 753 
United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 15 December 2003, vol 655 
Victoria, Royal Commission into Family Violence, Report and Recommendations (2016) 
Victoria, Royal Commission into Family Violence, Summary and Recommendations (2016) 
Victorian Domestic Violence Committee, ‘Criminal Assault in the Home: Social and Legal 
Responses to Domestic Violence’ (Department of Premier and Cabinet, 1985) 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) 122 
Webster, Kim, Darren Pennay, Rebecca Bricknall, Kristen Siemer, Michael Flood, Anastasia 
Powell, Violeta Politoff and Andrew Ward, ‘Australians’ attitudes to violence against 
women: Full technical report – Findings from the 2013 National Community Attitudes 
towards Violence Against Women Survey’ (Victorian Health Promotion Foundation, 2014) 
140 
Willis, Matthew, ‘Non-disclosure of violence in Australian Indigenous communities’ 




Abel, Stuart, ‘Violent Plymouth bully approached ex-wife a week after he was told to stay 
away’, The Plymouth Herald (online), 21 December 2017 
<http://www.plymouthherald.co.uk/news/plymouth-news/violent-plymouth-bully-
approached-ex-955791> 
Bevin, Edith, ‘Tasmanian man accused of preventing wife from making decisions, accessing 
joint accounts’, ABC News (online), 1 August 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-
01/tasmanian-man-prosecuted-for-alleged-economic-abuse/7679922> 
Campbell, Denis, ‘More than 40% of domestic violence victims are male, report reveals’, 
The Guardian (online), 5 September 2010 
<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2010/sep/05/men-victims-domestic-violence> 
‘Central Criminal Court, September 1’, The Times (London), 22 September 1854, 8-9 
Clarke, Chris, ‘Abuse Link to Striker’ The Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 14 July 2017, 13 
Duff, Antony, Theories of Criminal Law (2013) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/criminal-law/> 
Jabour, Bridie, ‘Annastacia Palaszczuk warned: don’t put domestic violence against men 
above women’, The Guardian (online), 19 October 2015 
<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/oct/19/annastacia-palaszczuk-warned-dont-
put-domestic-violence-against-men-above-women> 
‘Justifiable Homicide: Wife Shoots Husband’, The Argus (Melbourne), 29 April 1910, 6 
Molnar, George, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 21 March 1981, 12 
Nancarrow, Heather Rose, Legal Responses to Intimate Partner Violence: Gendered 
Aspirations and Racialised Realities (PhD Thesis, Griffith University, 2016) 
Remeikis, Amy, ‘Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk “changes language” about violence against 
men’, Brisbane Times (online), 19 October 2015 
<http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/queensland/premier-annastacia-palaszczuk-changes-
language-about-violence-against-men-20151018-gkc3e9.html> 
Silverman, Rosa, ‘When she threatened to leave, he threatened to kill himself: the story 





Thames Television, ‘The Right to Rape’, World in Action, 25 September 1989 
The Argus (Melbourne), 17 June 1864, 5 
The Argus (Melbourne), 9 May 1868, 5 
The Daily Telegraph (London), 17 December 1874, 5 
‘The Narrabri Tragedy: Inquest on the Victim’, The Argus (Melbourne), 4 February 1910, 7 
‘The Warrenheip Outrage’, The Argus (Melbourne), 27 July 1860, 5 
 ‘Wife Beating’, Ovens and Murray Advertiser (Beechworth), 9 January 1875, 7 
‘Wife Murder’, The Argus (Melbourne), 19 December 1862, 7 
